Opinion
September 16, 1999
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.), entered December 23, 1997 which denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion granted, and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.
Lisa E. Mudd for Defendant-Appellant.
ROSENBERGER, J.P., MAZZARELLI, RUBIN, ANDRIAS, BUCKLEY, JJ.
Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of contract, intentional interference with contract and prima facie tort based upon the suspension of his hospital privileges. Plaintiff, a thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon, was at first summarily suspended by the hospital's Medical Board upon allegations that he had been verbally abusive and failed to follow hospital practice when there was a scheduling conflict. An adversarial hearing was held by defendant's Ad Hoc Committee, which concluded that plaintiff's conduct was lower than the standards of the Medical Staff, was potentially disruptive to the hospital's operations and should be censured. The Medical Board thereafter adopted the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations requiring continued suspension unless and until plaintiff signed a written apology and he agreed in writing to follow hospital policies and practices. Plaintiff requested further administrative review but, after several adjournments requested by him, failed to appear before the Appellate Review Committee, which thereafter issued a report finding substantial evidence on the record justifying continued suspension until plaintiff apologized and agreed to comply. Subsequently the hospital's Board of Trustees ratified the Medical Board's actions.
There is no common-law cause of action based upon a denial of staff privileges by a private hospital (Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Assn., 11 N.Y.2d 205, 208-209). In 1972, section 2801-b Pub. Health of the Public Health Law was enacted to limit the common-law rule that immunized a private hospital's action from judicial scrutiny (L 1972, ch 284, § 2; Matter of Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 39 N.Y.2d 339, 344-345). Where a cause of action is based upon an allegedly wrongful denial of hospital privileges, the aggrieved physician is limited to injunctive relief under § 2801-c and is barred by § 2801-b from maintaining an action for damages (Wee v. City of Rome, 233 A.D.2d 876; Chuz v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 186 A.D.2d 450, 451). Plaintiff has never sought injunctive relief and, even had he specifically requested such relief in this action, has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to such relief (Gelbard v. Genesee Hosp., 211 A.D.2d 159, 161-162, affd 87 N.Y.2d 691; Guibor v. Manhattan Eye. Ear and Throat Hosp., 46 N.Y.2d 736). Plaintiff has elected to pursue causes of action for damages which all arise from the allegedly wrongful suspension of privileges. There are no contract or by-laws claims separate from the suspension of his privileges. All of plaintiff's causes of action for damages should have been dismissed since they are barred by Public Health Law § 2801-b (Solomon v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 248 A.D.2d 118, appeal dismissed in part, denied in part 92 N.Y.2d 874; Farooq v. Millard Fillmore Hosp., 172 A.D.2d 1063).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.