Opinion
March 31, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lester Gerard, J.).
We agree with the IAS Court that the language in the deed is clear and unambiguous and that there is no need to look outside the instrument to ascertain the intention of the parties (see, Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297, 305). The deed states that "the party of the second part", defendant Saltaire, is to use Parcel 2 "as a means of ingress and egress" from Maple Avenue to Parcel 1, there being no provision for ingress to or egress from any other parcel or use by any other party.
Accordingly, plaintiffs do not have a right of access to their parcel by way of Parcel 2.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Wallach, Rubin and Nardelli, JJ.