Mollah v. Mollah

36 Citing cases

  1. Tara W. v. Yitzchok W.

    66 Misc. 3d 1223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

    Discussion In order for a movant to prevail on a motion to hold a party in civil contempt, he or she "must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect, (2) the order was disobeyed and the party disobeying the order had knowledge of its terms, and (3) the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct" ( Latterman v. Latterman , 174 AD3d 518, 519 [2d Dept 2019] ; see alsoEl-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan , 26 NY3d 19, 29 [2015] ; Shemtov v. Shemtov , 153 AD3d 1295, 1295 [2d Dept 2017] ; Mollah v. Mollah , 136 AD3d 992, 993 [2d Dept 2016] ; Casler v. Casler , 131 AD3d 664, 665 [2d Dept 2015] ; Lundgren v. Lundgren , 127 AD3d 938, 940 [2d Dept 2015] ). "Once the moving party makes this showing, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute the movant's showing, or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order" ( Latterman , 174 AD3d at 519 ; see alsoEl-Dehdan , 26 NY3d at 35 ; Mollah , 136 AD3d at 993 )

  2. Kudla v. Kudla

    173 A.D.3d 1149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    We agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to hold him in civil contempt. A finding of contempt requires clear and convincing evidence that (1) a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect, (2) the order was disobeyed and the party disobeying the order had knowledge of its terms, and (3) the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct (see Judiciary Law § 753[A][3] ; El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d 19, 29, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340 ; Matter ofMendoza–Pautrat v. Razdan, 160 A.D.3d 963, 964, 74 N.Y.S.3d 626 ; Matter ofHalioris v. Halioris, 126 A.D.3d 973, 974, 6 N.Y.S.3d 267 ). "Once the movant establishes a knowing failure to comply with a clear and unequivocal mandate, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute the movant's showing, or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order" ( Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 993, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; seeEl–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d at 35, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340 ; Matter ofMendoza–Pautrat v. Razdan, 160 A.D.3d at 964, 74 N.Y.S.3d 626 ). A hearing is required only where the papers in opposition raise a factual dispute as to the elements of civil contempt or the existence of a defense (seeShemtov v. Shemtov, 153 A.D.3d 1295, 1296, 61 N.Y.S.3d 278 ; Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d at 993, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ).

  3. Besosa v. Besosa

    172 A.D.3d 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    The defendant appeals.Contrary to the defendant's contention, he waived his right to a hearing on the plaintiff's cross motion for an award of counsel fees by not requesting a hearing (seeCastello v. Castello , 144 A.D.3d 729, 40 N.Y.S.3d 564 ; Mollah v. Mollah , 136 A.D.3d 992, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Delijani v. Delijani , 100 A.D.3d 951, 954 N.Y.S.2d 479 ).The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's cross motion for an award of counsel fees to the extent of awarding her the sum of $ 10,000 (seeFishman v. Solomon , 152 A.D.3d 570, 55 N.Y.S.3d 670 ; Mollah v. Mollah , 136 A.D.3d 992, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Le v. Le , 82 A.D.3d 846, 918 N.Y.S.2d 377 ).

  4. C.S.G. v. C.R.G.

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 50476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024)

    Here, plaintiff was compelled to bring this motion to enforce the terms of the Judgment of Divorce, and defendant has failed to rebut the statutory presumption that plaintiff, as the less monied spouse, is entitled to attorney's fees (see Mollah v Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994 [2d Dept 2016]). Plaintiff has submitted itemized billing statements as proof of the attorney's fees incurred by her, which establish the "extent and value of [the] services" rendered to her (see Yakobowicz v Yakobowicz, 217 A.D.3d 733, 737 [2d Dept 2023]).

  5. Cervera v. Cervera

    218 A.D.3d 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Under the circumstances of this case, where the plaintiff was compelled to engage in motion practice to enforce the terms of the stipulation against the defendant, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding reasonable attorneys' fees (see Domestic Relations Law § 238; Mollah v Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994; Matter of Rutuelo v Rutuelo, 98 A.D.3d 518, 519).

  6. Samaritan-Compass VI Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v. 1293-95 Rodman LLC

    217 A.D.3d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)

    In opposition, Rodman failed to refute Samaritan's showing and failed to establish a defense (see Mollah v Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 993 [2d Dept 2016]). To the extent Rodman believed that Samaritan was not following the terms of the order and license summary or that Samaritan's schedule was unworkable, its remedy was to move for a hearing, not to engage in noncompliance (see Peters v Sage Group Assoc., 238 A.D.2d 123, 123 [1st Dept 1997]; see also 1319 Third Ave. Realty Corp. v Chateaubriant Rest. Dev. Co., LLC, 57 A.D.3d 340, 341 [1st Dept 2008]).

  7. Wenig Saltiel, LLP v. Bozeman

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 50939 (N.Y. App. Term 2022)   Cited 1 times

    Plaintiff demonstrated that the judicial subpoena, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, had been in effect; that the subpoena had been disobeyed; that defendant had been served with the subpoena and thus had knowledge of its terms; and that plaintiff had been prejudiced by defendant's failure to appear at the postjudgment deposition (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d 19, 28-29 [2015]; Madigan v Berkeley Capital, LLC, 205 A.D.3d 900, 905 [2022]; Zeidman v Zeidman, 202 A.D.3d 893, 894 [2022]; Matter of Binong Xu v Sullivan, 155 A.D.3d 1031, 1032 [2017]). The burden then shifted to defendant to refute that showing, or to offer evidence of a defense such as an inability to comply with the order (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d at 35; Matter of Mendoza-Pautrat v Razdan, 160 A.D.3d 963, 964 [2018]; Mollah v Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 993 [2016]). Defendant, who defaulted on the motion, failed to meet that burden.

  8. Mitarotonda v. Mitarotonda

    171 A.D.3d 1040 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    "Child support payments may be suspended where the custodial parent unjustifiably frustrates the noncustodial parent's right of reasonable access" ( Matter of Jurgielewicz v. Johnston, 114 A.D.3d at 946, 981 N.Y.S.2d 733 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Rivera v. Echavarria, 48 A.D.3d 578, 852 N.Y.S.2d 236 ).Here, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination, without a hearing, that the defendant's child support obligation with respect to the parties' two sons was not terminated on the ground of constructive emancipation or interference with parental access. The defendant did not request a hearing or object to the submission of the issues based on papers, and thus, he waived that right (seeWerner v. Werner, 153 A.D.3d 759, 760, 60 N.Y.S.3d 330 ; Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 994, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Bandler v. Bandler, 58 A.D.3d 775, 776, 874 N.Y.S.2d 141 ). In any event, the defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the sons refused all contact with him (seeWerner v. Werner, 153 A.D.3d at 759, 60 N.Y.S.3d 330 ; O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 139 A.D.3d at 1028, 31 N.Y.S.3d 600 ; Marshall v. Marshall, 1 A.D.3d 323, 324, 767 N.Y.S.2d 54 ), or that the plaintiff deliberately frustrated or actively interfered with his relationship with the sons (see Matter of Addimando v. Huerta, 147 A.D.3d 750, 753, 46 N.Y.S.3d 168 ; Matter of Jurgielewicz v. Johnston, 114 A.D.3d at 946, 981 N.Y.S.2d 733 ).

  9. Estes v. Bradley

    167 A.D.3d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)

    Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have denied, as academic, that branch of the defendant's motion. As factual issues are presented, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a determination of that branch of the defendant's motion on the merits (seeMollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 114 A.D.3d 4, 17, 978 N.Y.S.2d 239, affd 26 N.Y.3d 19, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340 ). Moreover, although the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was for an award of an attorney's fee (see Domestic Relations Law § 237[a] ; DeCabrera v. Cabrera–Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881, 524 N.Y.S.2d 176, 518 N.E.2d 1168 ), we agree with the defendant that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding her the sum of only $10,000.

  10. Ciccone v. Ciccone

    166 A.D.3d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)

    Accordingly, we agree with the court's determination to grant that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to enforce this provision of the stipulation (seeKlein v. Klein, 134 A.D.3d 1066, 22 N.Y.S.3d 547 ; Stein v. Stein, 130 A.D.3d 604, 605, 12 N.Y.S.3d 284 ).Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff an attorney's fee in the sum of $3,500 (seeMollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992, 993, 26 N.Y.S.3d 298 ; Hackett v. Hackett, 115 A.D.3d 800, 803, 982 N.Y.S.2d 167 ; Pathak v. Shukla, 109 A.D.3d 891, 892, 971 N.Y.S.2d 455 ; Quinn v. Quinn, 73 A.D.3d 887, 899 N.Y.S.2d 859 ).The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.