Mitchell v. Wiltfong

9 Citing cases

  1. Vance by and Through Vance v. Thomas

    716 P.2d 710 (Okla. Civ. App. 1986)   Cited 6 times
    In Vance ex rel. Vance v. Thomas, 716 P.2d 710 (Okla. Civ. App. 1986), the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals concluded that an air rifle, though not inherently dangerous, could become a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of a child who had no knowledge of its potential for harm.

    Douglass v. Hartford Insurance Co., 602 F.2d 934, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1979). The Restatement position was adopted in Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App.2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979), where the court determined that a parent may be liable not because of his relationship to the child or the dangerous instrumentality, "but because of his own negligence — because of not taking reasonable precaution against an injurious result which he could well foresee." Id. at 233-234, 604 P.2d at 81.

  2. Crisafulli v. Bass

    308 Mont. 40 (Mont. 2001)   Cited 10 times
    Adopting § 316, imposing liability on a parent for acts of a child

    Lanterman, 354 A.2d at 436. ¶ 20 Examples of cases from states where § 316 has been followed are Vance v. Thomas (Okla.Ct.App. 1986), 716 P.2d 710, 713; Mitchell v. Wiltfong (Kan.Ct.App. 1979), 604 P.2d 79, 82; Robertson v. Wentz (Cal.Ct.App. 1986), 232 Cal.Rptr. 634, 637; and Mitchell v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Colo.Ct.App. 1975); 534 P.2d 1235, 1237. As with those decisions rejecting § 316, little analysis is to be found in those decisions which follow it. Most simply assume that it is the law and then analyze whether proof of its elements has been established.

  3. Crow v. Brezenski

    22-cv-1043-TC-RES (D. Kan. Dec. 20, 2023)

    Specifically, such liability arises where a parent fails to exercise reasonable care to control a minor child to prevent the child from intentionally harming others or creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others and the parent knows or should know that they have the ability to control the child and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 (1964); see also Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 604 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1979); accord Justin M. v. Beadle, 142 N.Y.S.3d 213, 215 (N.Y.App.Div. 2021). A duty to supervise and control is only owed to individuals foreseeably injured by a lack of supervision.

  4. Wood v. Groh

    269 Kan. 420 (Kan. 2000)   Cited 58 times
    Concluding that parents owed highest duty to protect public from misuse of gun stored in their home

    Contrary to the Grohs' argument, Instruction No. 14A is a correct statement of the tort of negligent parental supervision. The instruction given is consistent with the Restatement (Second)of Torts and with the Court of Appeals' decision in Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979), and properly framed the question raised by the evidence. (3) Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that the Grohs could be found negligent for failing to prevent Ed from breaking into a locked gun cabinet to obtain the .22 caliber handgun.

  5. Dinsmore-Poff, v. Alvord

    972 P.2d 978 (Alaska 1999)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that a parent's tort duty to restrain child exists only where "the parent ha reason to know with some specificity of a present opportunity and need to restrain the child to prevent some imminently foreseeable harm"

    One can divide reported cases in which parents knew of past violence into those: (a) reversing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals (or their equivalent) upon taking as true allegations that parents knew of, yet did absolutely nothing to correct, and even encouraged, a violent tendency; (b) finding parents liable, or reversing nonsuits in their favor, based not on allegations but on evidence; (c) exonerating parents who made adequate disciplinary efforts; and (d) exonerating parents who had no chance to prevent the harm. An archetypal example is Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79, 80, 82 (1979), in which the court of appeals found a viable complaint upon accepting as true allegations that child repeatedly beat other children and that parents not only did nothing to discipline but "incited" and "encouraged" him. See also Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641, 642 (D.Idaho 1930); Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961); Poncher v. Brackett, 246 Cal.App.2d 769, 55 Cal.Rptr. 59 (1966); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675, 679-80 (1953); Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706, 707 (1962); Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc.2d 320, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (1966); Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 A.D. 1061, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1950); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51, 52-53 (1944); Seaman v. Hockman, 2 Pa. D. C.2d 663, 54 A.L.R.3d 974, 999 (1953); Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 373 S.W.2d 441 (1963.).

  6. Russell v. Braden

    42 Kan. App. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 4 times
    In Russell, we found a parent has a duty to control a child to prevent injury to third persons, based on Kansas' adoption of a specific provision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. But Arnold does not point to any tort or contract-based law that supports imposing any duty on an insurer to follow up in any manner on an uncashed refund check.

    (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.'" Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App.2d 231, 234, 604 P.2d 79 (1979). In granting summary judgment against the Russells, the district court cited and relied in part on Cullip v. Domann, 266 Kan. 550, 972 P.2d 776 (1999), where our Supreme Court applied this Restatement provision in the context of summary judgment but characterized the elements of liability in terms of foreseeability, which is generally a question of fact for a jury:

  7. Sun Mountain Prods., Inc. v. Pierre

    84 Wn. App. 608 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 12 times
    Adopting objective standard of care for negligent supervision

    Although we have previously left open the possibility of adopting this RESTATEMENT, see Barrett, 62 Wn. App. at 722 n. 5, two Washington cases have cited the RESTATEMENT favorably, Eldredge, 90 Wn.2d at 408 and Carey v. Reeve, 56 Wn. App. 18, 22-23, 781 P.2d 904 (1989), as have the majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Merchant v. Mansir, 572 A.2d 493 (Me. 1990); Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979); Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272, 54 A.L.R.3d 964 (1973); Mancino v. Webb, 274 A.2d 711 (Del. 1971); Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961). We believe that the subjective standard would unduly burden plaintiffs, who would have to prove actual knowledge.

  8. Pesek v. Discepolo

    475 N.E.2d 3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 14 times
    Dismissing a claim against a school for failing to prevent one of its students from sexually assaulting a member of the public off school grounds

    • 2 Next, plaintiff contends count III stated a cause of action against Morton East High School. Plaintiff argues that because the school acts in loco parentis, it should be liable under the same theory as Anthony's parents. (See Mitchell v. Wiltfong (1979), 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79.) However, plaintiff's allegations directed at the high school are identical to those directed at Anthony's parents.

  9. Snow v. Nelson

    450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    We feel that this broader rule, which we believe to be a requirement of reasonable care in the circumstances, short of some form of vicarious liability, is the better rule. See, e.g., Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D.Idaho 1930) (child with habit of persuading and inveigling smaller boys into secluded places and beating, bruising, maiming and punishing them persuaded and inveigled a smaller boy into a secluded place, forced him to undress and beat and bruised him with switches, sticks and straps); Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961) (child with habit of striking, beating and abusing younger children struck, beat and kicked another child); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (child with habit of violently assaulting and throwing himself forcibly against persons and violently shoving and knocking them pushed babysitter to the floor); Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979) (child who had beaten, harassed and assaulted neighborhood children inflicted intentional mental distress, worry, concern, physical pain and suffering upon children and their parents); Moore v. Lexington Transit Corp., 418 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1967) (child who had on past occasions been permitted to open car door at a particular intersection opened car door at the same intersection, without permission, causing car door to strike moving bus); Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962) (child with habit of assaulting, accosting, tormenting and molesting young children assaulted, accosted, tormented and molested young child); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N.E. 334 (1928) (child who had used an air gun, not a dangerous instrumentality, indiscriminately and mischievously on three occasions by placing children in a line and pointing the air gun at them from a distance of ten or eleven feet, shooting at clothes hanging in the yard to dry and shooting at a shanty and bi