Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2585-CM
June 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Anthony Molina brough this action requesting injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants Brent Kemnitz and George Stephenson. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted to the extent that plaintiff asserted a cause of action against defendants in their official capacities (Doc. 30). The court allowed plaintiff's case to go forward against defendants in their individual capacities. The court also granted summary judgment to plaintiff, enjoining defendants from proceeding against plaintiff in state court to seek involuntary dismissal or contempt based on plaintiff's filing of his cause of action in federal court (Doc. 32). Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal (Doc. 33). This matter is before the court on plaintiff's Motion for Certification of Frivolous Appeal (Doc. 48).
Defendant Benjamin Christensen has since been voluntarily dismissed.
I. Background
Plaintiff was a student at the University of Evansville, Indiana, and a member of its intercollegiate baseball team. On April 23, 1999, plaintiff participated in a regularly scheduled game between the University of Evansville and Wichita State University. While plaintiff was warming up to be the lead-off batter, he was struck with a baseball thrown by defendant Christensen who was, at the time, throwing warm-up pitches.
Plaintiff initially brought suit against Ben Christensen and Wichita State University in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas. Plaintiff's claims against Wichita State University for negligence were based upon the actions of it employees, defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson. Defendant Kemnitz was the pitching coach for the Wichita State University baseball team, and defendant Stephenson was the head coach.
On Wichita State University's motion for summary judgment, the state court ruled that Wichita State University was immune from liability pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6104(o). Plaintiff then moved to dismiss without prejudice the remaining case against defendant Christensen. The state court ruled that plaintiff would be allowed to dismiss without prejudice, but further ordered, "(2) Any subsequent action commenced by the plaintiff against this defendant arising out of this incident shall only be filed in Sedgwick County District Court."
Later, plaintiff brought suit in this court, naming Christensen, Kemnitz, and Stephenson as defendants. Plaintiff requested that this court enjoin defendants from utilizing the state courts of Kansas in any manner that would seek to punish plaintiff for pursuing his cause of action in federal court or that would deprive plaintiff of his cause of action in federal court. Plaintiff also sought declaratory relief by requesting the court to declare that it had jurisdiction over plaintiff's action and that plaintiff has a right to pursue this cause of action in federal court. Finally, plaintiff sought the right to file a proposed complaint, alleging that defendants were negligent and that plaintiff was damaged as a result thereof.
On defendant's motion to dismiss, the court presumed that plaintiff sued defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The court held that any claims against defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court further held that neither the Eleventh Amendment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, nor the Younger abstention doctrine precluded plaintiff from pursing his claims against defendants in their individual capacities.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a party which lost in state court from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment violated the loser's federal rights. Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923).
The Younger abstention doctrine counsels federal court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
On plaintiff's summary judgment motion, the court granted plaintiff declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the court declared that plaintiff has a right to utilize the federal courts for purposes of pursuing his diversity action against defendants. The court also enjoined defendants from proceeding against plaintiff in the state court to seek involuntary dismissal or contempt based on plaintiff's filing of his cause of action in federal court.
Defendants have appealed both orders to the Tenth Circuit. Defendants contend that the court's order granting plaintiff summary judgment is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or an interlocutory order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Defendants also assert that, in the alternative, the order partially denying defendants' motion to dismiss is appealable pursuant to § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, which allows immediate appeals from the denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity. In response, plaintiff filed the instant motion, requesting the court to certify defendant's appeal as frivolous and retain jurisdiction over the case.
II. Discussion
Ordinarily, the filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction upon the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Because this divestiture of jurisdiction is subject to abuse and can unreasonably delay trial, the Tenth Circuit set forth a procedure by which a district court may maintain jurisdiction over a case if the court certifies that the party's appeal is frivolous. See United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 937 (10th Cir. 1982). Once a district court certifies an appeal as frivolous, and thereby regains jurisdiction, both the district court and court of appeals have jurisdiction to proceed. Id.
A. Appeal of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
An interlocutory appeal from an order refusing to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds relates to the entire action and, therefore, divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with any part of the action against an appealing defendant. Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1990). In Stewart, the Tenth Circuit recognized that a district court may certify an appeal as frivolous when a defendant appeals the issue of qualified immunity. Id. In this case, defendants appeal the district court's order denying them Eleventh Amendment immunity in their individual capacities.
As a general rule, suits seeking damages from state officials in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). "[A] suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999). However, if the state is obligated to pay any damage award entered against the state official, the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit. Cornforth v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
Plaintiff argues that defendants' appeal is frivolous because defendants have never argued that a suit against them in their individual capacities would have an effect on the State of Kansas. In other words, plaintiff claims that defendants must show that the state is obligated to pay any damage award entered against them in order to implicate Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court agrees that defendants have failed to make such a showing at this stage. However, in these circumstances, the court declines to certify defendants' appeal as frivolous without the benefit of knowing whether the state is in fact obligated to pay a damage award.
B. Appeal of Injunctive Relief
Defendants have appealed the court's summary judgment order granting plaintiff injunctive relief. Plaintiff argues that defendants' appeal of the court's order is frivolous.
Defendants argue that the court's order is appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which vests appellate courts jurisdiction from "final decisions" of the district courts. Plaintiff contends that the court's order does not constitute a final decision and is, therefore, not appealable under § 1291. Defendants also assert that the court's order is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which vests appellate courts jurisdiction from interlocutory orders granting or denying injunctions. Specifically, an order that prohibits a party from pursuing litigation in another court is an injunction for purposes of interlocutory appeal. MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 962 F.2d 978, 981 (10th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff contends that the court's order does not prohibit a party from pursing litigation in another court and, therefore, is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1).
The court concludes it is inappropriate to certify as frivolous defendants' appeal of this court's injunctive order. It appears that the only circumstances in which the Tenth Circuit has approved of district courts certifying appeals as frivolous are where the issues of double jeopardy or immunity are appealed. See Hines, 689 F.2d at 937 (double jeopardy); Stewart, 915 F.2d at 576 (qualified immunity). Moreover, it generally is not the duty of a district court to determine whether an appellate court has jurisdiction over an appeal. Rather, the Tenth Circuit should decide whether defendants properly appealed this court's order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Certification of Frivolous Appeal (Doc. 48) is denied.