In the present case, discussions between the employees and the School District's attorney clearly were not meetings pursuant to section 286.011(1) because neither employee was a school board member or part of a decision-making committee. SeeMolina v. City of Miami , 837 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (concluding that the Sunshine Law did not apply to staff members who serve in a fact-finding, advisory capacity); Knox v. Dist. Sch. Bd. of Brevard , 821 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that where a "school board delegates a portion of its decision-making authority to an advisory group, those meetings must be open to the public," but a school board's staff is typically not subject to the Sunshine Law (citing Blackford v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty. , 375 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979) )). Therefore, their meetings were not public meetings pursuant to the Sunshine Law.

Instead, these meetings were held solely for the purpose of gathering information. See Molina v. City of Miami , 837 So.2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) ("In short, the committee is nothing more than a meeting of staff members who serve in a fact-finding, advisory capacity to the chief. The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law is not applicable to meetings of staffers serving this function.

Affirmed. See Molina v. City of Miami, 837 So.2d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).

The Fifth District held, "A Sunshine violation does not occur when a governmental executive uses staff for a fact-finding and advisory function in fulfilling his or her duties." Id. at 315; see a/so Molina v. City of Miami, 837 So.2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that meetings of the Discharge of Firearms Review Committee were not subject to Sunshine Law where committee makes factual findings and passes those findings on to chief of police). In the present case, the memoranda were reviewed by senior officials in the Sheriff's Office, who could write comments on the memoranda, and the Sheriff then reviewed the memoranda.