Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-001638-MR
03-17-2017
LEWIS FRANCIS MOFFETT APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Erin Hoffman Yang Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky J. Hays Lawson Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH W. CASTLEN III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CR-00080 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, JONES AND NICKELL, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: The issue presented in this appeal is whether the Daviess Circuit Court erred in denying Lewis Moffett's motion to suppress evidence yielded from a canine sniff of his vehicle. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The facts surrounding Moffett's traffic stop are not in dispute as they were stipulated at trial:
On October 10, 2013, at 12:25 a.m. in Daviess County, Daviess County Deputy Sheriff Nathan Thomason initiated a traffic stop, having observed a vehicle with no headlamps illuminated. The Deputy requested identification from Mr. Moffett, who was driving the vehicle, and his two passengers, Treazure Sawyers and Donald Goodman. At 12:29 a.m., the Deputy radioed dispatch for any outstanding warrants. At 12:35 a.m. it was determined that Moffett and Sawyers had no warrants outstanding, but Goodman had two warrants for probation violations involving drug offenses. The Deputy was also familiar with Sawyers and her criminal drug history. Three minutes later, i.e., 12:38 a.m., a K-9 unit was requested by the Deputy, and the unit arrived ten minutes later, at 12:48 a.m. The canine, Raizi, walked around Mr. Moffett's vehicle and alerted to the trunk and also the rear passenger door where Goodman had been sitting prior to his removal from the vehicle. Illegal drugs were discovered at those locations.
Moffett was charged with one count of trafficking in marijuana and failure to illuminate headlamps. Moffett sought to suppress the illegal drugs from evidence by contending that the length of time of the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged and he should have been allowed to leave when it was determined that he had no outstanding warrants.
The trial court found the length of the stop was not unreasonable. It determined that approximately thirteen minutes elapsed from the time it was discovered that Moffett had no outstanding warrants and the canine unit arrived. The walk-around performed by the canine took "such a short period that neither party could attribute even one minute" to it. (R. 103). Additionally, the court pointed out that it would take a certain amount of that time to place Goodman under arrest during which Moffett would not have been permitted to leave the scene. And lastly, the trial court reasoned that Goodman's and Sawyers' prior drug records were a sufficient basis to request a canine for a sniff test. Accordingly, the trial court denied Moffett's motion to suppress.
After the denial, Moffett entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to one year imprisonment for the trafficking charge and fined $250 for failure to illuminate headlamps. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress requires a de novo examination of the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts. Bagby v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.3d 620, 622 (Ky. App. 2012).
III. Analysis
Moffett argues on appeal that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to allow the canine unit to arrive. He likens his case to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision, Rodriguez v. U. S., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). In Rodriguez, after conducting a routine traffic stop and issuing a warning citation, the police officer ordered a canine unit, which arrived approximately seven or eight minutes later. The canine alerted officers to the presence of drugs on the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court declared that absent reasonable suspicion, police officers may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff test. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615.
Moffett relies on this case for its rejection of even a de minimus intrusion on constitutional protections. However, unlike the officer in Rodriguez, who prolonged the traffic stop by conducting a dog sniff without any reasonable suspicion to do so, the circumstances in this case demonstrate the officer had reasonable grounds during the stop to suspect drug activity.
A police officer's ordinary inquiries into a routine traffic stop typically involve checking the driver's license, determining whether there are any outstanding warrants, and inspecting the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. Id. Any shift in the purpose of the stop must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that other violations of the law might be occurring to justify enlarging the scope of the stop without any unreasonable delay. Meghoo v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 752, 755 (Ky. 2008) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 837, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)). Officers may conduct an investigation "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." Meghoo, 245 S.W.3d at 755 (quoting U. S. v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Based upon Goodman's two outstanding warrants for probation violations related to drug offenses and the officer's familiarity with Sawyers' criminal drug history, the officer was fully justified in ordering the canine unit for further investigation. The entirety of the stop from the time the car was pulled over until the drugs were discovered was approximately twenty-three minutes. It took approximately ten minutes for the drug-sniffing dog to arrive at the scene after it was called, and the presence of drugs on the vehicle was almost immediately detected by the canine. This is consistent with the requirement that officers "diligently pursue[] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly[.]" U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Under the facts of this case, the stop was executed in a reasonable manner, and the length of the stop was not unreasonably prolonged by the canine sniff. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.
IV. Conclusion
The judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Erin Hoffman Yang
Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky