Nonetheless, we conclude that the school principals are equivalent to neighborhood business managers and thus could present testimony. However, an examination of their testimony reveals that it was wholly speculative in nature, and was based exclusively on what "might" occur if the license were granted. As such, it was not entitled to any weight by the local authority, Mobell v. Meyer, 172 Colo. 12, 469 P.2d 414 (1970); McQuate v. City of Boulder Fermented Malt Beverage Licensing Authority, 161 Colo. 190, 420 P.2d 823 (1966), and therefore, it could not be used as grounds for denying the license. Nor could the mere proximity of the school to the proposed outlet justify a denial of the license.
While testimony was presented regarding the teenage drinking problem at an adjacent high school and the possible adverse effect issuance of the license would have on that problem, these factors alone were not the basis of the council's denial, and thus their presence in the record does not mandate reversal. See Mobell v. Meyer, 172 Colo. 12, 469 P.2d 414 (1970). In conclusion, the council acted within its discretion in ordering the second hearing.
It appears, however, that the council's primary considerations were based on the needs of the neighborhood, and desires of the inhabitants, as required by s 12--46--105(1) (c), C.R.S.1973, and thus, the possibility that irrelevancies were also considered does not constitute reversible error. See Mobell v. Meyer, 172 Colo. 12, 469 P.2d 414. The record shows that there are two other outlets within the designated area for consumption of 3.2% Beer both on and off the premises and that the council recognized the difference between Loaf 'N Jug's proposed outlet and outlets selling for on the premise consumption only.
The only factors to be considered by the City Council in ruling on a beer application are 'the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood and the desires of the inhabitants as evidenced by petitions, remonstrances, or otherwise.' Section 12--46--105(1), C.R.S. 1973, See also Mobell v. Meyer, 172 Colo. 12, 469 P.2d 414. These needs and desires were evidenced by the petitions presented by the applicants at the hearing, and, while mere numbers are not determinative, See Vigil v. Burress, 157 Colo. 507, 404 P.2d 147, the evidence was overwhelming that the residents felt their needs were not being met. The verified signatures on the petitions presented at the hearing showed 357 people in favor of the Rais' application, and 85 against, while the Mesa Pizza Hut application had 623 in favor and 75 opposed.
The trial court properly determined that this testimony was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a denial of a license. Mobell v. Meyer, 469 P.2d 414; McQuate v. Boulder, 161 Colo. 190, 420 P.2d 823; Ladd v. Board of County Commissioners, 146 Colo. 366, 361 P.2d 627. The council's primary argument is that the denial of a liquor license could not be an abuse of discretion where evidence showed that applicant's premises were within 450 feet of a junior college campus.