Opinion
C.A. No: 05L-02-004.
Submitted: June 12, 2006.
Decided: August 14, 2006.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR ADDITIONAL DAMAGES DENIED.
Kevin P. O'Neill, Esq., Wilmington, Delaware for Plaintiff.
Donald L. Logan, Esq., Tighe, Cottrell Logan, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware for Defendant.
OPINION
Plaintiff, Paul Molloy, petitions this Court to order Defendant, Daystar Sills, Inc. ("Daystar"), to pay him additional damages, pursuant to 25 Del.C. § 2729(a). Molloy claims that Daystar's affidavit in support of its Petition to Discharge the Mechanics' Lien grossly overstated the disputed portion of Molloy's claim for breach of contract. Daystar argues that Molloy's request for additional damages after mechanics' lien has been discharged, and after judgment has been rendered on the merits of Molloy's claims, is untimely. For the following reasons, Molloy's petition is DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Molloy, a rough frame contractor, who does business as Frame Masters, entered an agreement with Daystar for work related to the construction of the Safe Harbor Hotel and Condominiums ("Safe Harbor"). Daystar was the general contractor, responsible for the overall construction of the project, and Molloy was hired by Daystar as a subcontractor.On February 4, 2005, Molloy filed a complaint, alleging that Daystar breached the parties' agreement. In support of his claims against Daystar, Molloy also filed a mechanics' lien against the Safe Harbor property. Upon Daystar's petition, this Court discharged the mechanics' lien on March 18, 2005, in exchange for a letter of credit. A bench trial was held in this matter on August 14 and 15, 2005, and this Court issued a decision on March 26, 2006, ordering Daystar to pay Molloy $40,898 for the work he performed. Daystar satisfied the Court's order in full on April 27, 2006.
The amount Molloy originally requested, $48,898, was reduced by $3,000 for invoices that were not approved by Daystar.
DISCUSSION
Upon a petition by the owner of a property or any party in interest, this Court must discharge a mechanics' lien if the petitioner deposits the disputed amount with the Court. The petitioner must also submit an affidavit establishing which portion of the claim is disputed. The non-disputed portion of the claim must be paid to the claimant before the lien is discharged. If the Court determines that the affiant has overstated the disputed amount of the claim, "the Court may, in its discretion, award damages to the claimant against the affiant in an amount up to twice the figure stated by the affiant to be disputed."
Id.
Id.
Id.
In this case, the affiant, David Sills, disputed all of Molloy's claims, which totaled $44,898. Molloy now petitions this Court for an award equaling twice the amount of the judgment entered by this Court, or $80,890. Molloy argues that he is entitled to the § 2729(a) damages, because this Court's decision on the merits established that Daystar wrongfully refused to pay Molloy's claims, as Daystar's defenses and counterclaims were meritless, conclusory, inconsistent, and unsupported. Moreover, Molloy claims that Sills' affidavit improperly makes a blanket statement, disputing all the claims.
Molloy's argument is not persuasive. Daystar's defense and counterclaims in this matter cannot be characterized as "grossly overstated." The parties had genuine disputes as to who caused the delay of the project, and who caused the additional, corrective work. Ultimately, Molloy prevailed at trial, because Daystar was not able to prove the majority of its defenses and counterclaims through a presentation of the evidence. Molloy refers to a few select quotations in this Court's Order to support his position that Daystar's case was baseless. However, this Court considered extensive testimony and evidence on multiple issues in dispute. Daystar's defenses and counterclaims probably could not be characterized as rising to the level in which additional damages are warranted. That issue, however, need not be addressed, because of the timing of Plaintiff's application.
Molloy contends that his rights to § 2729 damages are only triggered once judgment is rendered in his favor. Therefore, the argument goes, he could not have raised the issue until now. That is not supported by the language of the statute, which provides that "[i]f it is finally determined by the Court that the disputed portion of the claim has been grossly overstated by the affiant, the Court may, in its discretion, award damages to the claimant against the affiant in an amount up to twice the figure stated by the affiant to be disputed." The statute does not require that final judgment of the party's claims be determined before the issue of § 2729 damages can be considered. Taken in context with the purpose of statute, as a means to discharge a mechanics' lien, it is more logical to presume that the statute foresees a court imposing § 2729 damages at the disposition of the petition to discharge the mechanics' lien, not following judgment on the merits of the underlying claims.
§ 2729(a).
Molloy claims that he has raised the issue now, because it is his first opportunity to do so. That is not accurate. Plaintiff could have, and should have raised this statutory penalty claim as part of this trial presentation; or, at the very latest in the post-trial briefing which occurred. In that manner, the issue could have been resolved in the long course of time waiting for and analyzing the trial transcript; or, conceivably, in the course of a post-judgment Rule 59(d) motion, to be filed within 10 days of judgment. None of that was accomplished. The mere mention in pleadings and the post-trial briefing of "bad faith" on the part of Defendant is insufficient to preserve this issue for the present claim.
Additionally, though not necessary for this decision due to the foregoing, Plaintiff's claim appears to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, barring a second action on a cause of action previously reduced to judgment in a "prior suit" involving the same parties. That doctrine is not limited to issues raised and decided in the underlying action, but also includes those issues that might have been raised. Plaintiff's § 2729 claim is clearly such an issue. While Plaintiff's claim is asserted within the caption of the original action, it is an effort to seek redress on a claim which had been brought to judgment after extensive live and written proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the petition of Plaintiff, Paul Molloy, d/b/a Frame Masters, for additional damages from Defendant, Daystar Sills, Inc., pursuant to 25 Del.C. § 2729(a) is DENIED.