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deeming facts not controverted by opposing party admitted
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No. CIV 05-0751-PHX-SMM.
May 14, 2007
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant Phoenix Union High School District's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 28) and Plaintiff Servina Molina's ("Plaintiff") Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Retaliation Claim. (Dkt. 33)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this Title VII action on March 10, 2005, alleging claims for sexual harassment and retaliation. (Dkt. 1) On October 13, 2006, after completion of discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 28) Plaintiff responded to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and filed a Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Retaliation Claim on November 16, 2006. (Dkt. 33) In turn, Defendant filed a Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 39) as well as an Objection to Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Facts (Dkt. 40). Plaintiff has not filed a reply in support of her Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or a response to Defendant's Objection and the time for filing such a reply or response has lapsed. Therefore, the Court will address the pending motions on the merits using the materials submitted by the parties.
The parties have had the opportunity to submit evidence and briefing, and the Court would not find oral argument helpful in resolving this matter. Accordingly, the Court finds the pending motion for summary judgment suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 56.2; Local Rules of Civil Procedure ("LRCiv") of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 7.2(f); Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1991) ("When a party has an adequate opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence and a memorandum of law, there is no prejudice" when oral arguments are not held on motions for summary judgment.)
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant requests that the Court accept their Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement ("Statement of Facts") as true because Plaintiff has not controverted any of their facts. (Dkt. 30) In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff "provided no independent factual support for the statements she advances as `facts.'" (Dkt. 40 at 1)When, as here, a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as required under Rule 56(c), "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). In addition, the Local Rules provide that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must:
[F]ile a statement, separate from that party's memorandum of law, setting forth: (1) for each paragraph of the moving party's separate statement of facts, a correspondingly numbered paragraph indicating whether the party disputes the statement of fact set forth in that paragraph and a reference to the specific admissible portion of the record supporting the party's position if the fact is disputed; and (2) any additional facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact or otherwise preclude judgment in favor of the moving party. Each additional fact shall be set forth in a separately numbered paragraph and shall refer to a specific admissible portion of the record where the fact finds support. Each numbered paragraph of the statement of facts set forth in the moving party's separate statement of facts shall, unless otherwise ordered, be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment if not specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the opposing party's separate statement of facts.
LRCiv 56.1(b) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff's Controverting Statement of Facts and Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Retaliation Claim ("Controverting Statement of Facts") do not comply with LRCiv 56.1(b). Plaintiff did not provide correspondingly numbered paragraphs for each paragraph of Defendant's statement of facts. Instead, Plaintiff provided a collection of notes, most of which were lacking any independent factual support; a few conclusory paragraphs that responded to Defendant's Statement of Facts; and, three exhibits. Therefore, the Court deems each paragraph of Defendant's Statement of Facts (Dkt 30), except paragraph nine (9), admitted pursuant to LRCiv. 56.1(b).
Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Controverting Statement of Facts does comply with LRCiv. 56.1(b); however, it does not controvert paragraph 9 of Defendant's Statement of Facts and is, therefore, deemed admitted. Defendant's paragraph 9 states, "[i]n order to diffuse the situation and to allow both Mr. Royer and Plaintiff to return to their positions and to focus on their job duties, the District transferred both employees to different high schools." (Dkt. 30) Plaintiff's response simply states, "Paragraph 2 and 9 of Defendant[']s Statement of Facts [are] false. Jeff Royer was not placed on Administrative leave." Apart from the unsupported assertion that paragraph 9 is false, Plaintiff does not address Defendant's statement or provide any independent evidence to contradict Defendant's statement. Moreover, the references Plaintiff cites do not address whether she and Royer were in fact transferred to different high schools. Accordingly, the Court deems paragraph 9 of Defendant's Statement of Facts uncontroverted and, therefore, admitted for purposes of resolving the pending motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
The following facts are undisputed.
Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant, was employed as a security assistant at Cesar Chavez High School ("Chavez") and her supervisor was a male by the name of Jeff Royer ("Royer"). On April 8, 2002, three female security employees — Plaintiff, Barbara Bennett, and Naomi Wilkerson — verbally accused Royer of sexual harassment and race and gender discrimination.
Defendant's Employee Conduct/Discipline Handbook ("the Handbook") specifically sets forth the procedure for making a sexual harassment complaint. According to the Handbook, for all complaints of sexual harassment, except when the designated contact person is the party alleged to have committed the harassment, an employee is required to file a written complaint containing all relevant information with the local administration. Neither Plaintiff nor Ms. Bennet or Ms. Wilkerson, ever filed a formal written sexual harassment complaint. At her deposition, Plaintiff admitted that she knew about the Defendant's sexual harassment policy and procedure
In addition to the Handbook, Defendant regularly requires employees to complete inservice training, which specifically includes training on sexual harassment. Royer completed Defendant's inservice training, on October 13, 2000, and August 10, 2001.
According to Plaintiff, Royer made only two sexually oriented comments to her, both of which were uttered on November 1, 2001. The sexually oriented comments were: (1) comments to the effect that she and Naomi Wilkerson, another security assistant, should get together in a sexual way, and (2) that she could pose for Royer naked on his desk. Plaintiff and Wilkerson stated in their depositions that these comments were made after Royer witnessed Plaintiff showing Wilkerson a picture of herself in a two-piece bathing suit in the security office. Plaintiff also alleged that Royer committed various acts of disparate treatment against the female security assistants; however, neither the pleadings nor the Complaint state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII. Plaintiff has only alleged claims for sexual harassment and retaliation.
The harassment accusation was not the only dispute involving Royer and Plaintiff at this time. At or about the same time the female security employees verbally accused Royer of harassment and discrimination, Plaintiff was accusing Royer of dating a Chavez student. Plaintiff approached Officer Adrian Giona ("Officer Giona"), Chavez's School Resource Officer ("SRO"), and Jose Arenas, Chavez Athletic Director, to report that Royer was dating a student. According to Officer Giona, Plaintiff believed Royer had falsely accused her of impersonating a police officer and she decided to report his sexual misconduct shortly thereafter.
In light of the circumstances existing between Plaintiff and Royer, Defendant determined that it was in their best interest to place both he and Plaintiff on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an external investigation. The placement of an employee on administrative leave with pay for the duration of an investigation was standard practice for Defendant and was used regularly to ensure that investigations were completed in a timely and unbiased fashion. Nancy Oyen ("Oyen"), Executive Director for Employee Relations/Legal Services, appointed Dr. Phil Berra ("Dr. Berra") as the external investigative officer to investigate all of the allegations against Mr. Royer. Dr. Berra investigated the allegations against Royer, and ultimately found that he acted inappropriately towards female security assistants.
Based on the investigative results set forth in Dr. Berra's report, Defendant issued Royer a written reprimand on May 14, 2002. In order to diffuse the situation and to allow both Royer and Plaintiff to return to their positions and to focus on their job duties, Defendant transferred both employees to different high schools. Both Plaintiff and Mr. Royer retained the same job positions, respectively, same pay, and were transferred to high schools within the southern portion of the District in the vicinity of Cesar Chavez High School.
Plaintiff has expressly stated that her Title VII claims relate only to Defendant's decision to place her on administrative leave, not their decision to transfer her to another high school.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.
A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment need not produce evidence "in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-88; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII provides that an employer may not "discriminate against an individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of [her] . . . sex[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court has made clear that sexual harassment constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).; see Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (citing Meritor). There are two types of sexual harassment recognized by the courts. The first, referred to as "quid pro quo" harassment, is characterized by a loss (either actual or threatened) of tangible economic benefits to the employee who rejects the employer's sexual demands. See Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995). The second, referred to as "hostile environment" harassment, occurs when there exists an offensive or intimidating work environment for employees of one particular gender. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995).
A. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's sexual harassment claims, arguing that there is no evidence showing that Royer made quid pro quo threats to her or that her job was affected by Royer's alleged comments. To establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, plaintiff must show that an individual explicitly or implicitly conditioned a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon an employee's acceptance of sexual conduct. Heyne, 69 F.3d. at 1478. Here, Plaintiff has not pled a claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment and has not advanced any arguments or presented any evidence to support such a claim. Notably absent from Plaintiff's filings is any claim that her job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, was conditioned upon the acceptance of sexual conduct. Rather, Plaintiff's allegations concern disparate treatment of female employees and offensive comments. Based on Plaintiff's Complaint and her summary judgment briefs, the Court finds that her sexual harassment claim is for hostile environment based on sex.
B. Hostile Work Environment
To establish a claim for hostile environment based on sex, plaintiff must prove that she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct, that the conduct was unwelcome, and that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1065 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991)). The work environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable [female] would find hostile or abusive, and one that the [plaintiff] in fact did perceive to be so. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22); see Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-80 (adopting a "reasonable victim" standard). The plaintiff must also prove that "any harassment took place `because of sex.'" Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
i. Objectively Hostile Environment
Courts look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. Occasionally annoying or merely offensive comments do not constitute sexual harassment; however "[s]exual or gender-based conduct which is abusive, humiliating, or threatening violates Title VII. . . ." Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994). "It is enough . . . if such hostile conduct pollutes the victim's workplace, making it more difficult for her to do the job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to stay on in her position." Id.
The evidence in this case, construed in Plaintiff's favor, shows the following. On April 8, 2002, three female security employees accused Royer, their supervisor, of sexual harassment and gender discrimination. At the request of Oyen, Defendant's Executive Director for Employee Relations/Legal Services, Dr. Berra was appointed to conduct an external investigation into the allegations against Royer. Dr. Berra investigated the allegations and found that Royer violated Defendant's polices regarding sexual harassment and standards of employee conduct. Specifically, Dr. Berra found that Royer "engaged in verbal interchanges of a sexual nature with specific female members." (Id.)
The `verbal interchanges' relevant to this matter arise from comments Royer made on September 5, 2001 and on November 1, 2001. On September 5, 2001, after learning that some of the female security employees had complained to Dr. McElroy about his behavior, Royer said, "I don't know what kind of problem you girls are having with the way things are run around here but nothing is going to change no matter what you guys say." (Dkt. 30, Ex. K 120:9-24). This statement was uttered over the radio used by the security employees to communicate with each other. The second incident occurred on November 1, 2001, after Royer witnessed Plaintiff showing Wilkerson a picture of herself in a two-piece bathing suit. After seeing the picture, Royer said, "Hey, 7. I'm ready now. I brought my camera. You can pose for me naked on my desk." (Dkt. 29, Ex. K 123:14-16) Later that same day, Royer said to Plaintiff, "Hey 7. Now you and Naomi will be all alone. Now you guys can get together. I would like to see the both of you together." (Id., Ex. K 127:17-24) No other sexually offensive statements were attributed to Royer. Based on the results of Dr. Berra's investigation, Defendant issued a written reprimand to Royer on May 14, 2002, and transferred both Royer and Plaintiff to different high schools.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim should be dismissed because her allegations, if assumed to be true, do not constitute the type of "severe or pervasive" harassment required to establish a claim under Title VII. The Court agrees.
Looking at all of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in Plaintiff's position, the Court finds that Royer's conduct was not of a severity or frequency to create an objectively hostile working environment. Royer's comments, while offensive, were not abusive, humiliating or threatening. The fact that the comments were uttered immediately after Royer saw a picture of Plaintiff in a bathing suit indicate that this was teasing, albeit offensive, inappropriate teasing. Moreover, only two sexual comments were made to Plaintiff and both occurred on the same day — the day Royer saw her showing the picture to Wilkerson. Finally, Royer's reference to the female security employees as "girls" was arrogant and chauvinistic; however, there is no evidence that he habitually spoke to the female employees in this way. As the Supreme Court has previously recognized, "[s]imple teasing, offhand comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Construing the evidence in Plaintiff's favor, there is no doubt that Royer made inappropriate, offensive comments to Plaintiff. However, these comments were isolated and not severe enough to render Plaintiff's workplace objectively hostile.
Defendant does not address whether Plaintiff established the second and third elements of the hostile environment sexual harassment claim: (1) whether the harassment was `unwelcome' and (2) whether it occurred `because of sex.' Nichols, 256 F.3d at 871-872. Having found that there was no triable issue as to the first element of the claim (that the workplace was not objectively hostile environment), the Court will also refrain from discussing the second and third elements of the claim.
ii. The Faragher/Ellerth Defense
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment, the Court finds that summary judgment on the claim is nonetheless warranted because Defendant has demonstrated both parts of the affirmative defense known as the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
Generally, an employer is vicariously liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. However, when no "tangible employment action" has been taken, an employer may raise an "affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The Faragher/Ellerth defense requires the employer to show: (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1999).
Here, the record unequivocally demonstrates that Defendant exercised reasonable care both to prevent and correct sexual harassment. Defendant promulgated an anti-harassment policy, which is contained in the Handbook. The Handbook defines harassing conduct and provides a specific reporting procedure. In addition, Royer completed Defendant's inservice training, which specifically included training on sexual harassment, at least twice before the alleged harassment occurred. Plaintiff acknowledged receiving the Handbook, reading the portions regarding Defendant's harassment policy and understanding the procedure for reporting sexual harassment. Precautions similar to the ones employed by Defendant have been recognized by the Ninth Circuit as satisfying the employer's burden under the first prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense to show that it exercised reasonable preventive care. See, e.g., Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2003).
Royer completed Defendant's inservice training on October 13, 2000 and August 10, 2001.
Defendant has also provided evidence to show that it took reasonable remedial measures upon learning of Royer's inappropriate conduct toward female employees. The day after the security employees accused Royer of race and gender discrimination, Defendant placed him on administrative leave. Defendant appointed an external investigator, Dr. Berra, to investigate the allegations against Royer. After a detailed investigation, Dr. Berra concluded "that Royer's treatment of females in the workplace was at times less than professional," that Royer used sexually derogatory language, and that Royer's "macho" attitude led him to the disparate treatment of males and females in the workplace. (Dkt. 28, Ex. D at 10) Based on the results of Dr. Berra's investigation, Defendant formally reprimanded Royer, provided Royer with additional training on their sexual harassment policy and transferred him to another school within Phoenix Union High School District.
Plaintiff has provided no evidence that explains why she did not follow the reporting procedures set forth in the Handbook. According to the Handbook, Plaintiff was required to file a complaint containing all relevant information with the local administration. Plaintiff admitted to being aware of the policies and procedure set forth in the Handbook; however, the Court finds that she did not file a formal written sexual harassment complaint against Royer. While Plaintiff asserted that she filed written complaint regarding the sexual harassment in her Controverting Statement of Facts, there is no evidence to support this assertion. Morever, in light of Plaintiff `s failure to adhere to the Local Rules governing motions for summary judgment, Defendant's statement that she did not file a written grievance, which was supported by the affidavit of Oyen, was deemed admitted pursuant to LRCiv 56.1(b). Thus, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff did not file a formal complaint regarding harassment against Royer. Having failed to provide any evidence that she utilized the available preventive or corrective opportunities, the Court finds that Defendant established the both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
Plaintiff produced no evidence capable of rebutting Defendant's Faragher/Ellerth defense. Rather, Plaintiff argues that Defendant may not assert the Faragher/Ellerth defense because she suffered a tangible employment action — namely, the administrative leave. A tangible employment action is defined as a "significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities." Ellerth, 524 U.S. 761. The allegations involving Plaintiff were not confined to the sexual harassment issue; around the same time the female security employees accused Royer of sexual harassment, Plaintiff accused Royer of dating a student at Chavez and attempted to have the Officer Giona, the SRO, charge him with dating a student. Defendant's decision to place Plaintiff on administrative leave was part of their standard practice and was used regularly to ensure investigations were objective and timely. Moreover, Plaintiff admits that she received full pay while she was on leave and she retained the same position and responsibilities upon her return to work. Because Plaintiff did not experience a tangible employment action, the Court finds that the Faragher/Ellerth defense does apply to her claim.
Although at trial the burden of proving the Faragher/Ellerth defense would rest on Defendant, Plaintiff needed to produce evidence capable of rebutting it to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff has not done so and the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim.
II. RETALIATION
Title VII "prohibits retaliation against an employee `because [she] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice'" by Title VII. Nelson v. Pima Cmty. College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). A plaintiff makes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by producing evidence that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, that the employer subjected her to a materially adverse action, and that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has explained that "the requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence." Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (2002) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).
Defendant moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim, arguing that no materially adverse action was taken against Plaintiff. In turn, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to liability on the retaliation claim and argued that Defendant's decision to place her on administrative leave constituted an adverse action for retaliation purposes. According to Plaintiff, she was placed on leave after filing a complaint with the SRO, which was also the same day other female security employees filed a sexual harassment complaint against Royer. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's actions "had a chilling effect on those sexually harassed and were designed to prevent them from raising such claims in the future." (Dkt 33 at 17) Defendant does not dispute these facts, but disputes Plaintiff's claim that their actions had a chilling effect on victims of harassment. Defendant produced evidence demonstrating that the placement of an employee on paid administrative leave for the duration of an investigation was a standard practice "used regularly to ensure that District investigations were completed in a timely and unbiased fashion." This fact was not controverted by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts that the retaliation occurred prior to her transfer to South Mountain High School. (Dkt. 33 at 17) Therefore, the Court's analysis of her retaliation claim will be confined to her placement on administrative leave.
A materially adverse action is an act that is likely to deter a reasonable employee from making or supporting a claim of discrimination. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). As the Supreme Court has said, "[c]ontext matters" when analyzing the significance of a given act of retaliation. Id. The evidence in this case, construed in Plaintiff's favor, does not create a triable issue as to whether Defendant's placement of Plaintiff on paid administrative leave constituted a materially adverse action. At the time Plaintiff was placed on leave, her relationship with Royer had taken an antagonistic turn and the situation between the two was becoming unmanageable. For example, approximately a week before Plaintiff was placed on leave, Royer was accused of dating a Chavez student. The source of the allegation informed Dr. McElroy that she received the information from Plaintiff's daughter. The day before Plaintiff was placed on leave, three Chavez female security employees accused Royer of race and gender discrimination. That same day, the Chavez Athletic Director informed Dr. McElroy that Plaintiff had made serious accusations about Royer's professional and personal life. On the day Plaintiff and Royer were placed on leave, Officer Giona informed Dr. McElroy that Plaintiff had asked her to charge Royer with dating a Chavez student. According Officer Giona, Plaintiff believed Royer had accused her of impersonating a police officer and informed her that she had evidence of sexual misconduct by Royer with a student. Given the severity of the allegations, Defendant appointed an outside investigator to investigate whether Royer had dated a student and whether he had engaged in race and gender discrimination. Defendant also determined that it was in their best interest to place both Plaintiff and Royer on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of the investigation. In light of the turbulent situation at Chavez, the Court finds that Defendant's placement of Plaintiff on paid administrative leave was not a materially adverse action. Plaintiff and Royer were involved in an acrimonious dispute that was becoming increasingly antagonistic. Moreover, while Plaintiff was the only female security assistant placed on administrative leave during the external investigation, she was not the only female security assistant that complained of sexual discrimination. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant's decision to place Plaintiff on paid administrative leave would not deter a reasonable employee from making or supporting a claim of discrimination. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claim because the evidence, construed in her favor, fails to establish that she was subjected to a material adverse action.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, in light of the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 28) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Retaliation Claim (Dkt. 33) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.