Opinion
Case No. 00-cv-4234-JPG
December 14, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment (Docs.34 39).
I. Background
This case stems from an automobile accident involving a car driven by defendant Gylian Cunningham, the daughter of defendants Carroll and Michael Cunningham. The car was insured by defendant Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Allied"). Angela Kay Moehring ("Moehring") was a passenger in the car and was permanently injured in the accident. Moehring, through her mother, sued Allied and the Cunninghams in state court, and that case remains pending with settlement negotiations ongoing.
In the meantime, Moehring filed this diversity suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaration of the policy limits on the Allied insurance policy ("the policy"), which was written on three Cunningham vehicles. The policy contained the following "anti-stacking" provision:
The Court is satisfied that this action presents a justiciable case or controversy. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1992). There is a real disagreement between Moehring, the Cunninghams and Allied over the liability for Moehring's injuries, as is evidenced by Moehring's state court law suit and a settlement offer for what may be the policy limits of the Allied insurance policy. Thus, it appears that the parties have a stake in the outcome of this case. Furthermore, although Moehring is not a party to the insurance contract, Allied has not sufficiently supported — and has therefore waived — the argument that she does not have standing to sue under the policy. Perfunctory and underdeveloped arguments are waived. Spath v. Hayes Wheel Int'l-Ind., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2000).
LIMIT OF LIABILITY
A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting from any one auto accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. "Insureds;"
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.
Policy, Part A — Liability Coverage. The Declarations page, a copy of which is attached to this order, is set forth in columnar fashion with a separate column for the limit of liability and premium for each type of insurance coverage. There are also three rows of figures across the columns that correspond to the three vehicles covered by the policy. The figures represent the limit of liability or premium for the type of coverage in that column. For example, in the limit of liability column for bodily injury for each person, the figure $50,000 appears in the row for each of the three vehicles, and in the limit of liability column for medical payments for each person, the figure $5,000 appears in the row for each of the three vehicles.
Moehring asks the Court to declare that the limit of liability may be "stacked." That is, she wants the Court to declare that the limit of liability for bodily injury for each person involved in the accident is the sum of all the figures in the column — $150,000 — and that the limit of liability for medical payments for each person involved in the accident is the sum of the three figures in that column — $15,000. Allied, on the other hand, argues that those limits cannot be "stacked" and that the limits of liability are instead the figures that appear in the row corresponding to the vehicle involved in the accident — $50,000 for bodily injury and $5,000 for medical payments.
It is unclear which of the three covered vehicles was involved in the accident. This is irrelevant, however, because all three vehicles had the same liability limit in the relevant categories.
II. Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). Because both parties agree to the material facts of this case, the only question remaining is which party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As both parties agree, Illinois law applies in this diversity case. In applying Illinois law, this Court must try to predict how the Illinois Supreme Court would rule on the issues presented. Allen v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 1997). If the Illinois Supreme Court has not ruled on a particular issue presented, decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court control unless there are persuasive indications that the Illinois Supreme Court would decide the issue differently. Id.
Under Illinois law, the interpretation of an insurance policy, even an ambiguous policy, is a question of law. River v. Commercial Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1998); Crum Forster Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 620 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ill. 1993). In interpreting a policy, the Court must attempt to effectuate the parties' intention as expressed by the policy, giving "due regard to the risk undertaken, the subject matter that is insured, and the purposes of the entire contract." River, 160 F.3d at 1169 (quotations omitted); accord Allen, 128 F.3d at 466; Crum Forster, 620 N.E.2d at 1078. If the policy is unambiguous, the Court must construe it according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. River, 160 F.3d at 1169; Allen, 128 F.3d at 466; Crum Forster, 620 N.E.2d at 1078. On the other hand, if the policy is ambiguous, the Court must construe all ambiguities in favor of the insured and against the insurer, who drafted the policy. River, 160 F.3d at 1169; Allen, 128 F.3d at 466; Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (Ill. 1992). To determine if an ambiguity exists, the Court must ask whether the policy, taken as a whole and reading all parts in light of the other parts, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. River, 160 F.3d at 1169; Allen, 128 F.3d at 466; Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1212. The parties' mere disagreement about the interpretation of a policy does not render it ambiguous. River, 160 F.3d at 1169.
After reviewing the policy as a whole, the Court finds that the policy is ambiguous with respect to whether coverage may be "stacked." It is true that the "anti-stacking" clause cited above is unambiguous when read by itself; it clearly limits Allied's liability to the "limit of liability shown in the Declarations." However, the Court is convinced that the Illinois Supreme Court would find the Declarations page ambiguous. Although it has never squarely addressed the issue, the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated in dicta what this Court will refer to as the "multiple printing" rule. Bruder v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 355, 362 (Ill. 1993). That rule is that, despite clear indications elsewhere in the contract that "stacking" of policy limits is not permitted, a declarations page that prints the policy limit more than once could reasonably be interpreted as providing a policy limit that is the sum of the printed limits. Id.
Bruder involved an insurance policy that covered two pickup trucks. Id. at 357-58. The policy contained an "anti-stacking" provision and a declarations page. Id. at 360-362. Like the policy in this case, the Bruder declarations page had a column for the premium paid for each type of coverage and a line across the columns to correspond to each insured vehicle. However, unlike the policy in this case, the Bruder declarations page set forth the limits of liability outside of the columnar arrangement. It was printed only once on the page. Id. at 361-62. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Bruder policy was not ambiguous because the policy limits were printed only once on the declarations page, but noted that multiple printings of policy limits on a declarations page would create an ambiguity. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
Understanding the arrangement of entries in the columns is important in determining the effect of what is not there included. Specifically, the limits of liability are not set out within the column arrangement in the same manner as the page lists the premium amounts and totals. That is, there is no column for which the limit of liability for bodily injury is to be listed like a premium amount so that the $100,000 limit for each person would appear in both sentence-like lines for the pickup trucks.
It would not be difficult to find an ambiguity created by such a listing of the bodily injury liability limit for each person insured. It could easily be interpreted that an insured should enjoy a total limit $200,000 in coverage because a figure of $100,000 would be shown for each pickup truck. There would be little to suggest in such a listing that the parties intended that coverage was to be limited to that provided for only one of the two pickup trucks. It would be more reasonable to assume that the parties intended that, in return for the two premiums, two $100,000 coverage amounts were afforded. See Squire [v. Economy Fire Cas. Co.], 69 Ill. 2d at 179-80, 13 Ill. Dec. 17, 370 N.E.2d 1044 (holding that the existence of two declarations pages, both setting $10,000 limits for liability for each person, created an ambiguity permitting the aggregation of those coverage amounts).
Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
The highlighted dicta "persuasively indicates how the Illinois Supreme Court would rule" in a case similar to the hypothetical considered by the Bruder court. Allen, 128 F.3d at 467. Accordingly, other courts have regularly applied the "multiple printing" rule based on Bruder's dicta. See, e.g., Allen, 128 F.3d 467; Domin v. Shelby Ins. Co., Case No. 1-01-1143, 2001 WL 1482982, *4 (Ill.App.Ct. Nov. 21, 2001) (unambiguous where policy limits printed only once); Janes ex rel. Estate of Janes v. Western States Ins. Co., Case No. 5-99-0763, 2001 WL 1003328 (Ill.App.Ct. Aug. 31, 2001) (ambiguous where policy limits printed multiple times); Skidmore v. Throgmorton, 751 N.E.2d 637, 643-44 (Ill.App.Ct. 2001) (same); Yates v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 724 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (Ill.App.Ct.) (same), app. denied, 189 Ill.2d 683 (2000); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Estate of Goben, 707 N.E.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Ill.App.Ct.) (same), app. denied, 184 Ill.2d 560 (1999). Allied points to only one case that has strayed from the "multiple printing" rule: Pekin Ins. Co. v. Estate of Ritter, 750 N.E.2d 1285, (Ill.App.Ct.) (unambiguous even though policy limits printed multiple times), app. denied, 196 Ill.2d 547 (2001). Ritter is not persuasive to this Court, however, because it does not attempt to reconcile its decision with the Bruder dicta or other cases following that dicta. Instead it dismisses it without substantive discussion. The Bruder dicta is a persuasive indication that the Illinois Supreme Court would differ from the Ritter court on this issue. Therefore, Ritter provides no guidance to this Court.
The policy in the instant case is exactly like the one in the Bruder hypothetical. The $50,000 limit on liability for bodily injury and the $5,000 limit on liability for medical payments are listed in columns so that the limit is printed three times, once for each of the three covered vehicles. Because the Illinois Supreme Court would find such a policy ambiguous, the Court must do the same. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Allied policy at issue in this case is ambiguous when read as a whole and therefore must be construed in favor of the insured to allow "stacking" of the stated liability limits.
Although the Court finds Ritter lacking in its explanation of its decision to ignore Bruder's dicta, the Court agrees with Ritter's assessment that the insurance policy at issue was unambiguous. The Court believes that where an insurance policy lists a liability limit that is clearly associated with a particular vehicle, either because it is on a line or in a column that corresponds to that vehicle and that vehicle only, no one could reasonably interpret that liability limit to apply to any other vehicle included in the policy. No one has ever questioned the clarity of listing multiple types of coverage in the same column or line. The Court has not located any case suggesting that the liability limit for bodily injury to each person, for example, should be the aggregate of the limits for all types of coverage. Even the Illinois Supreme Court believes that a reasonable person can keep "type of coverage" columns straight. See Bruder, 620 N.E.2d at 362-63. It is unclear why they cannot keep "type of vehicle" rows straight as well. The Court has held this view since its decision in Allen, District Court Case No. 95-cv-4017-JPG, and no case since then has convinced the Court otherwise. Nevertheless, the Court is constrained by the Bruder dicta to find the Allied policy ambiguous.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Moehring's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39), DENIES Allied's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 34), DECLARES that the limits of liability for Allied's personal automobile insurance policy number AXC 0008260815-0 are $150,000 for bodily injury for each person and $15,000 for medical payments for each person, and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.