However, "[a]s a general matter, decisions regarding who will be called as a defense witness [are] a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and these decisions, even if erroneous, do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless they are so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made them under the circumstances." Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 534 (2) (a), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015). At the motion for new trial hearing, Mathis’ trial counsel testified that he had interviewed Snipes twice before trial, during which Snipes told him that Benton had threatened Snipes, not Mathis, and that Snipes was unsure if he had told Mathis about Benton's threats.

Admissibility of evidence of a victim’s character is now governed by OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (a) (2) and 24-4-405 (a), which generally limit evidence of a victim’s character to reputation or opinion and not specific bad acts. See Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 535-536 (3), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015). The former exception to the general rule created by Chandler v. State , 261 Ga. 402, 407 (3) (c), 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991), allowing evidence of specific acts of violence by a victim against third persons when a defendant claimed a justification defense, "is no longer viable under Georgia’s new Evidence Code."

Character evidence about a victim generally "is limited to reputation or opinion, not specific bad acts." Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 536 (3), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015). See also OCGA § 24-4-405.

See United States v. Gulley , 526 F.3d 809, 819 (5th Cir. 2008) (pointing out that "a self defense claim may be proven regardless of whether the victim has a violent or passive character," and collecting federal cases on this issue). See also Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 536, 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015) ; Ronald L. Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 128 (6th ed. 2018). OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (a) and 24-4-405 closely track their counterparts in the Federal Rules of Evidence, so we look to federal appellate decisions applying these federal rules for guidance in interpreting the Georgia statutes.

Although trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that she should have objected to the prosecutor's argument, trial counsel's own hindsight assessment of her performance does not control. See Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 533 (2) (a), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015). Instead, to establish that trial counsel was deficient, Kennedy has to show that no reasonable attorney would have failed to object to the prosecutor's argument.

For trials that take place after January 1, 2013, "[t]he admissibility of evidence of a victim's character is ... governed by OCGA §§ 24–4–404 and 24–4–405. See Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 535 (3), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015)." Gibson v. State , 300 Ga. 494, 498, n. 8, 796 S.E.2d 712 (2017).

Hendrix contends he was prejudiced by this decision not only because it relied on a less viable defense but also because he rejected the State's plea offer in reliance on the perceived strength of his self-defense claim. Though Hendrix cites Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402(3)(b), (c), 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991) as authority for offering evidence of a victim's prior acts of violence in support of a self-defense claim, Hendrix fails to acknowledge that Chandler is no longer viable under Georgia's new evidence code, see Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532(3), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015). As Hendrix was tried after the January 1, 2013 effective date of the new evidence code, it is unclear whether such evidence would have been admissible in any event.

Counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that Scott's "prior convictions at the time to me were not paramount as far as him telling his story and explaining why he did what he thought he had to do." And, since requesting a limiting instruction might have drawn further jury attention to Scott's prior convictions, see Phillips , 285 Ga. at 220 (5) (c), 675 S.E.2d 1, counsel's choice to not request such an instruction could have been objectively reasonable and strategic, even though counsel did not testify to actually relying on a strategic reason for not making the request, see Shaw , 292 Ga. at 875 (3) (a) n.7, 742 S.E.2d 707 ; Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 533-534 (2) (a), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015) (explaining that, since "hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel," counsel's trial decision may still have been reasonable even though he testified that, in hindsight, he had no strategic reason for that decision (citation and punctuation omitted)). This is particularly true when, as here, the jury does not hear any details about the convictions other than the statutory names and case numbers.

. See Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 536 (3), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015) (construing OCGA § 24-4-405 to mean that "as a general rule, character evidence of a victim is limited to reputation or opinion, not specific bad acts") (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Gulley , 526 F.3d 809, 818-819 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that "the plain language of [federal] Rule 405 (b) limits the use of specific instances of conduct to prove essential elements of a charge or defense" and thus that the victim's prior violent acts were not admissible in support of the defendant's self-defense claim); United States v. Gregg , 451 F.3d 930, 933-935 (8th Cir. 2006) (same). Specific instances of a victim's past conduct may also be admitted, not to show the victim's action in conformity therewith, but rather "establish the defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness of the defendant's use of force."

Moreover, "as a general rule, character evidence of a victim is limited to reputation or opinion[.]" Mohamud v. State , 297 Ga. 532, 536 (3), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015). See also OCGA § 24-4-405 (a).