Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:05-cv-1513-GET.
February 15, 2006
ORDER
The above-styled matter is presently before the court on:
1) Winnebago Industries, Inc.'s ("Winnebago") motion for protective order [docket no. 27];
2) Workhorse Custom Chassis, LLC's ("Workhorse") motion for protective order [docket no. 343;
3) Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint [docket no. 74];
4) Winnebago's motion to quash plaintiffs' subpoena and motion for protective order [docket no. 77];
5) Winnebago's motion to supplement motion to quash [docket no. 78a;
6) Workhorse's motion to quash [docket no. 79];
7) Recreation Vehicle Industry Association, Inc.'s motion to quash plaintiffs' subpoena and objections thereto [docket no. 83];
8) Plaintiffs' motion to vacate discovery deadline and to set a case management status conference [docket no. 92];
9) Plaintiffs' motion for a Rule 56 stay [docket no. 106] of Winnebago's motion for summary judgment;
10) Plaintiffs' motion for a Rule 56 stay [docket no. 107] of Workhorse's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs filed the instant action in the Superior Court of Fulton County on April 25, 2005, alleging that defendants, who manufactured parts of plaintiffs' motor home, failed to comply with their express and implied warranties in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et. seq. ("Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act"). Defendants removed the action to this court on June 9, 2005 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d).
Defendants each filed a motion for protective order in late July 2005. The parties discussed possible mediation and settlement during August and September. On October 20, 2005, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint. On November 10, 2005 both defendants filed separate motions to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to Recreational Vehicle Industry Association, Inc. ("RV1A"). On November 18, 2005, RVIA filed its own motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. On December 19, 2005, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the discovery deadline and to set a case management status conference. Discovery ended on January 7, 2006. On January 25, 2405, Winnebago filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 27, Workhorse filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 31, 2005, plaintiffs filed motions to stay each defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court will discuss plaintiffs' motion to amend, then consider discovery disputes and deadlines.
Motion to Amend
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff may amend its pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served and otherwise only by leave of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Under Rule 15, leave of court to file such amended pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." This decision is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or other inappropriate conduct, the court should allow leave to amend the relevant pleadings. Foman v. Davis, 37 1 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227 (1962).
Plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint in order to add the retailer who sold plaintiffs the motor home as a defendant. Because defendants have filed answers, plaintiffs must seek leave of the court. However, defendants have not filed any responses to plaintiffs' motion to amend. Local Rule 7.1B requires that "any party opposing a motion shall serve the party's response . . . not later than ten (10) days after service of the motion," and further provides that, "[f]ailure to file a response shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion." LR 7.1B, ND Ga.
After reviewing the record, the court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the court GRANTS plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint [docket no. 74] on the merits and as unopposed.
Motions for Protective Order
Both defendants filed motions for protective orders to prevent 30(b)(6) depositions noticed by plaintiffs and attendant requests to produce documents. Winnebago seeks a protective order to prevent the depositions of persons most knowledgeable on marketing, warranty terms, and component selection. Workhorse, the chassis manufacturer, seeks an order preventing the depositions of persons most knowledgeable on marketing and warranty terms. As defendants offer overlapping arguments in support of their motions, the court will discuss the common arguments first, and then address any individual arguments.
"Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). Generally, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party [which] need not be admissible at the trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
Several arguments raised by defendants are based on the reasoning that if defendants can demonstrate that certain of plaintiffs' claims are barred, discovery should not be permitted. For example, both defendants argue that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring deceptive warranty claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and that defendants' compliance with the single-document rule prevents certain of plaintiffs' claims. Workhorse offers additional arguments that plaintiffs made no claims under the warranty for repairs, do not contend to have relied on advertisements by Workhorse, and admit to having no problems with the portions of the motor home covered by Workhorse's warranty. A motion for protective order is not the appropriate mechanism for requesting the court to consider whether plaintiffs may proceed on certain claims. Rule 12 provides the motions available to parties to bring the merits of plaintiffs' claims to the attention of the court before discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12. However, neither defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Consequently, the court will not now consider arguments that plaintiffs may not seek discovery because plaintiffs are barred from bringing certain claims.
Defendants have offered additional arguments in support of their motions for protective orders. They argue that depositions of persons most knowledgeable of warranty terms and of marketing are irrelevant because determining whether a warranty has been breached should be based only on the warranty terms and contract law. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 525; 112 S. Ct. 2608 (2992). Plaintiffs contend that evidence outside the warranty is necessary to establish defendants' obligations under their warranties because the warranties are ambiguous as to coverage. Plaintiffs further assert that they may inquire about pre-purchase disclosure of warranty terms.
Defendants also argue that information concerning marketing and warranty is irrelevant because plaintiffs' choice to sue for breach of warranty precludes them from bringing fraud actions.See Reichman v. S. Ear, Nose Throat Surgeons, PC, 266 Ga. App. 696, 700 (2004). However, defendants cite no case prohibiting discovery on a fraud or contract claim because the other was also asserted; the cases cited determine liability after discovery on the basis of either contract or fraud, but not both. While plaintiffs may not be able to recover for both fraud and breach of warranty, they may assert alternative causes of action and seek discovery as to each.
Winnebago argues that the depositions and document requests seeking marketing and warranty information are not relevant to plaintiffs' warranty claims due to Winnebago's merger clause in the Limited Warranty. The clause provides that "Winnebago does not authorize any person to create for it any other obligations or liability in connection with this vehicle," which Winnebago contends is sufficient to bar oral representations of the warranty terms. See id. Plaintiffs respond that marketing is relevant pursuant to a Fifth Circuit decision establishing that terms of an advertisement may become part of a warranty. See Vogel v. Am. Warrant Home Serv. Corp. 695 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1980).
After considering the parties' arguments, the court finds that the arguments discussed above call for the resolution of issues on the merits, which are not ripe for determination until discovery expires. The arguments therefore do not support the motions for protective orders.
Defendants offer a few additional arguments, not based on the merits of plaintiffs' claim. Winnebago argues that plaintiffs' notice of deposition of person most knowledgeable on component selection is too broad, and calls for the production of trade secrets. However, Winnebago has not shown that trade secrets are implicated under the criteria laid out by the Eleventh Circuit for determining whether the documents sought contain trade secrets. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridaestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1313-1314 (11th Cir. 2002). Workhorse argues that the noticed depositions are too broad because they do not specify the precise subject matters, or narrow the scope even to the subject model motor home and chassis. Workhorse also argues that the noticed depositions and attendant document requests are unduly burdensome and unnecessary. After considering the parties' arguments, the court finds them insufficient to require a protective order. However, the arguments do raise legitimate concerns about the breadth of discovery sought.
Accordingly, and for all the aforementioned reasons, Winnebago's motion for protective order [docket no. 27] is DENIED. Workhorse's motion for protective order [docket no. 34] is DENIED. However, the 30(b) (6) depositions are limited to the model of motor home and chassis at issue in the case and the portions of the motor home that are allegedly defective: the electrical system, generator, paint, exterior and interior trim, heat pump, entry door, water leaks, bathroom door, slide out, black tank, air conditioning, oil leaks, satellite, headlights, entertainment center, back-up monitors and recalls of any parts of the motor home. When the motions for protective order were filed, approximately three months remained in the original discovery track. Accordingly, discovery is extended. Plaintiffs have three months from the date of this order to complete discovery; discovery is limited to the particular requests at issue in this order.
Motions to Quash
On October 27, 2005, pursuant to plaintiffs' request, this court issued a subpoena duces tecum to RVIA, a trade organization for manufacturers of recreational vehicles. Winnebago filed a motion to quash the subpoena and motion for protective order, and subsequently a motion to supplement its motion to quash. Winnebago's motion to supplement its motion to quash [docket no. 78] is GRANTED and considered. Workhorse also filed a motion to quash. Though the subpoena was not issued to either defendant, the motions were properly filed. Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 555 n. 3 (N.D. Ga. 2001). RVIA also filed a motion to quash, along with objections to the subpoena. After the motions to quash were filed, plaintiffs reissued the subpoena from a district court in Virginia as the district where production or inspection was requested. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(2)(C). However, because plaintiffs have not withdrawn the subpoena issued from this court, the motions to quash still must be decided.
Defendants object to the subpoena duces tecum issued by this court because it: 1) was improperly served; 2) issued from the wrong court; 3) unduly burdens RVIA to produce documents in breach of warranty claims against any members of its organization; 4) unduly burdens RVIA because certain materials sought are available from parties; 5) seeks confidential and protected trade secrets in agreements between RVIA members to arbitrate with, indemnify, or contribute to each other; and 6) seeks documents that are irrelevant to evaluating the underlying breach of warranty claim.
After considering the parties arguments, the court hereby GRANTS Winnebago's motion to quash [docket no. 77]; Winnebago's motion for protective order [docket no. 77]; Workhorse's motion to quash [docket no. 79] and RVIA's motion to quash [docket no. 83] without prejudice to plaintiffs' right to pursue the subpoena in the proper forum. However, any subpoenas issued for discovery in this matter are subject to the limitations imposed above: to the particular motor home, chassis, and defects at issue.
Plaintiffs' Remaining Motions
Plaintiffs have recently filed several motions seeking to establish new discovery deadlines and postpone filing responses to the motions for summary judgment. The court's order on the discovery motions, above, requires it to establish the deadlines plaintiffs seek.
First, plaintiffs have filed a motion to vacate discovery deadline and set a case management status conference. Plaintiffs allege that they needed discovery re-opened in order to permit the deposition of fire marshal Hall and resolve the existing discovery disputes. Plaintiffs requested a case management status conference due to the addition of a new defendant. In its response, Winnebago consented to the discovery extension for the purpose of Hail's deposition only, but opposed a conference with the court as unnecessary. Workhorse also filed a response, arguing that plaintiffs' counsel had adequate opportunity to depose Hall before the close of discovery and requesting the court to set a summary judgment deadline for twenty (20) days after Hall's deposition if the deposition was permitted.
Having considered the parties' arguments, and the court's decisions regarding discovery, plaintiffs' motion to vacate discovery deadline and for a case management status conference [docket no. 92] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Discovery is re-opened and extended as provided above, and plaintiffs may depose Hall during that time. However, a status conference is not necessary at this time. Parties are DIRECTED to resolve by agreement a discovery schedule consistent with this order and file it with the court. If the parties cannot agree on a discovery schedule, each should file a proposed suggestion for discovery schedule.
Secondly, plaintiffs have filed motions to stay each defendants' motion for summary judgment in order to complete discovery pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (t), Defendants timely filed their motions for summary judgment based on the expiration of discovery. Winnebago has filed a response agreeing to stay plaintiffs' response until after the deposition of Hall. Workhorse has not filed a response, but none is yet due. The court considers these motions to stay, though the time for responses has not yet expired, because the extension of discovery requires the court to extend summary judgment deadlines. Therefore, plaintiffs' motions to stay Winnebago's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 106] and Workhorse's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 107] are GRANTED. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are due twenty (20) days after the close of discovery, should they seek to file motions other than those already filed. Plaintiffs' responses to defendants' motions for summary judgment are due twenty (20) days after defendants' file renewed motions for summary judgment, or if defendants do not file renewed motions, within twenty (20) days after the close of discovery.
Summary
1) Winnebago's motion for protective order [docket no. 27] is DENIED;
2) Workhorse's motion for protective order [docket no. 34] is DENIED;
3) Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint [docket no. 74] is GRANTED;
4) Winnebago's motion to quash and motion for protective order [docket no. 77] are GRANTED;
5) Winnebago's motion to supplement motion to quash [docket no. 78] is GRANTED;
6) Workhorse's motion to quash [docket no. 79] is GRANTED;
7) RVIA's motion to quash [docket no. 83] is GRANTED;
8) Plaintiffs' motion to vacate discovery deadline and to set a case management status conference [docket no. 92] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED insofar as discovery is extended as provided below, and DENIED as to a status conference. Parties are DIRECTED to resolve by agreement a discovery schedule consistent with this order and file it with the court. If the parties cannot agree on a discovery schedule, each should file a proposed suggestion for discovery schedule;
9) Plaintiffs' motion to stay [docket no. 106] Winnebago's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;
10) Plaintiffs' motion to stay Workhorse's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 107] is GRANTED.
Discovery is hereby extended. Plaintiffs have three months from the date of this order to conduct only the discovery permitted by this order. Plaintiffs motions to quash are granted without prejudice to plaintiffs' right to pursue the subpoena in the proper forum. All additional discovery, including any subpoena issued for discovery in this matter, is limited to the model of motor home and chassis at issue in the case, and the particular defects asserted in plaintiffs' complaint: the electrical system, generator, paint, exterior and interior trim, heat pump, entry door, water leaks, bathroom door, slide out, black tank, air conditioning, oil leaks, satellite, headlights, entertainment center, back-up monitors and any recalls. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are due twenty (20) days after the close of discovery, should they seek to file motions other than those already filed. Plaintiffs' responses to defendants' motions for summary judgment are due twenty (20) days after defendants' file renewed motions for summary judgment, or if defendants do not file renewed motions, within twenty (20) days after the close of discovery.
SO ORDERED.