Where the trier of fact has drawn an inference of such implied permission from conflicting evidence bearing on that issue, which inference appears to be reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, that factual conclusion of permissive use may not be disturbed on appeal. ( Garmon v. Sebastian, 181 Cal.App.2d 254, 257 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 101], hear. den.; Mize v. Jorden, 116 Cal.App.2d 301, 305 [ 253 P.2d 702].) Furthermore, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to respondent, and all reasonable inferences should be indulged in to uphold the judgment.
[1] Ordinarily the question as to whether or not a vehicle was used with the permission of the owner is one of fact, to be determined by the trial court. ( Mize v. Jorden, 116 Cal.App.2d 301 [ 253 P.2d 702]; Casey v. Fortune, 78 Cal.App.2d 922 [ 179 P.2d 99].) [2] The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and if there is any substantial support for a finding such finding will not be disturbed on appeal. ( Flemmer v. Monckton, 73 Cal.App.2d 271 [ 166 P.2d 380].)
In regard to the precise issue of consent or permission, the California courts have uniformly held that the element of permission is necessary to a determination of liability under Section 402 and is a question of fact to be proved at the trial. Irvine v. Wilson, 137 Cal.App.2d Supp. 843, 289 P.2d 895 (1955); Mize v. Jorden, 116 Cal.App.2d 301, 253 P.2d 702 (1953); Scheff v. Roberts, 35 Cal.2d 10, 215 P.2d 925 (1950); Reed v. Cortez, 88 Cal.App.2d 416, 198 P.2d 911 (1948); Hobbs v. Transport Motor Co., 22 Cal.2d 773, 141 P.2d 738 (1943). This general rule is further stated in 8 Am.Jur.2d ยง 605, at p. 157: