Under the situation here presented plaintiff's claims could not be established other than by the testimony of an expert or experts possessing the requisite knowledge as to proper care and skill with reference to such matters according to the teachings of osteopathic schools, and the methods customarily employed by osteopathic practitioners, as suggested by the applicable test. The case of Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769 ( 238 N.W. 529, 78 ALR 694), is typical of the decisions holding that where the question at issue is the failure to exercise due care in the making of a diagnosis an expert belonging to one school may be competent to testify in an action brought against a practitioner of a different school. For the reasons above stated, it and similar decisions are not in point in the instant controversy.
And no act of the legislature, except such as may be passed at the first session under this Constitution, shall take effect until the expiration of ninety days after its passage, unless the legislature shall by a vote of two thirds of the members elected to each house, taken by yeas and nays, otherwise direct.W. Va. Const., art. VI, § 30, was cited in Moats v. Cook, 113 W. Va. 151, 167 S.E. 137 (1932), in which action this Court held that the office of advisory member of the State board of education was not abolished, where the language of the legislative act in question abolishing that office was not indicated in the title to the act. The following language of Judge Lively in Moats constitutes an adequate reply to the assertion of the respondents in this action that the manner of termination of the employment of the State janitors was justified for economic reasons.
The general principles stated in the quotation appearing immediately above have been recognized and adhered to by this Court. State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W. Va. 72, pts. 1 and 2 syl., 105 S.E.2d 886; State ex rel. McMillion v. Stahl, 141 W. Va. 233, 238-239, 89 S.E.2d 693, 698; State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 134 W. Va. 278, 287, 58 S.E.2d 766, 772; City of Wheeling ex rel. Carter v. American Casualty Company, 131 W. Va. 584, 594-595, 48 S.E.2d 404, 410; Brewer v. City of Point Pleasant, 114 W. Va. 572, pts. 2 and 3 syl., 172 S.E. 717; Boggess v. Johnson, 113 W. Va. 193, 167 S.E. 82; Moats v. Cook, 113 W. Va. 151, pt. 1 syl., 167 S.E. 137; Brozka v. County Court of Brooke County, 111 W. Va. 191, 160 S.E. 914; State v. Scarbrough, 108 W. Va. 9, 150 S.E. 219; State v. Furr, 101 W. Va. 178, pts. 1 and 2 syl., 132 S.E. 504; Casto v. Upshur County High School Board, 94 W. Va. 513, 520, 119 S.E. 470, 473; State v. Haskins, 92 W. Va. 632, pts. 2 and 3 syl., 115 S.E. 720; State ex rel. Hallanan v. Thompson, 80 W. Va. 698, pt. 1 syl., 93 S.E. 810; McEldowney v. Wyatt, 44 W. Va. 711, 30 S.E. 239; State v. Mines, 38 W. Va. 125, pts. 10 and 11 syl., 18 S.E. 470; Chesapeake Ohio R. R. Co. v. Patton, 9 W. Va. 648, 655-656. The same general principles are adhered to and applied in Virginia.
Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa 593, 597, 41 N.W.2d 702, 705, and citations; Johnson v. Borland, 317 Mich. 225, 26 N.W.2d 755, 757; 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons, section 48d, page 960. See also Van Sickle v. Doolittle, 173 Iowa 727, 155 N.W. 1007; Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Maine 328, 62 A.2d 174; Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114, 70 L.R.A. 49; Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N.W. 529, 78 A.L.R. 694; Williams v. Marini, 105 Vt. 11, 162 A. 796. In the Josselyn, Grainger, Cook and Williams cases defendant was an osteopath.
As defendant's brief stated, a physician is entitled to an error of judgment or an honest mistake. Brown v. United States, 419 F.2d 337 [8th Cir., December 5, 1969]; Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N.W. 529. However, the failure to make the brucellosis diagnosis in 1964 is more than an error of judgment and does constitute negligence.
Unlike ordinary legislation, a constitution is enacted by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity and is therefore the paramount law. " State ex rel. Smith v. Gore , 150 W. Va. 71, 77, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1965) (emphasis added); Moats v. Cook , 113 W. Va. 151, 167 S.E.137, 138-39 (1932) ("The Constitution is the supreme law of the land...."). As this Court held in syllabus point three of State ex rel. Casey v. Pauley , 158 W. Va. 298, 210 S.E.2d 649 (1975), "[c]ourts are not concerned with the wisdom or expediencies of constitutional provisions, and the duty of the judiciary is merely to carry out the provisions of the plain language stated in the constitution. "
"When a patient selects one of the several recognized schools of treatment, he thereby adopts and accepts the kind of treatment common to that school; and the care, skill, and diligence with which he is treated, when that becomes a question in the courts of this state, must be tested by the evidence of those who are trained and skilled in that particular school of treatment." Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263 P. 26, 56 A.L.R. 814; Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769 238 N.W. 529, 78 A.L.R. 694, 701. That rule is not applicable in view of the real issue in this case.
"AN ACT authorizing and directing a reduction in the salary of each and every holder of a public office or position, or place of public employment in the state of West Virginia, or any of its subdivisions, from and after the date that this act becomes effective, or as soon thereafter as the term of the present incumbent of an office shall expire, or existing legal contracts of employment shall terminate, providing certain exceptions thereto, and also fixing the salary of the holders of certain other offices, public positions or places of public employment in this state, and certain political subdivisions thereof, as hereinafter set out and specified, and providing penalties for the violation of this act." As stated by Judge Lively in our recent case Moats v. Cook, 113 W. Va. 151, 167 S.E. 137, involving the same statute in so far as it attempts to abolish the "positions" of members of the advisory council to the state board of education, this title by its most liberal construction expressed the purposes (1) of directing a reduction in salaries of officers of those holding public positions in the state government or any of its subdivisions; (2) fixing salaries of the holders of certain offices and public positions in the state government and certain political subdivisions thereof; and (3) providing penalties for violations. We held in that case that subsection (v) of section 5, abolishing the positions of members of the state board of education and the position of each of its advisory members, was void on the ground that it was not within the title of the act.
Very many questions pertaining to the diagnosis, physical conditions and what they indicated, the progress of the infection and other observed facts and their significance, could be established by regular physicians; indeed, some of them, at least, could be shown by unskilled observers. But when the propriety of the treatment from an osteopathic standpoint is the question, the ordinary physician should be rejected as a competent expert, unless it is made to appear that both the schools to which the witness and the defendant belong require and employ the same treatment. Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114, 70 L.R.A. 49, 59; Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769, 238 N.W. 529, 78 A.L.R. 694, and note. This is a corollary to the proposition that the skill of any practitioner of medicine is to be judged by the requirements of his own school. Expert osteopathic evidence was produced at the trial.
Janssen v Mulder, 232 Mich. 183; 205 N.W. 159; 25 NCCA 248 (1925), see also Annotation, 85 ALR2d 1022, 1023-1026, 61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, § 113, pp 235-236, 70 CJS, Physicians and Surgeons, § 44, p 953. In Bryant v Biggs, 331 Mich. 64, 77; 49 N.W.2d 63 (1951), the Supreme Court rejected the proposition set forth in Cook v Moats, 121 Neb. 769; 238 N.W. 529; 78 ALR 694 (1931), that in certain cases osteopathic and medical standards should be the same. However, since that time a growing number of jurisdictions have begun to recognize an exception to the general rule when the standards are similar.