The wife also argues that the husband's presenting her with the antenuptial agreement on the day before the wedding, when the preparations for the wedding had already been made and out-of-town guests had already arrived, and at a time when obtaining legal advice was hampered by time constraints, created a coercive atmosphere in which she felt compelled to sign the agreement. In support of her argument, the wife relies on Ex parte Williams, 617 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Ala. 1992); Roberts v. Roberts, 802 So.2d 230, 234 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001); and Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999, 1000 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). Although the wife is correct that in Ex parte Williams the supreme court reversed a summary judgment holding an antenuptial agreement valid because questions of fact existed regarding whether an expectant mother's choice between signing an antenuptial agreement as a condition to marriage to legitimize her unborn child and being left to bear the stigma of unwed pregnancy because of her moral objection to abortion created a coercive atmosphere in which she had no choice but to sign the antenuptial agreement, Ex parte Williams, 617 So.2d at 1035, we cannot agree that the holding in Ex parte Williams is of benefit to the wife in the present case.
Antenuptial agreements have been held valid in Alabama. Ex parte Walters, 580 So.2d 1352 (Ala. 1991); Strait v. Strait, 686 So.2d 1230 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996); Thornburg v. Thornburg, 628 So.2d 885 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993); Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). Marriage itself may be sufficient consideration for an antenuptial agreement.
This admission meets one of the alternative requirements of a valid antenuptial agreement, i.e., that either 1) the consideration be adequate, and the entire transaction fair, just, and equitable; or 2) the agreement be entered into with competent, independent advice from counsel and full knowledge of any interest in the other party's estate, and its approximate value. Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999, 1000 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). Clearly the admission admits that Mrs. Goodwin knew of any interest in Mr. Goodwin's estate, and its approximate value.
At the outset, we note that ante-nuptial agreements have been held valid in Alabama. Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989); Ruzic v. Ruzic, 549 So.2d 72 (Ala. 1989); Woolwine v. Woolwine, 549 So.2d 512 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989); and Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So.2d 749 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 752 (Ala. 1980). In determining whether a specific ante-nuptial agreement is valid, the Court of Civil Appeals set out in Barnhill an "either/or" test; we find no error in this approach.
"This is particularly true when other factors are present such as the husband's relinquishment of any rights that he might have in the wife's estate." Id. See also Mayer v. Mayer, 628 So.2d 744 (Ala.Civ. App. 1993) (discussing enforceability of antenuptial agreements); and Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999, 1000 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989) (accord). In this case, Sarah and Wiley executed the postnuptial agreement eight and one-half months after they married.
She supports her argument by pointing to her testimony that she signed the agreement without legal advice and without full knowledge of the value of Jimmy's estate; she argues that, based on that evidence, the agreement must be found to be unfair and, therefore, invalid. Antenuptial agreements are recognized in Alabama; however, courts are to scrutinize such agreements to determine whether they are just and reasonable. Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). For an antenuptial agreement to be enforceable, the party seeking to enforce it has the burden of showing that the consideration for the agreement was adequate and fair, just, and equitable from the other party's point of view or that the agreement was freely and voluntarily entered into by the other party with competent, independent advice and full knowledge of his or her interest in the estate and its approximate value. Id. at 1000; Woolwine v. Woolwine, 519 So.2d 1347 (Ala.Civ.App. 1987). Under appropriate circumstances, marriage may be sufficient consideration for an antenuptial agreement, especially when other factors exist, such as the husband's relinquishment of any rights he may have in the wife's estate.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding the antenuptial agreement to be valid. Antenuptial agreements are valid in Alabama if they are just and reasonable. Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). The party seeking to enforce the agreement has the burden to show that consideration was adequate and that the entire transaction was fair, just, and equitable, or that the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily by the other spouse, with competent, independent advice and with a full disclosure of the value of the property in question.
"the one seeking to enforce the agreement has the burden to show that the consideration was adequate and that the entire transaction was fair, just, and equitable from the other party's point of view or that the agreement was freely and voluntarily entered into with competent, independent advice and full knowledge of any interest in the estate and its approximate value."Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999, 1000 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989). Although marriage may be sufficient consideration under the appropriate circumstances, we do not consider it to be sufficient in the instant case.
Elliott v. Elliott, 579 So.2d 1383 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991). Antenuptial agreements are recognized in Alabama; however, the trial court must carefully scrutinize such agreements to determine whether they are just and reasonable. Ex parte Walters, 580 So.2d 1352 (Ala. 1991); Coggins v. Coggins, 601 So.2d 109 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992); Mixon v. Mixon, 550 So.2d 999 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989); and Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So.2d 749 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980). The trial court must determine whether there was adequate consideration, whether the transaction was fair and just and equitable, and whether the agreement was entered freely and voluntarily.