Opinion
A24-0372
09-13-2024
Joshua Steven Mittelsted, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Mower County District Court File No. 50-CR-14-2947
Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Harris, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
SUSAN L. SEGAL, CHIEF JUDGE.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2015, a jury found appellant Joshua Steven Mittelsted guilty of seven counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct against two victims. State v. Mittelsted, No. A16-0589, 2017 WL 2625475, at *2 (Minn.App. June 19, 2017). The district court denied Mittelsted's motion for a dispositional departure and imposed presumptive executed sentences totaling 388 months' imprisonment. Id.
2. Mittelsted filed a direct appeal, which we stayed for postconviction proceedings. Id. In the reinstated appeal, we affirmed Mittelsted's convictions, concluding that his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and district court evidentiary errors failed, and that the record refuted his claim that the district court did not consider his motion for a dispositional departure. Id. at *3-10.
3. Mittelsted filed a second postconviction petition in 2019 in which he argued that a new interpretation of state law-the supreme court's decision in State v. Ortega-Rodriguez, 920 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 2018)-applied retroactively to his case and required reversal of the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions due to insufficient evidence of sexual penetration. Mittelsted v. State, No. A19-1084 (Minn.App. Feb. 10, 2020) (order op.), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 2020). The postconviction court summarily denied postconviction relief, and we affirmed, concluding that "[t]he files and records of Mittelsted's 2015 jury trial conclusively show that Mittelsted's convictions of first-degree [criminal sexual conduct] meet the standard of proof set forth in Ortega-Rodriguez." Id.
4. In April 2021, Mittelsted filed his third petition for postconviction relief, in which he argued
that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, the district court erred by accepting into evidence hearsay statements and videotaped victim interviews in violation of his constitutional rights, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of certain counts, the victims had motive to lie, the prosecutor committed misconduct, and he was denied due process.Mittelsted v. State, No. A21-0657 (Minn.App. Nov. 8, 2021) (order op.), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 15, 2022). "The postconviction court denied his ineffective-assistance claims as time-barred and the remaining claims as procedurally barred." Id. We affirmed, holding that the two-year time bar for petitions for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2022), expired in 2019, that he failed to plead any exception to the time-bar, that all of his claims could have been raised in his direct appeal or in his prior postconviction proceeding, and that he failed to plead an exception to the procedural bar. Id.
5. On December 22, 2023, Mittelsted filed a document entitled "plea to the jurisdiction" in which he argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the state (1) failed to prove the elements of the conviction offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) "committed a sentencing defect." In the supporting memorandum, Mittelsted also appears to argue that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective because they did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and that the statute of limitations was tolled by "fraudulent concealment" under Minn. Stat. § 548.14 (2022). The postconviction court construed this document as Mittelsted's sixth petition for postconviction relief and summarily denied relief, determining that (1) the claims of insufficient evidence and "sentencing defect" could have been raised on direct appeal and are therefore barred by State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976); (2) to the extent Mittelsted is making a claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction, the court found that it has jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal; and (3) his allegations of fraud lack support. The postconviction court also determined that Mittelsted's claims are time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), and do not fall within any exception in subdivision Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2022).
In December 2022 and March 2023, Mittelsted filed petitions for postconviction relief challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The district court denied relief. Mittelsted did not appeal these orders.
6. Mittelsted appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient, that his trial and appellate counsel provided deficient representation, and that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his claims without applying the actual-innocence exception to the statute of limitations. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013) (stating that a showing of actual innocence based on new evidence can enable a habeas petitioner to overcome procedural bar). The state responds that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the petition is untimely and procedurally barred, Mittelsted failed to invoke any of the statutory time-bar exceptions, failed to assert the novel-legal issue or interests-of-justice exceptions to Knaffla, and his reliance on federal actual-innocence caselaw is inapposite to time and procedurally barred state postconviction claims.
7. "We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, including the petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion." Campbell v. State, 916 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2018). "A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
8. A person convicted of a crime who claims that a conviction or sentence violated his rights may petition for postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2022). "No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal." Id., subd. 4(a). There are five exceptions to the two-year statutory time-bar. Id., subd. 4(b). A petitioner bears the burden of establishing that an exception applies. Brocks v. State, 883 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2016).
9. In addition to the two-year postconviction statutory time-bar, "once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims that were known or should have been known but were not raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred" under Knaffla. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 2015) (stating reformulated Knaffla rule); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2022) ("A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence."). The Knaffla rule also bars consideration of claims that were raised or could have been raised in previous postconviction petitions. Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 (Minn. 2013). There are two exceptions that permit a court to consider a Knaffla-barred claim: "if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to consider the claim." Id. (quotation omitted). A postconviction court may deny a petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing if the petition is statutorily time-barred or Knaffla-barred. Taylor v. State, 874 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Minn. 2016).
10. The postconviction court determined that Mittelsted's claims are both time-and Knaffla-barred. We agree. We previously concluded that the two-year statutory time bar expired in 2019, two years after final disposition of his direct appeal. We need not address the exceptions to the two-year statutory time-bar because Mittelsted does not expressly invoke any of them. See Clifton v. State, 830 N.W.2d 434, 437-38 n.2 (Minn. 2013).
A conviction becomes final 90 days after disposition on direct appeal if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed with the United States Supreme Court. See Berkovitz v. State, 826 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 2013).
11. Mittelsted raised or could have raised claims involving the sufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and sentencing defects in his direct appeal and in his prior postconviction proceedings. The claims are, therefore, procedurally barred by Knaffla. Mittelsted does not rely on the exceptions to the Knaffla procedural bar but argues, as he has in his prior postconviction proceedings, that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in the conduct for which he was found guilty. And to the extent Mittelsted is trying to circumvent the time and procedural bars by recasting his sufficiency-of-the-evidence and sentencing claims as claims that the district court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, his efforts fail because the time and procedural bars apply to subject-matter jurisdiction claims that were known at the time of direct appeal. See Martin v. State, 969 N.W.2d 361, 364 (Minn. 2022).
12. Because Mittelsted's claims are statutorily time and procedurally barred, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying postconviction relief.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed. 7 2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.