Opinion
Case No. CV 04-00358 ER (MCx).
September 15, 2005
ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW CLAIMS
The Court ordered the Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff's state law claims, based on the principles announced by the Court in Molski v. Mandarin Touch, 359 F. Supp. 2d 924 (C.D. Cal. 2005). After considering the Plaintiff's response to the Court's order to show cause, the Court has come to the following conclusions.
The Second Cause of Action for violations of California Civil Code §§ 51, et seq., 52, et seq., and 54, et seq.; the Third Cause of Action for violation of California Health Safety Code § 19955, et seq.; the Fourth Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se; the Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence; the Sixth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief are dismissed because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1367 (c) (1), (2) and (4).
I. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Federal courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims in the following circumstances:
(1) if the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, (2) if the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) if in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c). Since the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims in Molski v. Mandarin Touch and Jankey v. Yang Chow andMolski v. Kahn Winery, 2005 WL 1939705 (2005), at least two other judges have come to the same conclusion and have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over similar state law claims brought by Plaintiff Molski in two other cases. See Molski v. EOS Estate Winery, No. CV 03-5880-GAF (C.D. Cal. filed Jul. 14, 2005); Molski v. Hitching Post I Restaurant, Inc., No. CV 04-1077 SVW (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. filed May 25, 2005). Molski brings the same state law claims in this case, as well as state law claims for negligence per se and negligence. Because these state law claims raise novel issues of state law and because the state law claims substantially predominate over the federal ADA claim, the Court may properly decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under § 1367 (c)(1) and (2). Mandarin Touch, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37; EOS Estate Winery, slip op. at 5-6; Hitching Post I, slip op. at 15-17.
Though Plaintiff has pointed to several claimed remedial measures taken by Sport Chalet, in his other cases, he has caused letters to be written to the defendants threatening that, if they undertook remedial measures, they would be subject to claims for spoilation of evidence. There can be no stronger proof that he is not interested in the remedial measures provided by the ADA but in the recovery of damages under state law. Because the state law claims are the ones for which damages are available, they clearly predominate this lawsuit, and therefore, the discretion to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate here.
Molksi v. Mandarin Touch, 359 F. Supp. 2d 924 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
As Judge Feess and Judge Wilson have pointed out, Plaintiff's litigation history shows that he is involved in forum shopping, which provides another compelling reason to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims under § 1367 (c) (4). EOS Estate Winery, slip op. at 7-9; Hitching Post I, slip op. at 17-18; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965);Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1998).
As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, the District Court "should discourage litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping." Here, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for declaratory relief is included as part of his "means of forum shopping," and accordingly declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it as well.
Finally, the Court should consider whether declining to exercise jurisdiction serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness and comity. City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997). Although principles of economy and convenience may not be fully served if the federal claim remains, the principle of comity strongly favors dismissing the state law claims. See Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Court for the Central District of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1553 (9th Cir. 1994) ("When novel issues of state law are presented, though, considerations of judicial economy are not determinative.") (quoting Gingerich v. White Pigeon Community Schs., 736 F. Supp. 147, 149-51 (W.D. Mich. 1990)). As Judge Feess noted, "[s]ince it is apparent from Molski's track record that his federal claim is the least important of his causes of action, comity dictates that this Court consider his forum shopping tactics in determining whether to exercise its discretion to dismiss the supplemental claims." EOS Estate Winery, slip op. at 9. The California courts should be given the opportunity to interpret California law in this area, and this Court should discourage forum shopping by refusing to allow Plaintiff's "bootstrapping" of several predominating state law claims to the single federal claim.
Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and these claims are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve, by United States mail or by telefax or by email, copies of this Order on counsel for the parties in this matter.