See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S.Ct. 299, 300, 33 L.Ed. 637, 640 (1890), in which the Court stated that "religion," as used in the First Amendment, "has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will." In Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803, 99 S.Ct. 57, 58 L.Ed.2d 95 (1978), the Missouri Supreme Court, in addressing the issue of whether a taxpayer qualified for a tax exemption applicable to property "used exclusively for religious worship," cited, with approval, the definition of religion set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Davis, supra. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965), and Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) (conscientious-objector cases in which the courts discussed a Davis- based statutory definition of "religious training and belief").
Taxation of property is the rule, and exemption from taxation is the exception. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Mo. banc 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803, 99 S.Ct. 57, 58 L.Ed.2d 95 (1978); Midwest Bible Missionary Institute v. Sestric, 364 Mo. 167, 174, 260 S.W.2d 25, 30 (1953). Statutes granting exemptions from taxation are to be construed strictly, but reasonably, against the party claiming the exemption.
This Court has further held that other, basic principles of evidence also apply in administrative proceedings. Thus, in Missouri Church ofScientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo. banc 1977), this Court stated, "[a]lthough technical rules of evidence are not controlling in administrative hearings, fundamental rules of evidence are applicable." The principle set out in Missouri Church of Scientology reiterates a principle this Court recognized at least as long ago as State ex rel. De Weese v. Morris, 221 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Mo. 1949), in which this Court stated, "[t]he fact that technical rules of evidence do not control has been considered to permit of leading questions and other informalities but not to abrogate the fundamental rules of evidence."
Moreover, where the action of the board does not involve exercise of its administrative discretion in light of the facts but only the application of the law to the facts, the reviewing court may weigh the evidence for itself and determine the facts accordingly, giving due weight to the opportunity of the board to observe the witnesses. § 536.140.3 and Bergman v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis, 425 S.W.2d 143, 146-47 (Mo. 1968); see also Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 838-39 (Mo. 1977) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803, 99 S.Ct. 57, 58 L.Ed.2d 95 (1978), and J.E. Williams Construction Co. v. Spradling, 555 S.W.2d 16, 23 (Mo. 1977) (en banc; per curiam). In Bergman the court held at 47 that [a]fter the facts are determined, appellant either is or is not entitled to the increased pension benefits as a matter of law.
In considering respondent's claim, this court is guided by the following principles: Taxation of property is the rule, and exemption from taxation is the exception. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Mo. banc 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803, 99 S.Ct. 57, 58 L.Ed.2d 95 (1978); Midwest Bible Missionary Institute v. Sestric, 364 Mo. 167, 174, 260 S.W.2d 25, 30 (1953). Statutes granting exemptions from taxation are to be construed strictly, but reasonably, against the party claiming exemption.
Scientology is not universally conceded to be a religion. See Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n., 560 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Mo. 1977) (applying a "Supreme Being" test to disqualify Scientology for a state tax exemption). Although the broader definition of religion has been applied in several free exercise cases arising in different contexts, it cannot be said to have completely carried the field.
While Antioch notes the BZA did not put on any evidence contradicting its claims that the zoning change would benefit it, the BZA did not have any burden to do so. It was up to Antioch to present competent and substantial evidence supporting a variance, and up to the BZA to determine, in its discretion, whether that evidence supported a variance. See supra § II ; cf. Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 843 (Mo. banc 1977) (finding an "administrative agency may base its decision solely on a finding of lack of credible testimony, though such testimony is uncontradicted or unimpeached"). For these reasons, the Church has failed to show "as a practical matter the property cannot be used for a [specific] permitted use without coming into conflict with certain of the ordinance’s restrictions."
The taxpayer has the burden of proof before the AHC, and the Hermanns fail to meet the statutory requirements under section 143.081.3 to satisfy the burden of proving the tax credit applies to their 1996 tax return under these circumstances.State ex rel. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Koupal, 835 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Mo.banc 1992); Spudich v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo.banc 1988); State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Goldberg, 578 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo.banc 1979); and Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Mo. banc 1977). See section 621.050.2 and section 136.300.2.
This interpretation is contrary to the tax policy formulated by the legislature as "[i]t is firmly engrained that taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception and such claims are not favored in the law." Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Mo. banc 1977) (internal citation omitted). The majority correctly acknowledges its role in the interpretation of the sales tax statute: "[S]ales tax is purely a matter of statute and within the power of the legislature, subject to constitutional limits.
In the trial court, the taxpayer has the burden of establishing that its property falls within the exempted class. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Mo. banc 1978). The standard of appellate review of evidentiary issues in a nonjury case is that the judgment will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it or unless it is against the weight of the evidence.