Although this deadline may appear "unforgiving, this strict interpretation of the diversity visa statute has been adopted by every circuit court to have addressed the issue." Mogu v. Chertoff, 550 F.Supp.2d 107, 109 (D.D.C. 2008) ; see also Mohamed v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]e are compelled ... to apply the unambiguous language of the operative statutory framework."); Coraggioso, 355 F.3d at 734 (holding that statute "unambiguously indicates Congress's intent to impose a time deadline on an applicant's eligibility"); CarrilloโGonzalez v. INS, 353 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (referencing "[c]ongressionally-mandated, one-year deadline of the DV Lottery Program"); Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 914 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that statute "plainly means" that those "who have been randomly selected to qualify for a visa under the diversity visa program cannot be issued a visa after midnight of the final day of the fiscal year for which they were selected"); Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 501 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Based on the statutory deadline set by Congress, the INS lacks the statutory authority to award the relief sought."). Although this Court has sympathy for those applicants who do not ma
" Mohamed, 436 F.3d at 81. Thus, simply put, "[t]he diversity visa program is a limited time offer," Mogu v. Chertoff, 550 F.Supp.2d 107, 109 (D.D.C. 2008), and "[t]hose not receiving visas must, with Sisyphean frustration, go back to the starting line and reapply to the lottery," Coraggioso, 355 F.3d at 732. We find persuasive and adopt the reasoning and conclusions of the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits and thus conclude that Mwasaru's appeal is moot.
lem for the plaintiff is that its request to remedy this delay is moot. A claim is moot "if the judgment, regardless of which way it goes, will neither presently affect the parties' rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future," Noble v. Sombrotto, 525 F.3d 1230, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); i.e., "when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome," County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The mootness doctrine is distinct from that of standing only in that "the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed," Davis v. FEC, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2769, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008), whereas "[a] court determines whether a case is moot at the time of review and not at the time of filing," Mogu v. Chertoff, 550 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 n. 5 (D.D.C. 2008). In Counts I through III of its amended complaint, the plaintiff asks that the Court compel a ruling from the Department of Labor on its Davis-Bacon coverage determination request.
"A case is moot if the judgment, regardless of which way it goes, will neither presently affect the parties' rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future,"Noble v. Sombrotto, 525 F.3d 1230, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted); i.e., "when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome," County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). The mootness doctrine is distinct from that of standing only in that "the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed,"Davis, 128 U.S. at 2769, 128 S. Ct. at 2769, whereas "[a] court determines whether a case is moot at the time of review and not at the time of filing," Mogu v. Chertoff, 550 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 n. 5 (D.D.C. 2008). The defendants argue that the DOI's "sole function" insofar as this lawsuit is concerned "was to negotiate and approve indirect cost rates," and that consequently "the most that the Court could order pursuant to such a claim [would be] that [the] DOI recalculate [the p]laintiff's out-of-date rates," which would have "no practical effect."
"Though unforgiving, this strict interpretation of the diversity visa statute has been adopted by every circuit court to have addressed the issue." Mogu v. Chertoff, 550 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Mohamed v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2006) ("we are compelled . . . to apply the unambiguous language of the operative statutory framework"); Coraggioso v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the statute "unambiguously indicates Congress's intent to impose a time deadline on an applicant's eligibility"); Carrillo-Gonzalez v. INS, 353 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (referencing the "[c]ongressionally-mandated, one-year deadline of the DV Lottery Program"); Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 914 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the language "eligible to receive such visa is unambiguous"); Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 501 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[b]ased on the statutory deadline set by Congress, the INS lacks the statutory authority to award the relief sought"). The Court agrees with the respondents' argument that because the remedy sought by Keli is statutorily barred, this case is moot.