When the signature on the instrument complies with OCGA §§ 11-3-401 or 11-3-403 (3), it is presumed to be valid; a general denial in the answer raises the defense of non est factum and creates a factual question as to the authenticity of the signature and keeps the signature from being deemed admitted under OCGA § 11-3-307. Jones v. Kim, 189 Ga. App. 5, 6 (2) ( 374 S.E.2d 820) (1988); Spurlock v. Commercial Banking Co., 151 Ga. App. 649, 652 (2) ( 260 S.E.2d 912) (1979); Modern Free Accepted Masons of the World v. Cliff M. Averett, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 641, 643 (2) ( 165 S.E.2d 166) (1968). Until evidence is produced that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the holder is not required to prove the signature's authenticity even if denied, in the answer and the holder in due course has the right to rely upon the presumption of authenticity.

Thus, there was no probative evidence in the record of this case that would authorize a finding that appellant executed the note in any capacity other than that of president of CN Industries. It follows that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict. See Larry's Mobile Homes v. Robins Federal Credit Union, 161 Ga. App. 822 ( 288 S.E.2d 800) (1982); Yeomans v. Coleman c. Drug Co., supra; Modern Free and Accepted Masons of the World v. Cliff M. Averett, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 641 (1) ( 165 S.E.2d 166) (1968); First National Bank of Atlanta v. C S Concrete Structures, 128 Ga. App. 330 ( 196 S.E.2d 473) (1973); OCGA § 11-3-403 (3). 3.

That section provides: "Except as otherwise established the name of an organization preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in a representative capacity." We find this section has been applied in the following cases: Larry's Mobile Homes v. Robins Fed. Credit Union, 161 Ga. App. 822, 823 (2) ( 288 S.E.2d 800); First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. C. S. Concrete Structures, 128 Ga. App. 330 ( 196 S.E.2d 473); Moorer v. Merrill, 120 Ga. App. 250, 251 (1) ( 170 S.E.2d 298); and Modern Free and Accepted Masons v. Cliff M. Averett, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 641 (1), 643 ( 165 S.E.2d 166). In none of these cases did the instrument contain the name of the organization preceded or followed by the name, but not the office (official capacity), of an authorized individual, as does the note at issue in this case.

There is no ambiguity in the instrument in this regard which would admit of parol evidence to alter the obligation. The note represents the corporate obligation of Summit Productions, Inc., and not a personal obligation of Pound or Kivette. Modern Free c. Masons v. Cliff M. Averett, 118 Ga. App. 641 (1) ( 165 S.E.2d 166). The trial court did not err in granting the defendant-appellees' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in accordance with their motion for a directed verdict previously made, which latter motion was made on the ground that the note itself and the evidence disclosed a corporate obligation only.

This, as Official Comment 1 to § 3-307 indicates, has application to claims of lack of authority. Modern Free Accepted Masons of the World v. Cliff M. Averett, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 641, 643 (1968). See Auburn State Bank v. National Laundry Co., 289 Mass. 397, 398-399 (1935), and Gibbs v. Lido of Worcester, Inc., 332 Mass. 426, 429-430 (1955), both holding that authority to sign a promissory note on behalf of a corporation was admitted under G.L.c. 231, § 29, now repealed by St. 1975, c. 377, § 77, and superseded by Mass.R.Civ.P. 9(a), 365 Mass. 751 (1974).