However, a corporation has no right of removal under OCGA § 14-2-510 (b) (4) if the complaint alleges facts to support proper venue under a different statutory provision. See Mohawk Industries v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26 (576 SE2d 16) (2002) (no right of removal where factual allegations supported venue under both subsection (b) (3) and subsection (b) (4)). And with regard to motor carriers, OCGA § 40-1-117 (b) states that "[e]xcept in those cases where the Constitution requires otherwise, any action against any resident or nonresident motor carrier for damages by reason of any breach of duty . . . may be brought in the county where the cause or action or some part thereof arose[.]"
However, a corporation has no right of removal under OCGA § 14-2-510 (b) (4) if the complaint alleges facts to support proper venue under a different statutory provision. See Mohawk Indus. v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26 (576 SE2d 16) (2002) (noright of removal where factual allegations supported venue under both paragraph (b) (3) and paragraph (b) (4)). And with regard to motor carriers, OCGA § 40-1-117 (b) states that “[e]xcept in those cases where the Constitution requires otherwise, any action against any resident or nonresident motor carrier for damages by reason of any breach of duty … may be brought in the county where the cause or action or some part thereof arose[.]”
Rucker alleged in his complaint, among other things, that Taylor hired Phillips without having made any inquiry into his criminal background, that Taylor breached his duty of ordinary care by hiring or retaining Phillips in light of his criminal background, that AHS had represented to the Ruckers that its service technicians were pre-screened, insured and regularly monitored, that AHS had breached its contract with the Ruckers by failing to monitor and screen Taylor and Phillips and that had AHS performed its contractual responsibilities it would have known that Phillips was dangerous and that Taylor was not properly monitoring or screening prospective employees. Mohawk Indus. v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26, 27 ( 576 SE2d 16) (2002). Further, in his motion for summary judgment, Rucker argued that his claim against Taylor arose not out of the intentional acts of Phillips, but out of Taylor's negligent hiring and retention of Phillips and his failure to follow his own policies with respect to performing criminal background checks.
The Chattooga County trial judge then would have been authorized to decide upon Mauer's motion and certify her decision for review. See Banks v. City of Hampton, 280 Ga. App. 432, 433 ( 634 SE2d 192) (2006) (following removal of the case to the transferee court, plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case back to the original court; the transferee court entered its decision on the motion and issued a certificate of immediate review; this Court granted plaintiffs application for interlocutory appeal, conferring proper jurisdiction over the appeal); Mohawk Indus, v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26, 26-27 ( 576 SE2d 16) (2002) (same). Mauer, however, did not file a motion for remand in this case.
Therefore, venue was solely based on OCGA § 14-2-510 (b) (4), and removal was proper. Compare Mohawk Indus, v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26, 27 ( 576 SE2d 16) (2002) (removal improper because venue did not depend "solely" upon the location of the accident as required under OCGA § 14-2-510 (b) (4); Mohawk had a plant and transacted business in county from which case was removed). 3. S. T. next argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Newspaper defendants.
Only now does it appear that venue in Dougherty County for Paragon's remaining tort claims could be based solely on OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4). See, e.g., Mohawk Indus. v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26, 28 ( 576 S.E.2d 16) (2002) (it was apparent that removal was improper because venue did not depend "solely" upon the location of the accident as required under OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4), and so case was returned to the court from which it was removed). Huddle House did not remove the case to DeKalb County. But Huddle House did file a motion in Dougherty County asking the trial court to transfer the case to DeKalb County within the 45 day period which would have otherwise been allowed for filing a notice of removal under OCGA § 14-2-510(b)(4).