Opinion
2022-SC-0365-MR
06-15-2023
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Elizabeth B. McMahon Leo Gerard Smith Louisville Metro Public Defender's Office. COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Michael Robert Wajda Assistant Solicitor General.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS NO. 2022-CA-0651 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 20-F-009095, 22-H-000405 &22-H-000405-001.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Elizabeth B. McMahon Leo Gerard Smith Louisville Metro Public Defender's Office.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky Michael Robert Wajda Assistant Solicitor General.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
M.L.S. appeals to this Court from the Court of Appeals' denial of a writ to prohibit the Jefferson Circuit Court from proceeding with the Commonwealth's petition to involuntarily commit M.L.S. The underlying basis of the relief sought by M.L.S. is that recently enacted KRS Chapter 202C, codifying the commitment process, is unconstitutional. This Court recently considered the same constitutional arguments raised by M.L.S. in another writ case. We concluded that the petitioners in that case, G.P. v. Bisig, had an adequate remedy available by appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeals' denial of a writ of prohibition. We likewise conclude M.L.S. has an adequate remedy by appeal and affirm the Court of Appeals.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
In September 2022, this Court heard oral argument in the combined cases of G. P. v. Hon Angela McCormick Bisig, Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court, Div. 10., and Commonwealth of Kentucky, Case No. 2022-SC-0011-MR; and C.M. v. Hon Annie O'Connell, Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court, Div. 2, and Commonwealth of Kentucky, Case No. 2022-SC-0125-MR. The Court rendered its decision in October 2022, a few days after M.L.S. filed the instant appeal. M.L.S. noted that her appeal raised the same issues before the Court in those two cases.
655 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2022).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
M.L.S. was charged in Jefferson District Court with assault in the first degree. Defense counsel moved for an evaluation to determine whether M.L.S. was competent to stand trial. After M.L.S. was examined at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), the Jefferson District Court held a competency hearing. The District Court found M.L.S. incompetent but that there was a substantial probability the M.L.S. might regain competency in the foreseeable future. Pursuant to KRS 504.110, the District Court ordered M.L.S. to return to KCPC for treatment for an additional 60 days, unless she was found competent to stand trial within that period.
In March 2022, the Jefferson District Court found M.L.S. incompetent and unlikely to regain competency in the foreseeable future. On the same date, the Commonwealth filed a petition in Jefferson Circuit Court for M.L.S.'s involuntary hospitalization pursuant to KRS Chapter 202C, codifying House Bill 310 which had been signed into law on April 1, 2021. Defense counsel filed objections and moved the circuit court to hold House Bill 310 unconstitutional. After oral argument, the Jefferson Circuit Court denied the motion.
Id. at 129-30 (describing the involuntary commitment process).
In June 2022, M.L.S. sought a second-class writ of prohibition from the Court of Appeals asserting that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred by failing to find House Bill 310 unconstitutional and requested that the Court of Appeals enter a writ prohibiting the trial court from proceeding with the Commonwealth's petition to involuntarily commit M.L.S. The Court of Appeals denied the petition because M.L.S. failed to show a lack of adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
M.L.S. asserts that KRS 202C is unconstitutional for various reasons, including 1) the General Assembly did not comply with Kentucky constitutional requirements for legislative procedure in passing House Bill 310; 2) KRS 202C applies retroactively in violation of KRS 446.080 and KRS 446.110; and 3) KRS 202C does not afford incompetent defendants adequate due process protection. M.L.S. seeks a writ of the second class, arguing that the circuit court is acting erroneously; that a direct appeal cannot redress the injury created by litigating her case in unconstitutional proceedings, i.e., her injuries include being forced to participate in the proceedings and "run the gauntlet" and potentially suffer a loss of liberty before an appeal may taken; and that the special case exception applies.
See id. at 131.
As noted above, we recently addressed the same issues and argument in Bisig for defendants who, like M.L.S., petitioned for a writ of prohibition at the Court of Appeals before an ultimate determination of commitment was made by the trial court, but after being confined following the initiation of KRS 202C proceedings. Because M.L.S. is similarly situated to the Bisig petitioners and presents the same issues and allegations of harm, we adopt this Court's opinion in Bisig and incorporate it herein by reference.
In sum, "[a] writ may not be used as a substitute for appeal or to circumvent normal appellate procedure." "Even in cases involving a claimed constitutional defect, it is generally the law that the remedy of appeal is adequate and prohibition is not proper." Here, if the trial court enters a final commitment order, M.L.S. may seek redress of her injuries on appeal, and pursuant to KRS 202C.110, may also petition for a writ of habeas corpus to question the cause and legality of the detention and request that the court issue a writ for release.
Lawson v. Woeste, 603 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Ky. 2020) (citing Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. Corns, 736 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. 1987); and Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1961)).
Appalachian Reg'l Health Care, Inc. v. Johnson, 862 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Ky. 1993) (citation omitted).
Id. at 130-32.
CONCLUSION
Because M.L.S. has an adequate remedy by appeal to redress her allegations of injury, we affirm the Court of Appeals' denial of a writ of prohibition.
All sitting.
All concur.