Opinion
C/A No. 0:17-1215-MGL-PJG
06-29-2017
Ramon Luis Molina-Quintero, Petitioner, v. Warden G. Ramirez, FCI - Williamsburg, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The petitioner, Ramon Luis Molina-Quintero, a self-represented federal prisoner confined at FCI Williamsburg, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Petition in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner indicates he is a federal prisoner, confined at FCI Williamsburg. Prison officials charged Petitioner with use of narcotics on February 1, 2016 after a urine sample he provided one week earlier tested positive for Buprenorphine, a narcotic. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Petitioner's medical records did not indicate that he was prescribed any medication which would cause a positive test for Buprenorphine. (Id.) Petitioner was provided with a copy of the incident report, and a hearing before a disciplinary officer was held on February 8, 2016. (Id. at 10.) At the hearing, Petitioner told the hearing officer that he took a pill from another inmate to relieve pain, but that he does not use drugs. (Id. at 10-11.) The hearing officer reviewed the evidence against Petitioner—a chain of custody form for Petitioner's urine sample that included Petitioner's signature verifying that the sample was his and was sealed in his presence; the laboratory results showing Petitioner's sample tested positive for Buprenorphine; Petitioner's medical records that indicated he was not prescribed or given any medication that would cause his sample to test positive for Buprenorphine; and the incident report created by the reporting officer. (Id. at 11.) The hearing officer found the greater weight of the evidence showed that Petitioner committed the prohibited act of using narcotics. (Id.) The hearing officer sanctioned Petitioner by imposing disciplinary segregation, disallowing good conduct time, and revoking visiting privileges. (Id.)
Petitioner indicates he exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing the hearing officer's decision to the Federal Bureau of Prison's regional and central offices. The claim Petitioner raised in his administrative appeals, and the claim he raises to this court, is that his right to due process was violated because the evidence relied upon by the hearing officer was insufficient to show Petitioner committed the charged offense. Specifically, Petitioner claims the disciplinary hearing officer amended the disciplinary hearing report "to fit facts that found [Petitioner] guilty of the disciplinary action." (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Petitioner asks the court to dismiss the disciplinary action and remove the sanctions imposed by the hearing officer.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in this case pursuant to the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
B. Analysis
Prison disciplinary proceedings which implicate a protected liberty interest demand due process, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and here, Petitioner alleges he lost good conduct time as a result of the disciplinary conviction for use of narcotics. Thus, to satisfy due process requirements under Wolff, Petitioner was entitled to the following: (1) written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours in advance of the hearing; (2) written findings as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) the right to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense, provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals.; and (4) a fair and impartial tribunal. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67. Due process is satisfied as long as there is "some evidence" supporting the disciplinary hearing officer's findings. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). "Ascertaining whether this [due process] standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id. at 455-56.
Here, Petitioner asserts the disciplinary hearing report prepared by the hearing officer contained three facts that were used as a basis to find that Petitioner was guilty of the conduct charged, when they in fact referenced other inmates, in violation of his right to due process. He attaches the disciplinary hearing report to the Petition to demonstrate that the report did not implicate him. (ECF No. 1-1 at 8-9.) First, Petitioner points out that the report refers to a urine sample that was not his. Second, Petitioner points out that the report stated it considered the statement of the charged inmate, but referred to an inmate named "Vidal-Mal" rather than Petitioner. Third, Petitioner points out that the report references medical records from an inmate named "Gatlin" in a list of documents considered as evidence at the hearing. Petitioner contends these errors are "exculpatory evidence" and the evidence relied upon by the disciplinary hearing officer to convict him was insufficient to implicate him in the charged conduct. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 4.)
The laboratory that tested the urine sample labeled Petitioner's sample as "BOP0001955492." In the disciplinary hearing report, Petitioner's urine sample is referenced five times, but in one of the instances, the sample number is incorrectly listed as "BOP0001955497."
However, the court finds that the errors identified by Petitioner did not contradict the evidence of Petitioner's guilt identified by the hearing officer in the report—Petitioner's urine sample, supported by a proper chain of custody, that tested positive for a narcotic; Petitioner's medical records showing he was not prescribed or provided any medication that would test positive for narcotics; the reporting officer's report; and Petitioner's statement at the hearing that he took a pill given to him by a fellow inmate to treat his pain. (ECF No. 1-1 at 9.) Accordingly, Petitioner was provided with "written findings as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action" as required by the Due Process Clause, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, and, the disciplinary hearing officer's report detailed at least some evidence of Petitioner's guilt. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. The court therefore concludes that Petitioner has failed to show a violation of his due process rights in connection with his disciplinary hearing.
Moreover, the hearing officer amended the report to fix the three errors after Petitioner raised this issue in an administrative appeal. Petitioner attached the amended version of the disciplinary hearing report that corrected the three errors identified above, which appear to be nothing more than scrivener's errors. (ECF No. 1-1 at 10-11.) To the extent Petitioner argues the amended disciplinary hearing report was amended to "fit the facts" to find him guilty of the charged conduct, such a claim is not plausible. As stated above, the original report contained all of the information the hearing officer relied upon to find that the weight of the evidence showed Petitioner used narcotics. Therefore, the disciplinary hearing officer did not need to amend the report to "fit the facts" to find Petitioner guilty. Petitioner already had been found guilty in the disciplinary hearing, a fact that was not changed by minor errors in the report, and the report was sufficient to show he was afforded due process under Wolff.
In the original report, one of five references to the laboratory number of Petitioner's urine sample was off by one digit and other inmates' names were used in place of Petitioner's name in two instances.
Accordingly, the court finds that the facts alleged in the Petition and supporting documents show that Petitioner's right to due process was not violated in the disciplinary action. See generally E.I. de Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011) (providing that in evaluating a pleading on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents attached to the complaint). Consequently, the Petition and supporting documents plainly show Petitioner is not entitled to relief in this manner. See Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that the Petition in the above-captioned case be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return. June 29, 2017
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).