Opinion
24A-JT-263
06-26-2024
In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: M.L. (Minor Child), R.L. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Alexander W. Robbins Robbins Law LLC Martinsville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Morgan Circuit Court The Honorable Matthew G. Hanson, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 55C01-2304-JT-160
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Alexander W. Robbins Robbins Law LLC Martinsville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Brown, Judge.
[¶1] R.L. ("Mother") appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor child, M.L. ("Child"). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Mother and B.L. ("Father") are the parents of Child, born in August 2021. At the time of Child's birth, the Parents had open cases with the Department of Child Services ("DCS") regarding their two older children due to both Parents' drug use. In October 2021, DCS filed a Request for Approval of Program of Informal Adjustment under cause number 55C01-2110-JM-332, which was approved by the court. Mother subsequently tested positive for methamphetamine and was arrested in December 2021 for possession of a narcotic drug, unlawful possession of a syringe, and possession of paraphernalia. In January 2022, Child was removed from both Parents' care, and DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services ("CHINS"). The court held a hearing in February 2022, during which Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS because "she has open CHINS cases for other children, that she has tested positive for methamphetamine, that she has used methamphetamine, [and] agrees that [the] court's involvement is necessary to ensure compliance with recommended services[.]" Transcript Volume II at 25; Exbibits Volume 3 at 36.
Father's rights were also involuntarily terminated but he does not participate in this appeal.
[¶3] In March 2022, the court held a dispositional hearing and ordered Mother to: stay in contact with DCS and cooperate with Child's reunification permanency plan; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure a legal and stable source of income adequate to support all household members, including Child; not consume or sell any controlled substances; obey the law; complete a substance use assessment and follow all recommendations for treatment; submit to random drug screens; attend all visits; and demonstrate she is an effective caregiver who possesses the necessary skills, knowledge, and abilities to provide Child with a safe and stable home free from abuse and neglect on a long term basis.
[¶4] Over the next several months, Mother often had no contact with providers, failed to submit to required drug screens, and only attended a few visits with Child. Mother showed up for some visits under the influence of drugs, and the visitation referral was closed in late April 2022 due to safety concerns. Mother failed to appear for multiple status hearings, and she was arrested in June 2022 and placed in jail. In December 2022, the court held a status hearing and determined Mother was not in compliance with services and added a concurrent permanency plan of adoption.
[¶5] On April 4, 2023, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child. The court held a fact- finding hearing on January 4, 2024. DCS presented the testimony of Dr. Aaron Brown, scientific director of Cordant Health Solutions, Sawyer Toll, a mental health therapist ("Therapist Toll"), Family Case Managers Kylie Flynn and Tara Everroad ("FCM Flynn" and "FCM Everroad"), and Court Appointed Special Advocate Amy Twardoski ("CASA Twardoski"). Mother presented the testimony of CASA Twardoski.
[¶6] On January 8, 2024, the court entered a detailed twenty-page order finding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the continued placement outside the home would not be remedied; there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being; termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests; and there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being adoption.
Discussion
[¶7] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied and there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child.
[¶8] In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[¶9] A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. "Because a case that seems close on a 'dry record' may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence." Id. at 640.
[¶10] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child's removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See id. at 642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). A court may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent's response to those services. Id. Where there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances the problematic situation will not improve. Id.
[¶11] We note that to the extent Mother does not challenge the court's findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied. Indeed, Mother "accepts the trial court's findings regarding the conditions that led to [Child's] removal" which included "drug use by [Mother]" and "stability questions," but argues she "had insufficient time and opportunity to remedy or demonstrate the likelihood of remedying the conditions that led to the removal" because she "was incarcerated and had no services available to her" for "half of the life of the CHINS case[.]" Appellant's Brief at 9.
[¶12] The trial court's extensive termination order detailed Mother's history with DCS, her continued drug abuse, criminal activity, and incarceration. It emphasized Mother's failure to comply with services during the considerable period she was not incarcerated, noting that "she has done absolutely nothing ordered by this court and has done nothing promised in order to 'change her life.'" Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 169. Indeed, the record reveals that Mother was not in jail and could have participated in services for the first several months of the CHINS proceedings but she failed to do so. FCM Flynn testified that Child was originally removed from Mother's care due to "[s]ubstance abuse . . . lack of stability overall with housing and employment . . . also criminal issues[.]" Transcript Volume II at 124. FCM Flynn stated that, although Mother completed an intake assessment regarding her substance abuse, Mother "never did anything else" to address her issues. Id. at 126. Therapist Toll confirmed this in testifying that, other than completing an intake assessment through Centerstone, Mother failed to participate in any recommended services.
[¶13] The record further reveals that Mother became incarcerated in June 2022, was released on June 11, 2023, and was to contact DCS and report to Magdelene House for substance abuse treatment upon her release. FCM Everroad, who took over the case while Mother was incarcerated, testified that Mother did not contact DCS or report to Magdelene House as ordered. Thereafter, Mother contacted FCM Everroad "[v]ery minimally" and when FCM Everroad attempted to schedule to meet with Mother, "she wouldn't respond." Id. at 142. Mother further failed to provide any required drug screens after her release from jail, and she did not request any visitation with Child. As found by the trial court, the evidence demonstrated that Mother took "no steps to see [Child] . . . when she has been out of jail." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 169. When asked, if she had "any reason to believe based on your experience with this case that [M]other has appropriately addressed the reasons for [Child's] removal from her care," FCM Everroad responded, "No." Transcript Volume II at 143. FCM Everroad further opined that it was in Child's best interest that Mother's parental rights be terminated. CASA Twardoski similarly testified that, since her involvement with the case, nothing had changed and she supported the termination of Mother's parental rights.
[¶14] In light of the unchallenged findings and the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding a reasonable probability exists that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside Mother's care will not be remedied. Although Mother also challenges the trial court's finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, we need not address that argument as the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).
[¶15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights.
[¶16] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.