Opinion
Case No. 1:21-cv-12896
2023-04-21
Michael J. MOCKERIDGE and Susan J. Mockeridge, Plaintiffs, v. ALCONA COUNTY, BY its BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants.
Philip L. Ellison, Outside Legal Counsel PLC, Hemlock, MI, for Plaintiffs. Katelyn D. Crysler, Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, Detroit, MI, Matthew T. Nelson, Warner Norcross + Judd, Grand Rapids, MI, Sean Michael Freel, Freel Profressional Corp, Tawas City, MI, for Defendants Harry Harvey, David Schmidt. Allan C. Vander Laan, Kristen Lee Rewa, Meigs M. Day, Cummings McClorey Davis & Acho, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendants County of Alcona. Daniel Zick, Thomas R. Meagher, Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C., Lansing, MI, for Defendants Kenneth Gibson, Township of Caledonia. William Jay Brown, Brown Law PLC, Midland, MI, William P. Slough, Kirkpatrick, Slough, Duitsman-Coy & Mott, PLC, Gaylord, MI, for Defendant Keith Krentz.
Philip L. Ellison, Outside Legal Counsel PLC, Hemlock, MI, for Plaintiffs. Katelyn D. Crysler, Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, Detroit, MI, Matthew T. Nelson, Warner Norcross + Judd, Grand Rapids, MI, Sean Michael Freel, Freel Profressional Corp, Tawas City, MI, for Defendants Harry Harvey, David Schmidt. Allan C. Vander Laan, Kristen Lee Rewa, Meigs M. Day, Cummings McClorey Davis & Acho, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendants County of Alcona. Daniel Zick, Thomas R. Meagher, Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C., Lansing, MI, for Defendants Kenneth Gibson, Township of Caledonia. William Jay Brown, Brown Law PLC, Midland, MI, William P. Slough, Kirkpatrick, Slough, Duitsman-Coy & Mott, PLC, Gaylord, MI, for Defendant Keith Krentz.
ORDER GRANTING MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MOTION TO HOLD ITS INTERVENTION DEADLINE IN ABEYANCE
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, United States District Judge
In this case, the potential unconstitutionality of two Michigan statutes was certified to the Attorney General of Michigan—on Plaintiffs' motion—with an intervention deadline of May 1, 2023. Mockeridge v. Alcona Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 1:21-CV-12896, 665 F.Supp.3d 857 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2023).
However, with just 16 days left on the clock, Michigan has requested postponement of its intervention deadline until the Parties' five pending summary-judgment motions are resolved. ECF No. 117. Specifically, Michigan argues that Defendants have presented interpretations of the statutes that, if adopted, would moot the constitutional issues and, thus, the certification. Id. Michigan therefore seeks an additional 30 days to intervene after the resolution of the five motions if the certification is still apt. Id. at PageID. 2803. Otherwise, Michigan requests an extension until May 22, 2023. Id.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, advance three arguments for why Michigan should "either timely step up to the plate or stay in the dugout":
(1) State attorneys general may not self-decide when to join a federal case.See generally ECF No. 119.
(2) Nonparty Michigan has no current case or controversy with Plaintiffs and would be seeking to intervene as a party defendant, which would force Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to request relief against Michigan.
(3) An extension would be prejudicial and unfair to Plaintiffs.
Using Plaintiffs' "baseball metaphor," see ECF No. 119 at PageID.2810, it is difficult to understand why Plaintiffs worked so hard to invite Michigan's Attorney General to the field but now want to prevent her from playing. Moreover, "[t]he court may extend the 60-[day] period on its own or on motion." FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1 advisory committee's note to 2006 enactment. Second, state attorneys general who receive certification of the potential unconstitutionality "of any statute of that State" have Article III standing. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) ("The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality."). Third, a brief pause won't prejudice Plaintiffs, as they are the ones who requested the State of Michigan to intervene and cannot call foul on the consequences. And the five pending motions don't throw any curveballs, as Congress contemplated calling a time-out for this exact situation. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1 advisory committee's note to 2006 enactment ("One occasion for extension may arise if the court certifies a challenge under § 2403 after a party files a notice of constitutional question. Pretrial activities may continue without interruption during the intervention period, and the court retains authority to grant interlocutory relief."). In sum, these three strikes end Plaintiffs' turn at bat.
As Michigan correctly notes, extending its deadline to intervene requires "good cause." FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have completely failed to address Michigan's good cause. See generally ECF No. 119. Regardless, "premature adjudication" must be avoided "at all costs." Novak v. Federspiel, No. 1:21-CV-12008, 644 F.Supp.3d 378, 381 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2022) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997)). Federal courts should not interfere with important state functions, make tentative decisions on state law, or engage in premature constitutional adjudication. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965); Barber v. Charter Twp. of Springfield, 31 F.4th 382, 395 (6th Cir. 2022) (Readier, J., dissenting). This is a deeply rooted doctrine in constitutional law: that constitutional questions may not be decided unless they are unavoidable. Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., 975 F.3d 554, 571 n.5 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases); accord Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) ("[W]e have insisted that federal courts do not decide questions of constitutionality on the basis of preliminary guesses regarding local law.") (collecting cases). Because resolution of the five summary-judgment motions might moot Michigan's possible intervention, the deadline to intervene will be adjourned until resolution of the motions or further order of this Court.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Michigan Attorney General's Motion for Abeyance, ECF No. 117, is GRANTED.
Further, it is ORDERED that the Michigan Attorney General's deadline to intervene in the above-captioned case is ADJOURNED to 30 days after this Court resolves the five pending motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 79; 80; 83; 85; 86, or until further order of this Court.
This is not a final order and does not close the above-captioned case.