1. Plaintiffs argue that an owner, even one acting as its own general contractor for a construction project, is not a statutory employer pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-8 unless it is also serving as a contractor for "yet another entity" and has hired another contractor to perform work under that contract. See Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255) (1984). The reasoning in Modlin was expressly adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court.

DEEN, Presiding Judge. 1. This is a statutory employer case and is controlled by Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255) (1984). 2.

Godbee ignored Evans and announced the rule that OCGA § 34-9-8(a) (Code Ann. § 114-112) pertains to any employer who hires another to perform work, regardless of whether he is an owner rather than a contractor. Nevertheless, the error in Godbee, and the failure to account for Evans, was remedied in Modlin v. Black Decker, 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255) (No. 67781, decided March 5, 1984), wherein Godbee was expressly overruled and the reasoning of Evans revived. "Owners or entities merely in possession or control of the premises would not be subject to workers' compensation liability as statutory employers, except in the isolated situation where the party also serves as a contractor for yet another entity and hires another contractor to perform the work on the premises." Id. at ____.

(Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 406, citing Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477, 478-479 ( 317 SE2d 255) (1984). In Yoho v. Ringier of America, our Supreme Court held that an owner who is merely in possession or control of the premises is not subject to workers' compensation liability as a statutory employer and is not immune from tort liability.

2. Appellants primarily assert that the trial court erred as appellee was not a statutory employee under the precedent of Manning v. Ga. Power Co., 252 Ga. 404 ( 314 S.E.2d 432) and Modlin v. Black c. Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255). Accord Singleton v. Ga. Pacific Corp., 252 Ga. 557 ( 315 S.E.2d 876).

We granted the appeal to determine whether Winn-Dixie is immune from tort liability as the statutory employer of Couch. Held: "In Wright v. M. D. Hodges Enterprises, 183 Ga. App. 632 ( 359 S.E.2d 700) (1987), this court reviewed the criteria by which a statutory employer could be identified and noted that the rule set forth in Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255) (1984), created some confusion for the Eleventh Circuit in McCorkle v. United States, 737 F.2d 957, 961 (11th Cir., 1984), because that court was unable to determine whether Georgia wanted the `contractor/not a contractor bright line rule' or an `owner plus' or `circumstances of the case' rule. Wright held that it intended to apply both rules.

Whitehead tripped over a telephone cord and seriously injured his right knee. In Wright v. M. D. Hodges Enterprises, 183 Ga. App. 632 ( 359 S.E.2d 700) (1987), this court reviewed the criteria by which a statutory employer could be identified and noted that the rule set forth in Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255) (1984), created some confusion for the Eleventh Circuit in McCorkle v. United States, 737 F.2d 957, 961 (11th Cir. 1984), because that court was unable to determine whether Georgia wanted the "contractor/not a contractor bright line rule" or an "owner plus" or "circumstances of the case" rule. Wright held that it intended to apply both rules.

1. Both appellant and appellee cite Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255) (1984) and Manning v. Ga. Power Co., 252 Ga. 404 ( 314 S.E.2d 432) (1984) in support of their respective positions. Appellant relies upon Modlin and Manning as controlling authority for the proposition that appellee is merely the owner of the sign and not his statutory employer and thus has no corresponding tort immunity.

1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for summary judgment because, as a matter of law, Ralston was not liable to Land for his injuries. Appellant's contention in this regard is based upon this court's decision in Godbee v. Western Elec. Co., 161 Ga. App. 731 ( 288 S.E.2d 881), overruled, Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255). See also Manning v. Georgia Power Co., 252 Ga. 404 ( 314 S.E.2d 432). According to appellant's argument, appellee was a statutory employer pursuant to the Godbee rule and, therefore, could not have been liable in tort to Land.

We reverse. The cases relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment and by Brunswick in this appeal, holding that an owner of premises is entitled to statutory employer status under OCGA § 34-9-8, have been overruled by Modlin v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 170 Ga. App. 477 ( 317 S.E.2d 255), where we said: "Taking OCGA § 34-9-8 as a whole, the most reasonable conclusion is that the word `principal' in subsections (a) and (b) refers to `principal contractor.' Accordingly, owners or entities merely in possession or control of the premises would not be subject to workers' compensation liability as statutory employers, except in the isolated situation where that party also serves as a contractor for yet another entity and hires another contractor to perform the work on the premises. . . . Godbee v. Western Elec. Co., [ 161 Ga. App. 731 ( 288 S.E.2d 881)], Scogin v. Ga. Power Co., [ 165 Ga. App. 2 ( 299 S.E.2d 84)], and Johnson v. Ga. Power Co., [ 165 Ga. App. 672 ( 302 S.E.2d 417)], and their progeny are overruled. Because Western Elec. Co. v. Capes, [ 164 Ga. App. 353 ( 296 S.E.2d 381)], modified rather than followed Godbee, it is consistent with what is held here and need not be overruled.