Where a contract relates to real property, the inadequacy of a remedy at law is assumed. See Mohrlang v. Draper, 219 Neb. 630, 365 N.W.2d 443 (1985). In the instant case, the district court found that the “most reasonable objective manifestation of the intention of the parties” was for the property to be restored to its original topography, except for a small lake. It also determined that (1) after completion of the sand and gravel pit operation, Four H and Western left the property at a higher elevation than before, in breach of the 1998 CUP and the agreement; (2) the Tierneys had no adequate remedy at law for Four H's and Western's breach; and (3) if the court were to order specific performance, it would order Four H and Western to
To hold otherwise would make the Joneses' obligation to "endeavor to cure" meaningless and render any similar purchase contract largely voidable at the seller's whim, should a defect of title be found. Our holding in this regard is perhaps nothing more than the logical extension of the rule that inconvenience or cost of compliance with a contract, though such may make compliance a hardship, cannot excuse a party from the performance of an absolute and unqualified undertaking to do a thing that is lawful and possible. Mohrlang v. Draper, 219 Neb. 630, 365 N.W.2d 443 (1985) (suit for specific performance against vendor of lot by purchaser). The district court found that a reasonable amount of time had elapsed, that Snowdon Farms refused to take the land in its encumbered state, and that the Joneses had "a legally sufficient ground for re[s]cission."
"An action for specific performance is governed by the elements, conditions, and incidents which control the administration of all equitable remedies." Mohrlang v. Draper, 219 Neb. 630, 633, 365 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1985). AGREEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF TAYLORS' FARM
A court may refrain from granting specific performance if it would “be inequitable or unjust due to hardship on the one from whom performance is sought.” Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd. P'ship, 12 852 N.W.2d 292, 301 (Neb. 2014) (quoting Mohrlang v. Draper, 365 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Neb. 1985)). Even if enforcing the class-action waiver could be characterized as granting the remedy of specific performance, Ordosgoitti has not shown that enforcing the class-action waiver imposes undue hardship on him or would otherwise be inequitable.
Further, Nebraska law is clear that actions with respect to the conveyance of real estate are unique in nature and are properly the subject of specific performance. 3's Lounge Inc. v. Tierney, 741 N.W.2d 687, 699 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007); Mohrlang v. Draper, 365 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Neb. 1985). The most applicable defense raised by the Defendants is that they did not willfully or intentionally violate the preliminary injunction.
The Restatement (Second) on Contracts, § 261, entitled "Discharge by Supervening Impracticability," states: See, Turbines Ltd. v. Transupport, Inc., 285 Neb. 129, 825 N.W.2d 767 (2013) ; Cleasby v. Leo A. Daly Co., 221 Neb. 254, 376 N.W.2d 312 (1985) ; Mohrlang v. Draper, 219 Neb. 630, 365 N.W.2d 443 (1985). See, generally, 14 James P. Nehf, Corbin on Contracts § 74 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2001); 30 Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts by Samuel Williston § 77 (4th ed. 2004).
The burden of proving a contract is on the party who seeks to compel specific performance. See Mohrlang v. Draper, 219 Neb. 630, 365 N.W.2d 443 (1985).Satellite Dev. Co. v. Bernt, 229 Neb. 778, 429 N.W.2d 334 (1988).
Whatever Young was told by the Illinois officials, which is not clear from the record, the purpose of the contract was not at that time substantially frustrated thereby discharging Young from her obligation to pay the second $25,000 when it was requested. As this court said in Mohrlang v. Draper, 219 Neb. 630, 635, 365 N.W.2d 443, 447 (1985), "An imprudent or bad bargain in and of itself is not an excuse for nonperformance of a contract." Nevertheless, Young did pay the first $25,000, thereby substantially benefiting Tate, who was without money to invest at that time, and Tate did agree to be liable for the first $25,000.
An action in equity for specific performance of a written contract for the sale of real estate, as with any other equity action, is reviewed de novo on the record. Mohrlang v. Draper, 219 Neb. 630, 365 N.W.2d 443 (1985); Litz v. Wilson, 208 Neb. 483, 304 N.W.2d 48 (1981). Sloan's counterclaim for ejectment was legal in nature.