The petition set forth a claim for equitable and declaratory relief to enjoin the sheriff in that sale as well as to declare the rights of the parties. See Continental Oil Co. Agrico Chemical Co. Div. v. Sutton, 126 Ga. App. 78, 80 (1) ( 189 S.E.2d 925); Concrete Coring Contractors v. Mechanical Contractors Engineers, Inc., 220 Ga. 714, 719 ( 141 S.E.2d 439); Davis v. Logan, 206 Ga. 524, 526 (4) ( 57 S.E.2d 588); Ballard v. Waites, 194 Ga. 427 ( 21 S.E.2d 848); Mock v. Darby, 109 Ga. App. 620 ( 137 S.E.2d 81). The trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

In so holding, we express no opinion as to the substantive merits of appellant's claim but only that it has a procedural right to a hearing on its petition. Mock v. Darby, 109 Ga. App. 620 ( 137 S.E.2d 81) (1964). Judgment reversed. Deen, C. J., and Shulman, J., concur.

The issue decided by the majority is whether coverage vel non under an insurance policy affords the basis for a declaratory judgment action. It has been held that it does in Mensinger v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 202 Ga. 258 ( 42 S.E.2d 628); St. Paul Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 216 Ga. 437, 438 ( 117 S.E.2d 459); Georgia Cas. c. Co. v. Turner, 86 Ga. App. 418 ( 71 S.E.2d 773); Darling v. Jones, 88 Ga. App. 812 ( 78 S.E.2d 94); Griffin v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 801 ( 92 S.E.2d 871); Buffington v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 139 ( 121 S.E.2d 270); Dearhart v. Reserve Ins. Co., 108 Ga. App. 347 ( 132 S.E.2d 809), reversed on other grounds in 219 Ga. 699 ( 135 S.E.2d 378); Mock v. Darby, 109 Ga. App. 620 ( 137 S.E.2d 81); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peek, 112 Ga. App. 260 ( 145 S.E.2d 50); Ditmyer v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 512 ( 160 S.E.2d 844); Stubbs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 120 Ga. App. 750 ( 172 S.E.2d 441); Finney v. Pan-American Fire Cas. Co., 123 Ga. App. 250 ( 180 S.E.2d 253); LaSalle National Ins. Co. v. Popham, 125 Ga. App. 724 ( 188 S.E.2d 870); Coleman v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 228 ( 202 S.E.2d 698); and Haley v. State Farm c. Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 258 ( 202 S.E.2d 838). This issue was not presented or ruled upon in this case by the trial court, nor is it made the subject matter of any enumeration of error.

See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-242 ( 81 LE 617, 620-622, 57 SC 461, 108 ALR 1000).' Accord: Mensinger v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 202 Ga. 258 ( 42 S.E.2d 628); Ga. Cas. c. Co. v. Turner, 86 Ga. App. 418 ( 71 S.E.2d 773); Parks v. Jones, 88 Ga. App. 188 ( 76 S.E.2d 449); Griffin v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 801 ( 92 S.E.2d 871); Buffington v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 139 ( 121 S.E.2d 270); Dearhart v. Reserve Ins. Co., 108 Ga. App. 347 ( 132 S.E.2d 809), reversed on other grounds in 219 Ga. 699 ( 135 S.E.2d 378); Mock v. Darby, 109 Ga. App. 620 ( 137 S.E.2d 81); Ditmyer v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 512 ( 160 S.E.2d 844); Stubbs v. State Farm Mut. c. Ins. Co., 120 Ga. App. 750 ( 172 S.E.2d 441). Professor Borchard, who drafted the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, after which the various State Acts, including ours, is patterned, says that "cases which have attracted most attention to the declaratory judgment are those in which a casualty company institutes an action against the insured, joining or not joining the injured parties, for a declaration that the company is not under a duty to defend or to pay any eventual judgment, because the injury or death is not within the coverage of the policy or because the company has some defense which exempts it."

"Where an insurer denies coverage under a particular policy and seeks to relieve itself of its obligation to defend a pending suit against an insured because of circumstances pleaded which case doubt on the coverage of the policy as applied to those circumstances, there is such an immediacy of choice imposed upon it as to justify an adjudication by declaratory judgment." Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Peek, 112 Ga. App. 260 ( 145 S.E.2d 50). Accord: Mensinger v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 202 Ga. 258 ( 42 S.E.2d 628); Georgia Cas. c. Co. v. Turner, 86 Ga. App. 418 ( 71 S.E.2d 773); Parks v. Jones, 88 Ga. App. 188 ( 76 S.E.2d 449); Darling v. Jones, 88 Ga. App. 812 ( 78 S.E.2d 94); Griffin v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 801 ( 92 S.E.2d 871); Buffington v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 139 ( 121 S.E.2d 270); Dearhart v. Reserve Ins. Co., 108 Ga. App. 347 ( 132 S.E.2d 809), reversed on other grounds in 219 Ga. 699 ( 135 S.E.2d 378); Mock v. Darby, 109 Ga. App. 620 ( 137 S.E.2d 81). Although it is true that it is not alleged in the petition for declaratory judgment that either the plaintiffs in the pending suits or the defendant Henderson have made any demand upon the company for payment, or that they have notified it that they will look to it for payment of any judgment that may be rendered in them, "yet the plaintiffs are seeking judgments, and until they procure them they are in no position to make demand for payment upon the insurance company.

And where a complaint in a proceeding for a declaratory judgment stated a justiciable controversy, a demurrer should have been overruled, and after the filing of an answer, a decree containing a declaration of right should have been entered." Georgia Cas. c. Co. v. Turner, 86 Ga. App. 418, 423 ( 71 S.E.2d 773); Parks v. Jones, 88 Ga. App. 188, 191 ( 76 S.E.2d 449); Darling v. Jones, 88 Ga. App. 812, 815 ( 78 S.E.2d 94); Mock v. Darby, 109 Ga. App. 620 ( 137 S.E.2d 81). Regardless of whether the plaintiff's contentions are or are not correct in fact and in law, the petition here shows that plaintiff is in a position of uncertainty and insecurity with respect to its rights and obligations under the policy.