Opinion
Record No. 1674-93-4
December 28, 1993
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
(A. Thomas Lane, Jr.; Abbott Lane, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(M. Lanier Woodrum; Wooten Hart, on brief), for appellees. Appellees submitting on brief.
Present: Judges Barrow, Koontz and Bray.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Robert E. Mitzelfelt (claimant) appeals from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying his claim for benefits for an injury by accident, or in the alternative, an occupational disease allegedly sustained as a result of his employment as a minister for the Mt. Clinton Church of God (employer). Claimant contends on appeal that the commission erred in finding that he failed to prove an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment or a compensable occupational disease. Finding no error, we affirm the commission's decision.
Background
In 1991, while claimant was employed as a minister, certain conflicts developed between claimant, members of his congregation, the minister of another church, and claimant's supervisor. These problems culminated in a meeting between claimant and his supervisor held on July 26, 1991. Claimant testified that during the meeting he was shocked to learn of allegations of forgery and that an audit of his church records had been requested. He did not preach the following Sunday and sought medical treatment at a hospital on July 30, 1991.
Dr. Terry L. Overby treated claimant in the hospital on July 30, 1991. Dr. Overby testified in deposition that claimant suffered from an acute anxiety reaction as a result of "sort of a bad situation in his church". Dr. Overby described claimant's chest pains as "psychosomatic" and acknowledged that claimant had not sustained any structural or anatomical change in his body as a result of the allegedly distressing event. In February 1992, claimant began treatment with psychiatrist Dr. Nicholas McClean-Rice. Dr. McClean-Rice testified in deposition that claimant was depressed, anxious, and distraught. Dr. McClean-Rice diagnosed claimant as suffering from an "adjustment disorder." He further testified that it was his understanding that claimant's emotional condition was caused by "episodes and events in his professional life with his church . . . in which allegations" had been "made against him," and by the ensuing "ongoing dialogue and interaction between him and his supervisors."
Injury By Accident
On appellate review, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). The commission's findings of fact are binding and conclusive upon us if supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence was sufficient to sustain his burden of proof, the commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
"In order to establish an injury by accident, a claimant must prove: (1)an identifiable incident; (2) that occurs at some reasonable definite time; (3) an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in the body; and (4) a causal connection between the incident and the bodily change." Chesterfield County v. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 476, 389 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1990). "To be compensable as an injury by accident, a purely psychological injury must be causally related to a physical injury or be causally related to an obvious sudden shock or fright arising in the course of employment." Id. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182.
The deputy commissioner found that the evidence failed to demonstrate a physical injury as a result of the July 26, 1991 meeting between claimant and his supervisor, nor did it show that the meeting as described by claimant fell within the "obvious sudden shock or fright" exception. The full commission affirmed the deputy's findings. We conclude that these findings are supported by credible evidence.
The testimony and records of Drs. Overby and McClean-Rice support the commission's finding that claimant's evidence failed to prove that his psychiatric condition was causally related to a physical injury. Claimant's chest pains were described as "psychosomatic." Thus, his injuries were purely psychological. Moreover, the incident of July 26, 1991, as described by claimant, does not rise to the level of an obvious fright or sudden shock as contemplated in Hercules v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) or Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941). Conflicts with supervisory personnel that cause stressful consequences which result in purely psychological disability are ordinarily not compensable as an injury by accident. Teasley v. Montgomery Ward Co., 14 Va. App. 45, 49, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992).
Occupational Disease
The commission also found that claimant failed to establish a compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code § 65.2-400. Specifically, the commission found that the medical evidence was insufficient to show a causal connection between the claimant's work and his anxiety disorder. This finding is supported by credible evidence.
Employer's contention that Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this issue is without merit. The commission was entitled to consider whether claimant had proven a compensable occupational disease pursuant to Code § 65.2-400, even though neither party had requested review of the deputy's ruling on that issue. See Greif Companies v. Sipe, 16 Va. App. ___, ___, 434 S.E.2d 314, 316-17 (1993). "An appeal of a deputy commissioner's award empowers the Industrial Commission to reexamine all of the deputy's conclusions." Id. at ___, 434 S.E.2d at 317 (citations omitted). Thus, this issue is properly before us on appeal.
Dr. McClean defined an adjustment disorder as one which may affect people within the workplace or as a result of a factor or event outside of the employment. Additionally, the medical records reflect that, long before the July 26, 1991 meeting, claimant suffered from hypertension, anxiety, and chest pains. Dr. McClean-Rice also testified that the claimant's preexisting personality traits pre-disposed him to react inappropriately to stress. Based upon this record, we cannot say that the commission erred as a matter of law in finding that the evidence was insufficient to show that claimant's anxiety disorder was "incidental to the character of the business [or] that it flowed from the employment as a natural consequence" as required under Code § 65.2-400.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.