The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying both parties' requests for attorneys' fees (see Domestic Relations Law § 238, 237(b); Mollah v Mollah, 136 AD3d 992, 994; Klepp v Klepp, 44 AD3d 625, 625-626).
While we disagree with the court that tennis was not an agreed-upon extracurricular activity, since both the defendant and the plaintiff sought reimbursement for tennis-related expenses, the court properly found that the plaintiff either did not substantiate the tennis expenses (see Matter of Mayer v. Strait, 251 A.D.2d 713, 715, 673 N.Y.S.2d 777 ; see also Bushlow v. Bushlow, 89 A.D.3d 665, 666, 932 N.Y.S.2d 134 ) or claimed expenses that were not contemplated by the stipulation. The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying both parties' requests for attorneys' fees (see Domestic Relations Law § 238, 237(b) ; Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Klepp v. Klepp, 44 A.D.3d 625, 625–626, 841 N.Y.S.2d 883 ). The defendant's contention regarding that branch of his motion which sought to distribute the $300,000 escrow account in equal amounts to the plaintiff and the defendant is not properly before this Court, as the order dated December 5, 2013, upon which the money judgment was based, did not determine that branch of the defendant's motion.
Second, it must appear, with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed. Third, the party to be held in contempt must have had knowledge of the court's order.... Fourth, prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation must be demonstrated’ ” (Thimm v. Thimm, 137 A.D.3d 775, 776, 28 N.Y.S.3d 693, quoting El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d 19, 29, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340 [citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted]; see Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 993, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Wood v. Wood, 134 A.D.3d 1028, 1029, 22 N.Y.S.3d 499 ). Here, the father failed to sustain his burden because the evidence did not establish that the mother's actions with respect to the father's telephone communication with the children violated an unequivocal mandate contained in the settlement agreement or the so-ordered stipulation of settlement (see Matter of Hughes v. Kameneva, 96 A.D.3d 845, 946 N.Y.S.2d 211 ; Matter of Nelson v. Nelson, 194 A.D.2d 828, 598 N.Y.S.2d 609 ; Matter of Frandsen v. Frandsen, 190 A.D.2d 975, 594 N.Y.S.2d 87 ).
He did not request a hearing on the issue of an award of attorney's fees, and did not object to the resolution of the issue based on written submissions. Thus, he waived the right to a hearing on that issue (see Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 993, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Delijani v. Delijani, 100 A.D.3d 951, 952, 954 N.Y.S.2d 479 ). The court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for an award of attorney's fees, inasmuch as the plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for attorney's fees pursuant to the default provision in the parties' stipulation of settlement, which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce (see Garcia v. Garcia, 104 A.D.3d 806, 807, 961 N.Y.S.2d 517 ; Martin v. Martin, 92 A.D.3d 646, 937 N.Y.S.2d 886 ).
With respect to the order dated February 19, 2015, which granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for counsel fees based upon the defendant's contempt, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err in awarding the plaintiff counsel fees without first conducting a hearing. The defendant did not request such a hearing and, thus, he waived his right to one (see Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Delijani v. Delijani, 100 A.D.3d 951, 952, 954 N.Y.S.2d 479 ; Bogannam v. Bogannam, 60 A.D.3d 985, 987, 877 N.Y.S.2d 336 ).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. To find a party in civil contempt of court, the movant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that a lawful order of the court was in effect, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, (2) the appearance, with reasonable certainty, that the order was disobeyed, (3) that the party to be held in contempt had knowledge of the court's order, and (4) prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19, 29; Thimm v Thimm, 137 AD3d 775, 776). Once the party moving to hold another party in civil contempt establishes a knowing failure to comply with a clear and unequivocal mandate, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute the movant's showing, or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order (see Mollah v Mollah, 136 AD3d 992, 993). A hearing is required only if the papers in opposition raise a factual dispute as to the elements of civil contempt, or the existence of a defense (see Matter of Savas v Bruen, 139 AD3d 736, 737). Here, the petitioner, the current trustee of the testamentary trust of Claire S. Albertson Fitzgerald, deceased, commenced this proceeding to hold the appellant, a former trustee of the trust, in civil contempt for failure to comply with an order of the Surrogate's Court dated March 29, 2013.
To find a party in civil contempt of court, the movant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that a lawful order of the court was in effect, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, (2) the appearance, with reasonable certainty, that the order was disobeyed, (3) that the party to be held in contempt had knowledge of the court's order, and (4) prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation (see El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d 19, 29, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340 ; Thimm v. Thimm, 137 A.D.3d 775, 776, 28 N.Y.S.3d 693 ). Once the party moving to hold another party in civil contempt establishes a knowing failure to comply with a clear and unequivocal mandate, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute the movant's showing, or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order (see Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 993, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ). A hearing is required only if the papers in opposition raise a factual dispute as to the elements of civil contempt, or the existence of a defense (see Matter of Savas v. Bruen, 139 A.D.3d 736, 737, 30 N.Y.S.3d 673 ).
The defendant appeals. The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorneys' fees (see Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Le v. Le, 82 A.D.3d 846, 846, 918 N.Y.S.2d 377 ). We note that the plaintiff has not cross-appealed and, therefore, we review the amount of the award solely to determine whether it was excessive (see CPLR 5501 ; Hecht v. New York, 60 N.Y.2d 57, 61–62, 467 N.Y.S.2d 187, 454 N.E.2d 527 ).
Under the circumstances of this case, where the plaintiff was compelled to bring a motion to enforce the terms of the stipulation against the defendant and prevailed in doing so, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding her a reasonable attorney's fee (see Domestic Relations Law § 238 ; Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Patete v. Rodriguez, 109 A.D.3d 595, 599, 971 N.Y.S.2d 109 ; D'Anna v. D'Anna, 17 A.D.3d 400, 793 N.Y.S.2d 454 ; Lazansky v. Lazansky, 148 A.D.2d 501, 539 N.Y.S.2d 24 ).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, he waived his right to a hearing on the defendant's application for an award of an attorney's fee by agreeing that, although "each party retains the right to appeal any order of this court with respect to counsel fees," the parties' respective applications for an award of an attorney's fee would be "done simultaneously without a right to oppose or reply" (see Dow v. Dow, 80 A.D.3d 848, 914 N.Y.S.2d 410 ; Stricos v. Stricos, 263 A.D.2d 659, 692 N.Y.S.2d 801 ; Brodsky v. Brodsky, 214 A.D.2d 599, 624 N.Y.S.2d 960 ; see also Matter of Zaydenverg v. Zaydenverg, 151 A.D.3d 871, 56 N.Y.S.3d 531, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 04851, 2017 WL 2562628 [2d Dept.2017] ; Bengard v. Bengard, 5 A.D.3d 340, 772 N.Y.S.2d 526 ). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant's application for an award of an attorney's fee in the sum of $46,138 (see Domestic Relations Law § 238 ; Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Le v. Le, 82 A.D.3d 846, 918 N.Y.S.2d 377 ). The detailed billing records submitted by the defendant's attorney established that the fees were reasonable, and the amount of the award did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see Mons Pinto v. Pinto, 151 A.D.3d 715, 54 N.Y.S.3d 673, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 04434, 2017 WL 2454223 [2d Dept.2017] ; Pelgrim v. Pelgrim, 127 A.D.3d 710, 7 N.Y.S.3d 305 ).