Douglass v. Hartford Insurance Co., 602 F.2d 934, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1979). The Restatement position was adopted in Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App.2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979), where the court determined that a parent may be liable not because of his relationship to the child or the dangerous instrumentality, "but because of his own negligence — because of not taking reasonable precaution against an injurious result which he could well foresee." Id. at 233-234, 604 P.2d at 81.
Lanterman, 354 A.2d at 436. ¶ 20 Examples of cases from states where § 316 has been followed are Vance v. Thomas (Okla.Ct.App. 1986), 716 P.2d 710, 713; Mitchell v. Wiltfong (Kan.Ct.App. 1979), 604 P.2d 79, 82; Robertson v. Wentz (Cal.Ct.App. 1986), 232 Cal.Rptr. 634, 637; and Mitchell v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Colo.Ct.App. 1975); 534 P.2d 1235, 1237. As with those decisions rejecting § 316, little analysis is to be found in those decisions which follow it. Most simply assume that it is the law and then analyze whether proof of its elements has been established.
Specifically, such liability arises where a parent fails to exercise reasonable care to control a minor child to prevent the child from intentionally harming others or creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others and the parent knows or should know that they have the ability to control the child and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 (1964); see also Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 604 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1979); accord Justin M. v. Beadle, 142 N.Y.S.3d 213, 215 (N.Y.App.Div. 2021). A duty to supervise and control is only owed to individuals foreseeably injured by a lack of supervision.
Contrary to the Grohs' argument, Instruction No. 14A is a correct statement of the tort of negligent parental supervision. The instruction given is consistent with the Restatement (Second)of Torts and with the Court of Appeals' decision in Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979), and properly framed the question raised by the evidence. (3) Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury that the Grohs could be found negligent for failing to prevent Ed from breaking into a locked gun cabinet to obtain the .22 caliber handgun.
One can divide reported cases in which parents knew of past violence into those: (a) reversing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals (or their equivalent) upon taking as true allegations that parents knew of, yet did absolutely nothing to correct, and even encouraged, a violent tendency; (b) finding parents liable, or reversing nonsuits in their favor, based not on allegations but on evidence; (c) exonerating parents who made adequate disciplinary efforts; and (d) exonerating parents who had no chance to prevent the harm. An archetypal example is Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79, 80, 82 (1979), in which the court of appeals found a viable complaint upon accepting as true allegations that child repeatedly beat other children and that parents not only did nothing to discipline but "incited" and "encouraged" him. See also Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641, 642 (D.Idaho 1930); Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961); Poncher v. Brackett, 246 Cal.App.2d 769, 55 Cal.Rptr. 59 (1966); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675, 679-80 (1953); Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706, 707 (1962); Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc.2d 320, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (1966); Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 A.D. 1061, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1950); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51, 52-53 (1944); Seaman v. Hockman, 2 Pa. D. C.2d 663, 54 A.L.R.3d 974, 999 (1953); Bocock v. Rose, 213 Tenn. 195, 373 S.W.2d 441 (1963.).
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.'" Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App.2d 231, 234, 604 P.2d 79 (1979). In granting summary judgment against the Russells, the district court cited and relied in part on Cullip v. Domann, 266 Kan. 550, 972 P.2d 776 (1999), where our Supreme Court applied this Restatement provision in the context of summary judgment but characterized the elements of liability in terms of foreseeability, which is generally a question of fact for a jury:
Although we have previously left open the possibility of adopting this RESTATEMENT, see Barrett, 62 Wn. App. at 722 n. 5, two Washington cases have cited the RESTATEMENT favorably, Eldredge, 90 Wn.2d at 408 and Carey v. Reeve, 56 Wn. App. 18, 22-23, 781 P.2d 904 (1989), as have the majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Merchant v. Mansir, 572 A.2d 493 (Me. 1990); Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979); Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272, 54 A.L.R.3d 964 (1973); Mancino v. Webb, 274 A.2d 711 (Del. 1971); Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961). We believe that the subjective standard would unduly burden plaintiffs, who would have to prove actual knowledge.
• 2 Next, plaintiff contends count III stated a cause of action against Morton East High School. Plaintiff argues that because the school acts in loco parentis, it should be liable under the same theory as Anthony's parents. (See Mitchell v. Wiltfong (1979), 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79.) However, plaintiff's allegations directed at the high school are identical to those directed at Anthony's parents.
We feel that this broader rule, which we believe to be a requirement of reasonable care in the circumstances, short of some form of vicarious liability, is the better rule. See, e.g., Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D.Idaho 1930) (child with habit of persuading and inveigling smaller boys into secluded places and beating, bruising, maiming and punishing them persuaded and inveigled a smaller boy into a secluded place, forced him to undress and beat and bruised him with switches, sticks and straps); Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961) (child with habit of striking, beating and abusing younger children struck, beat and kicked another child); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (child with habit of violently assaulting and throwing himself forcibly against persons and violently shoving and knocking them pushed babysitter to the floor); Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79 (1979) (child who had beaten, harassed and assaulted neighborhood children inflicted intentional mental distress, worry, concern, physical pain and suffering upon children and their parents); Moore v. Lexington Transit Corp., 418 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1967) (child who had on past occasions been permitted to open car door at a particular intersection opened car door at the same intersection, without permission, causing car door to strike moving bus); Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962) (child with habit of assaulting, accosting, tormenting and molesting young children assaulted, accosted, tormented and molested young child); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N.E. 334 (1928) (child who had used an air gun, not a dangerous instrumentality, indiscriminately and mischievously on three occasions by placing children in a line and pointing the air gun at them from a distance of ten or eleven feet, shooting at clothes hanging in the yard to dry and shooting at a shanty and bi