Opinion
B325012
12-14-2023
FRANCISCO MOLLEDA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LYNWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
Decker Law, James D. Decker and Griffin R. Schindler for Plaintiff and Appellant. Olivarez Madruga Law Organization and Paul Aguilar for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 21STCP01168, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
Decker Law, James D. Decker and Griffin R. Schindler for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Olivarez Madruga Law Organization and Paul Aguilar for Defendant and Respondent.
ZUKIN, J.
INTRODUCTION
Francisco Molleda was employed as chief of security at Lynwood Unified School District (District). The District terminated Molleda's employment after sustaining four out of the five charges of misconduct levied against him. The trial court denied Molleda's petition for writ of administrative mandate after exercising its independent judgment on the evidence and making its own credibility determinations. Molleda contends the trial court's findings of misconduct are not supported by substantial evidence. Molleda also argues the penalty of termination was an abuse of administrative discretion. Because we find no merit in Molleda's contentions, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following evidence was adduced from the administrative evidentiary hearing through witness testimony and admission of relevant documents. Because we will apply the substantial evidence test in our review of the trial court's judgment, we present the facts in a manner that resolves all conflicts and draws all inferences in favor of the District. (Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 387.) We note conflicts in the evidence only where they are pertinent to the issues on appeal. (Ibid.)
In 1993, Molleda began working for the District as a security officer. In 2014, Molleda was promoted to chief of security. In this position, Molleda managed safety procedures on District campuses and supervised approximately 50 employees, which included Paul Garcia, (then) assistant chief of security, and Martin Chavez, a campus safety officer. Molleda reported directly to Greg Fromm, the District's chief business officer (CBO).
I. Prior Misconduct
On July 30, 2013, Molleda received a letter of reprimand from the District for "Disregard for Proper Procedures &Expectations" after Molleda permitted an unauthorized event to take place on District property and allowed an off-duty employee to remain on site. On March 4, 2015, Molleda received a letter of reprimand from the District for "Disregard for Proper Procedures Resulting in Penalizing Costs to the District" after Molleda withheld the last paycheck of an employee resulting in the District receiving a penalty.
On December 14, 2018, Carlos Zaragoza, the District's director of human resources, and Nancy Hipolito, the District's former assistant superintendent of human resources (and then consultant for the District), met with Molleda. The meeting was held to discuss, among other things: his lack of visibility on campus; the need to report to his supervisor; and issues with attendance, which included taking extended lunch breaks and not making up the time for his required eight-hour workday. At the meeting Molleda was issued several directives as later memorialized in an email. Molleda was required to work eight hours a day excluding his lunch and was required to advise his direct supervisor (Peter Wong, the District's (then) CBO, and later, Fromm) if he was out, arriving late, or leaving early. Molleda was also directed to take other steps to ensure he was a "visible presence" on security matters.
II. June 21, 2019 and June 24, 2019 Absences
Prior to June 2019, Fromm told Molleda in person that he had to preapprove Molleda's absences. Molleda was permitted to request time off through Fromm's assistant, however, all requests still needed to be preapproved by Fromm. In the past, Molleda notified Fromm directly about taking a day off. As long as Molleda notified Fromm of upcoming absences, the actual absence claim form required for such a request was a mere formality and commonly signed after the fact. Molleda had a history of submitting such forms after the fact.
On June 14, 2019, Molleda emailed an absence claim form requesting two days off (Friday, June 21, 2019 and Monday, June 24, 2019) to Fromm's assistant. Molleda did not directly request these days off from Fromm. Fromm did not receive Molleda's request from his assistant and therefore never preapproved the request. Molleda took the time requested off anyway.
On June 21, 2019, Fromm was advised by his assistant that Molleda was not at work. Fromm contacted Garcia and asked about Molleda's whereabouts. Garcia did not know. When Molleda returned to work on June 25, 2019, Fromm discussed the unapproved absences with Molleda. Fromm later signed the June 14, 2019 absence claim as Molleda had already taken the days off and his absences needed to be turned over to payroll to deduct his vacation time. Molleda later denied he needed preapproval from Fromm for his absences. Rather, he asserted Fromm advised him to submit any absence claim paperwork via email to his assistant. Molleda stated it was not until June 25, 2019 that Fromm told Molleda to include him on these emails. Molleda acknowledged the importance of letting Fromm know when he was going to be absent from work.
On July 2, 2019, Molleda sent a text message to Garcia about his absences on June 21, 2019 and June 24, 2019. The text message read, "If you run into [Fromm], let him know that I may have told you about being off and you may have just forgotten, if that's what u recall or don't recall. If not, you will be known as the Lone Ranger. Thanks." Garcia interpreted this text message to mean that if he did not cover for Molleda, he would be by himself running security. Garcia felt this was a threatening message because at the time, he "was already doing a lot of work for [Molleda]."
III. Office Relocation
On July 1, 2019, Zaragoza and Fromm met with Molleda to discuss his unapproved absences. During the meeting, Fromm directed Molleda to relocate his office from the "bungalow" to the superintendent's office by the end of the week (July 8, 2019). Fromm wanted Molleda to relocate his office so that he would be more visible during working hours. After the meeting, Molleda contacted several vendors and advised them of the move.
Despite the directive to relocate offices, Molleda failed to do so by July 8, 2019. When Fromm texted Molleda that morning about his whereabouts, Molleda responded he had to move equipment and could not get a vendor to support him in time for the move. At no point did Molleda ask Fromm for more time to relocate his office or state any concern with the directive. Instead, Molleda let the deadline pass without any communication to Fromm. Molleda acknowledged Fromm gave him a directive to relocate offices but believed there was no urgency to move by a specific time. But Molleda had told Garcia he never intended to relocate his office.
Fromm and Zaragoza met with Molleda later that day. Fromm informed Molleda that he was being placed on administrative leave for insubordination of the directive to relocate his office, effective immediately. Cindy Ward, a security officer, collected all District property Molleda had in his possession, including his District-issued cell phone.
IV. Personal Use of District-Issued Cell Phone
It was discovered that throughout 2018 and 2019 Molleda was purchasing male enhancement drugs from Chavez, his subordinate. Molleda had multiple text messages with Chavez on his District-issued cell phone about Chavez purchasing the drugs in Mexico on his behalf. These conversations took place during working hours and some of the drug exchanges transpired on District property. Molleda had purchased these drugs ten to fifteen times from Chavez. Molleda admitted he did not have a valid prescription for the male enhancement drug. Molleda did not believe the drugs were illegal. However, this male enhancement drug was not approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and was not available in the United States.
Molleda would also send Chavez sexually explicit text messages on his District-issued cell phone during work hours. In addition, Molleda sent Chavez racial slurs and insulting text messages about fellow employees.
V. Extended Lunch Breaks
During the 2018-2019 school year, Molleda used his District-issued cell phone to ask Chavez and Garcia to have lunch together. Chavez's work hours were 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Chavez was afforded a 30-minute lunch break and two 15-minute breaks. He was not permitted to combine his breaks. However, Chavez would take lunch breaks with Molleda that lasted more than 30 minutes, sometimes more than an hour. Chavez and Molleda would take these extended lunches once or twice a month. Garcia's lunch breaks were limited to 30 minutes. Garcia would join them on lunch breaks that exceeded 30 minutes, sometimes more than an hour. During these lunches, they would talk about both work-related and personal matters. When Chavez took an extended lunch, he did not make up the time but still got paid for an eight-hour shift.
Molleda denied he was prohibited from taking a lunch break longer than 30 minutes. Molleda admitted he was told by Hipolito in December 2018 that if he took an extended lunch beyond an hour, he needed to make up the time because he was required to work an eight-hour day.
VI. Performance Evaluations
During his employment, Molleda received performance evaluations. From 1998 through 2003, Molleda was graded either "standard," "above standard," or "superior." The evaluations did not indicate any work that needed improvement.
A performance evaluation dated May 14, 2008 rated Molleda from "meets standards" to "exceeds standards." There was no indication any work needed improvement. A performance evaluation dated April 28, 2009, rated Molleda from "below standards" to "exceeds standards." The "below standards" rating pertained to regular attendance and observation of established work hours. A performance evaluation dated June 28, 2012 rated Molleda from "meets standards" to "exceeds standards." For regular attendance, the box was blank. For observation of established work hours, he was rated "meets standards." The evaluation indicated that one of Molleda's goals was to improve his attendance.
A performance report signed by Fromm dated July 1, 2019 rated Molleda "meets standards" in all categories, including regular attendance and observation of established working hours. The evaluation was based on Molleda's performance from December 26, 2018 to July 1, 2019. At that point, Fromm had been working with Molleda for six months. This evaluation was given prior to the District learning that Molleda was taking extended lunches with subordinate employees and using his District-issued cell phone for personal reasons.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Administrative Charges On January 23, 2020, Molleda received a notice of the District's intention to recommend to its Governing Board (Board) that his employment be terminated for violating the District's Personnel Commission Rules and Regulations (Rules). The District levied five charges of misconduct against him: (1) Molleda took vacation without prior approval from his supervisor on June 21, 2019, and June 24, 2019; (2) Molleda willfully violated a directive to relocate his office on July 8, 2019; (3) Molleda tampered with his District-issued cell phone prior to being placed on administrative leave in July 2019; (4) Molleda improperly used his District-issued cell phone to purchase illegal male enhancement drugs from a subordinate employee; and (5) Molleda took extended lunches with subordinate employees.
The Rule violations are as follows: inefficiency (Rule 60.800.1.A.2), insubordination (Rule 60.800.1.A.3); willful or persistent violation of the Education Code, or Rules, or the procedures adopted by the District or a department when such procedures are made known to the employees in writing (Rule 60.800.1.A.4); repeated unexcused absences or tardiness, abuse of leave privileges or absence without notification or authorization (Rule 60.80.1.A.10); work-related dishonesty, theft, willful misuse for personal gain, willful destruction or mishandling of District property, unauthorized use of District or student body property, theft, willful misuse for personal gain, or willful destruction or mishandling of office (Rule 60.800.1.A.14); violation of the District's technology use policy (Rule 60.800.1.A.27); and refusal to comply with shift assignments, working hours, or work locations (Rule 60.800.1.A.28).
II. Skelly Hearing
In response to the District's notice, Molleda requested a Skelly hearing. On February 12, 2020, a Skelly hearing took place. The Skelly officer concluded that the District had reasonable grounds to conclude Molleda engaged in the misconduct charged and to proceed with the proposed discipline of termination. On March 12, 2020, the Board adopted the officer's recommendation and Molleda appealed the decision to the District's Personnel Commission (Commission).
Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215, requires, before a permanent employee is disciplined, that the employee be given "notice of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline."
III. Evidentiary Hearing
The Commission appointed a hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The hearing took place on June 24, July 7, August 10, and August 27, 2020. The following individuals testified at the hearing: Carlos Zaragoza, the District's director of human resources; Nancy Hipolito, the District's former assistant superintendent of human resources; Cindy Ward, a security officer; Cozell Thomas, a safety officer at one of the District's schools; Martin Chavez, a campus safety officer; Greg Fromm, the District's CBO; Paul Garcia, then assistant chief of security; and Molleda.
After the evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer issued an advisory decision on January 11, 2021. On January 15, 2021, the Commission issued its final decision sustaining four of the five charges. The Commission found the District did not prove the third charge, that Molleda tampered with his District-issued cell phone prior to being placed on administrative leave. The Commission upheld the penalty of termination.
IV. Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate
On April 19, 2021, Molleda filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging that the District abused its discretion. After briefing, the court denied the petition. Judgment was entered in favor of the District and against Molleda on October 3, 2022.
Molleda timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
Trial courts generally review petitions for writs of administrative mandate to determine whether the respondent agency abused its discretion. An agency abuses its discretion if it does not proceed as required by law, its "decision is not supported by the findings, or its findings are not supported by the evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) Trial courts exercise independent judgment when reviewing administrative decisions affecting a right that is vested and fundamental. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 44.) Permanent employees have a vested interest in their employment. (Brush v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 120, 123.) When such a petitioner claims the findings are not supported by the evidence, there is an abuse of discretion if the weight of the evidence does not support the findings. (§ 1094.5, subd. (c).)
"The independent judgment test required the trial court to not only examine the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence in a limited trial de novo. [Citation.] The trial court was permitted to draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. [Citation.] At the same time, it had to afford a strong presumption of correctness to the administrative findings and require the challenging party to demonstrate that such findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence. [Citation.]" (Candari v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 402, 407 (Candari).)
On appeal, we "review the record and determine whether the trial court's findings (not the administrative agency findings) are supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's decision. [Citation.]" (Candari, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 407-408; Paxton v. Board of Administration of the Public Employees' Retirement System (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 553, 559 [trial court's findings must be upheld unless they are "'"'so lacking in evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable'"'"].) Our review of the penalty imposed by an administrative agency is limited to a determination of whether the agency abused its discretion. (Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 839, 851.) "'Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Schmitt v. City of Rialto (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 494, 500.)
II. Unapproved Absences
Molleda argues the trial court's findings that Molleda was required to obtain preapproval of any absence from Fromm and that Molleda failed to do so for his June 21, 2019 and June 24, 2019 absences are not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
On December 14, 2018, Molleda was directed in writing to advise his supervisor of any absences. Fromm was Molleda's direct supervisor. Prior to June 2019, Fromm reinforced this directive and told Molleda that he had to preapprove his absences. Admittedly, Molleda did not directly request preapproval from Fromm prior to his June 21, 2019 and June 24, 2019 absences. Rather, he sent an absence claim request form via email to Fromm's assistant only, and Fromm never received the request. Therefore, Molleda's request was never approved.
On appeal, Molleda disputes the method for requesting time off and contends that he did not need prior approval from Fromm for his absences. However, Molleda's position directly conflicts with Fromm's testimony and the directive that arose out of the December 14, 2018 meeting. (See Duarte v. State Teachers' Retirement System (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 370, 384 ["we cannot reweigh the evidence"].) Moreover, the Commission along with the trial court found Fromm's testimony to be more credible. (See City of Corona v. Naulls (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 418, 427 ["'we do not . . . determine the credibility of witnesses on appeal'"].) And contrary to Molleda's contention, any negligence on the part of Fromm's assistant in failing to give Fromm the absence claim form is of no consequence because Molleda was required to inform Fromm directly of his absences.
We also reject Molleda's assertion that his July 1, 2019 performance evaluation had any bearing on the trial court's finding. According to the performance evaluation, Molleda was in regular attendance and observed established work hours. Molleda's attendance assessment does not affect the finding that he failed to follow the District's directive and request time off as required. Molleda's challenge to his July 2, 2019 text message to Garcia is equally unavailing. Molleda contends he was not asking Garcia to lie for him about his June 2019 absences or threatening him in any way. The context of the text message suggests otherwise. The more reasonable interpretation of the text message, including the "Lone Ranger" statement, is that Molleda was asking Garcia to lie and cover for him. This is bolstered by Garcia's testimony that Molleda did not tell him he was going to be absent on those days. Whether or not the text message was a threat, it was improper and as the trial court found, detracts from Molleda's credibility as a witness.
We conclude Molleda did not meet his burden of establishing that the administrative record lacks substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that Molleda was required to seek prior approval from Fromm for any absences, and Molleda did not make such a request for his June 21, 2019, and June 24, 2019 absences.
III. Office Relocation
Molleda contends the trial court's finding that he failed to relocate offices in violation of his supervisor's directive is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
On July 1, 2019, Fromm directed Molleda to relocate his office by July 8, 2019. Despite this directive, Molleda failed to do so within the given timeframe. At no point did Molleda ask Fromm for more time to relocate his office or state any concern with the directive. Instead, Molleda let the deadline pass without any communication with Fromm. Molleda also told Garcia that he never intended to relocate his office.
On appeal, Molleda asserts he was under the impression that the July 8 date was not a mandatory deadline and in addition, it was an impossible deadline to meet. Molleda does not dispute that Fromm gave him a directive to relocate offices. Molleda's assessment that the deadline was not mandatory lacks any reasonable explanation or support. Moreover, Fromm's text message to Molleda the morning of July 8, 2019 inquiring about his whereabouts reinforces the conclusion that the deadline was firm. Also, Molleda's statement that relocating within the timeframe was impossible lacks credibility because he never communicated that concern to Fromm prior to the deadline.
We conclude Molleda did not meet his burden of establishing the administrative record lacks substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Molleda failed to relocate his office on July 8, 2019 in contravention of his supervisor's directive.
IV. Personal Use of District-Issued Cell Phone
Molleda also contends the trial court's finding that Molleda used his District-issued cell phone for personal reasons is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Throughout 2018 and 2019, Molleda used his District-issued cell phone to send text messages to Chavez, a subordinate employee, to purchase male enhancement drugs in Mexico on Molleda's behalf. The drugs were neither approved by the FDA nor available in the United States. Molleda engaged in these transactions on District property, during working hours, and using District property. Molleda purchased the drugs ten to fifteen times from Chavez. Molleda concedes he did not have a prescription for the drugs. Molleda also used his District-issued cell phone to send text messages that were sexually explicit, racist, and insulting to fellow employees.
Molleda does not dispute that he was messaging Chavez about purchasing the male enhancement drugs using his District-issued cell phone, during working hours and conducting some of the drug exchanges on District property. Nor does Molleda dispute the other inappropriate text messages he sent. Rather, Molleda disputes the illegality of the male enhancement drug. The Commission found, and the trial court agreed, that this drug lacked FDA approval and was not available for sale in the United States. In addition, Molleda did not have a valid prescription for the drug. Thus, by permitting Chavez to import the drug for him, Molleda's actions could have resulted in Chavez violating federal law.
We conclude Molleda did not meet his burden of establishing that the administrative records lack substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding he used a District-issued cell phone for personal reasons.
V. Extended Lunches with Subordinates
Molleda further argues the trial court's finding that Molleda took extended, personal lunch breaks with subordinate employees is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Garcia and Chavez were only permitted a 30-minute lunch break but took lunches with Molleda in excess of 30 minutes. At the lunches, they would discuss work-related and personal issues. While Molleda could have authorized extended lunches for Chavez and Garcia as their supervisor, he did not claim that he did so. On appeal, Molleda claims that Chavez and Garcia "were aware that taking extended lunches was discretionary" and "they could have declined to join Molleda without consequence." However, it can be reasonably inferred that Chavez and Garcia believed Molleda, as chief of security, had authorized them to take extended lunch breaks that were personal in nature. Thus, we conclude Molleda did not meet his burden of establishing that the administrative records lack substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding.
VI. Penalty
We have already determined that substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings. That leaves only Molleda's argument that the penalty of termination was a grossly excessive punishment and a manifest abuse of discretion.
As previously stated, "[i]n a mandamus proceeding to review an administrative order, the determination of the penalty by the administrative body will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of its discretion." (Magit v. Board of Medical Examiners (1961) 57 Cal.2d 74, 87; accord Bautista v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 869, 879 (Bautista).) "'Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed.' [Citation.] 'It is only in the exceptional case, when it is shown that reasonable minds cannot differ on the propriety of the penalty, that an abuse of discretion is shown.' [Citation.]" (Bautista, supra, at p. 879.) Molleda has not demonstrated that his termination was a manifest abuse of discretion.
The Commission carefully considered all the evidence before recommending the penalty of termination. The Commission reviewed Molleda's past performance evaluations and although sparse, they ranged from standard, above standard, superior, to exceeds standards. In his 2009 evaluation, the Commission noted that he received a below standard rating for regular attendance and observation of established work hours. The 2012 evaluation noted that Molleda needed to "improve attendance rate to 10% or less." The Commission determined that the evaluations prior to 2019 were too stale to have significant weight. Fromm's 2019 evaluation rated Molleda as "meet standards" in all categories, but the evaluation was based on a work period from December 26, 2018 to July 1, 2019, when Fromm had only worked with Molleda for six months. The Commission also did not give great weight to the 2019 evaluation because it was executed before Molleda was placed on leave and before the District discovered that Molleda was using his District-issued cell phone for personal reasons.
The Commission then considered Molleda's conduct that gave rise to the charges levied against him. The Commission found Molleda's conduct reflected "a pattern of disregard for District management's directives and a lack of respect for the District's rules, procedures, and policies." The Commission acknowledged Molleda's lack of significant discipline, other than two letters of reprimand, and the most recent email dated December 14, 2018. The Commission stated that the December 14, 2018 email was "sufficiently recent to inform Molleda of the work standards expected of him and [Molleda] should have been mindful of his work responsibilities, including his one-hour lunch breaks, and . . . cognizant of his visibility." Molleda also should have been mindful of Fromm's directives regarding leaves of absence especially after the email advising Molleda of the need to keep his supervisor apprised of his whereabouts. The Commission stated that after receiving the December 14, 2018 email and Fromm's verbal directives, Molleda should have worked harder to improve his performance.
The Commission found Molleda's most egregious violation occurred when the District discovered Molleda had directed Chavez to purchase certain male enhancement drugs from Mexico on his behalf. The conduct was problematic because by permitting Chavez to import the drug for him, Molleda's actions could have resulted in Chavez violating federal law. In addition, Molleda purchased this drug from a subordinate employee, and the drug was sexual in nature, and not appropriate for a work setting. Molleda also purchased these drugs using a District-issued cell phone and made some of these drug exchanges on District property, during work hours. Therefore, instead of devoting his time to keeping the District campuses safe, he "exploited and abused the trust bestowed upon him for his personal benefit."
Moreover, the Commission stated it was inexcusable for Molleda to take a leave of absence without complying with the District's policies, refuse to meet deadlines set by his supervisor, and exploit his position by taking subordinate employees for extended lunch breaks. When Fromm confronted Molleda about his absences, Molleda abused his position as a supervisor and asked a subordinate employee to lie for him. The Commission also stated it was egregious that Molleda threatened to ostracize a subordinate employee if he chose not to lie for him. Molleda further sent text messages with racial and sexual overtones to his subordinate.
As chief of security, the Commission found Molleda was held to a very high standard of care. He was required to keep the campus, students, and employees safe. He was allowed to detain students and enforce the District policies. The Commission stated that "[i]n order for the District to engage in . . . efficient and effective operations . . ., the constituents for which [Molleda] serves must believe and trust that the District's highest security [officer] is trustworthy . . . and adheres to school policies and procedures." The Commission concluded that "Molleda's conduct in the misuse and abuse of his position and equipment violated the trust bestowed upon him." And the male enhancement drug matter, "either alone, or in combination with the other acts charged, is sufficient to warrant dismissal."
Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the penalty of termination was an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The District shall recover its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: CURREY, P. J., MORI, J.