Opinion
NUMBER 2013 CA 1633
06-03-2014
LILLIE MAE MITCHELL v. ST. MARY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD
Julius W. Grubbs, Jr. J.P. D'Albor New Iberia, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Lillie Mae Mitchell Alvin J. Bordelon, Jr. Andrew C. Abrams Metairie, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant St. Mary Parish School Board
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Sixteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Mary
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 123,959
Honorable Charles L. Porter, Judge
Julius W. Grubbs, Jr.
J.P. D'Albor
New Iberia, LA
Counsel for
Plaintiff/Appellee
Lillie Mae Mitchell
Alvin J. Bordelon, Jr.
Andrew C. Abrams
Metairie, LA
Counsel for
Defendant/Appellant
St. Mary Parish School
Board
BEFORE: PARRO, GUIDRY, AND DRAKE, JJ.
GUIDRY, J.
A local school board appeals a judgment finding it liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she tripped and fell over a floor mat that had been used to prop open a door at a local school. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On Saturday, November 6, 2010, Lillie Mae Mitchell drove her granddaughter, Justice Mitchell, to Franklin Junior High School to attend the Student Adjustment Center (detention), which was held on Saturdays for students with behavior infractions. Because they were late arriving, Ms. Mitchell instructed Justice to go into the school, ascertain if she would still be able to attend, and return to the car to inform her of what she had learned; but, on entering the school, Justice forgot to follow her grandmother's instructions. Consequently, Ms. Mitchell sought to enter the school to find out if her granddaughter would be allowed to stay. However, as Ms. Mitchell walked through the doorway, she tripped over a floor mat that had been propped in the doorway and fell, sustaining serious injuries.
Ms. Mitchell filed a petition for damages against the St. Mary Parish School Board ("School Board") for the injuries she sustained as a result of tripping on the floor mat left in the doorway of the Franklin Junior High School. The case proceeded to a trial on the merits, following which the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ms. Mitchell, finding the School Board completely liable for the injuries Ms. Mitchell sustained. The School Board appeals that judgment, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the floor mat presented an unreasonable risk of harm and in finding that the School Board had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged defect.
DISCUSSION
The accident from which this lawsuit stems was caused by a floor mat that was placed in a doorway of the Franklin Junior High School in such a manner that it kept the door from closing. The legal basis for liability of a public entity for injuries caused by a defect in a thing that it owns or of which it has custody is set out in La. R.S. 9:2800, which statute provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2800. Limitation of liability for public bodies
A. A public entity is responsible under Civil Code Article 2317 for damages caused by the condition of buildings within its care and custody.
...
C. Except as provided for in Subsections A and B of this Section, no person shall have a cause of action based solely upon liability imposed under Civil Code Article 2317 against a public entity for damages caused by the condition of things within its care and custody unless the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the particular vice or defect which caused the damage prior to the occurrence, and the public entity has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect and has failed to do so.
D. Constructive notice shall mean the existence of facts which infer actual knowledge.
...
F. A violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by a public entity is not negligence per se.
G. (1) "Public entity" means and includes the state and any of its branches, departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, employees, and political subdivisions and the departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, and employees of such political subdivisions. Public entity also includes housing authorities, as defined in R.S. 40:384(15), and their commissioners and other officers and employees and sewerage and water boards and their employees, servants, agents, or subcontractors.
Thus, in order to prevail in her suit, Ms. Mitchell had to prove (1) the thing that caused the damage was in the custody of the School Board, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2317; (2) the thing contained a defect because it had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the defective condition of the thing caused Ms. Mitchell's injuries; and (4) pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800, the School Board had actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable opportunity to remedy it prior to the accident, but failed to do so. See Fuselier v. City of Oakdale, 13-640, p. 4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1/15/14), 130 So. 3d 984, 986.
The School Board does not deny custody of the floor mat or that the floor mat caused the injuries Ms. Mitchell sustained. However, it does dispute that the floor mat presented an unreasonable risk of harm or that it had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defective condition that the floor mat, as used, presented.
A finding of the existence of a defect alone is not sufficient to establish liability; in order for there to be liability, the defect must create an unreasonably dangerous risk. See Cormier v. Comeaux, 98-2378 (La. 7/7/99), 748 So. 2d 1123, 1127. A risk-utility balancing test should be applied to aid the trier-of-fact in making this unscientific, factual determination, wherein the fact-finder must balance the gravity and risk of harm against individual societal rights and obligations, the social utility of the thing, and the cost and feasibility of repair. This risk-utility balancing test considers four pertinent factors: (1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of its social utility or whether it is dangerous by nature. Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Buildings, 12-1238, pp. 9-10 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So. 3d 175, 184.
Applying the first factor of the risk-utility balancing test, it is not the mere use of a floor mat, but the manner in which the floor mat was used that must be considered. It can be reasonably assumed that the common utility of a floor mat placed near an entryway is to act "as a precautionary measure to protect the public against water dripping from people who [enter] the facility during a heavy rain or to guard against excess mud falling on the floor upon entry into the building." Borruano v. City of Plaquemine, 97-1926, p. 6 (La. App, 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 720 So. 2d 62, 65. Karl Bashay, who was principal of Franklin Junior High School at the time of the incident, testified that the floor mat was in place for people to "wipe their feet." However, when Ms. Mitchell encountered the floor mat, it was not being used in that manner. Instead, the evidence shows that the floor mat was used to prop open a locked door at Franklin Junior High School for ease of access. Thus, it is this use of the floor mat that must be considered in regard to the floor mat's utility.
Next, this utility must be weighed against the likelihood and magnitude of harm presented by using the floor mat in the manner at issue, including whether such use of the floor mat was open and obvious.
The assistant principal of Franklin Junior High School, Dequindra Redding, and Mr. Bashay, who served as vice principal for three years before becoming principal, both testified that they wrere unaware of any prior accidents occurring as a result of someone tripping over any floor mat in any doorway of the school. Ms. Mitchell, who was 81 years old at the time of accident and 83 years old at the time of trial, stated that she did not see the floor mat in the doorway prior to tripping on it because, as she explained, she "had no reason for looking down. I just hold the door open and I fell." However, Justice Mitchell, Ms. Mitchell's granddaughter, acknowledged that the floor mat was not hidden from view and that she saw the floor mat in the doorway when she entered the school prior to her grandmother's entrance. Nevertheless, all of the witnesses presented at trial acknowledged that propping the floor mat in the doorway in the manner that it was positioned at the time of Ms. Mitchell's fall presented a tripping hazard. Further, Mr. Bashay and Edra Warren, the teacher in charge of the Student Adjustment Center on the date of Ms. Mitchell's accident, both testified that using the floor mat to prop the door open also presented a security risk of allowing unwelcome visitors into the school.
As observed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, "comparative fault principles should apply, and the plaintiff's 'awareness of the danger' is but one factor to consider when assigning fault to all responsible parties under [La. C.C.] art. 2323." Broussard, 12-1238 at p. 18, 113 So. 3d at 189.
Due to an unexplained illness, Ms. Warren did not appear at the trial, but her deposition testimony was offered in lieu of her live testimony.
The third factor in the risk-utility balancing test is to balance the risk of harm against the cost or feasibility of preventing the harm. To properly evaluate this factor, we must first consider the cause of the harm.
The harm posed in this case arose from students seeking to enter the school. Ms. Warren stated that the Student Adjustment Center was held from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Saturdays. She acknowledged that on the days she conducted the Student Adjustment Center, she was responsible for allowing students in and out of the school, so she stayed downstairs until 8:15 a.m. before escorting students upstairs to her classroom to complete punishment work. She state that once she escorted the students upstairs to her classroom, if the downstairs doors were "locked fast," students were to go to the back stairwell by her classroom and knock on that door to be let into the school. When asked if it was "common knowledge" that there was another way of entering the school through the double doors at the top of the stairwell at the back of the school building, Ms. Warren replied "[y]eah."
Ms. Warren also testified that she allowed tardy students to participate in the Student Adjustment Center if they were not too late arriving. As she explained, "[s]ometimes if a kid is arriving after 8:15, I'll write down the time because I don't mind staying after 12:00. You know, if I don't have anything to do on a Saturday, I'll stay like an extra thirty (30) minutes for ... late kids." But she stated, "if they're too late[,] like arriving at 9:00, then I make them come back on another day. It's unfair to the kids that signed in early."
Ms. Redding testified that all of the teachers had keys to the school. Further, Mr. Bashay, Ms. Redding, and Ms. Warren all stated that the practice of propping open locked school doors was discouraged and not officially endorsed, yet this alone was clearly insufficient to stop the practice, as both Ms. Redding and Ms. Warren admitted knowing that the practice was still occurring. Moreover, although Ms. Warren testified that it was "common knowledge" that there was another means of entering the school on Student Adjustment Center days, there was no evidence presented that students were expressly directed to use the back stairway doors, either by a posted notice or otherwise. Further, the School Board presented no evidence to show how it would be hindered in using more aggressive means to discourage students from propping open the school doors, such as not allowing any student who arrives after 8:15 a.m. to participate in the Student Adjustment Center or by assigning another teacher to be at the school on Student Adjustment Center days, who could be designated the responsibility for monitoring the entrance and exit of students.
Finally, the last factor in the risk-utility balancing test requires assessment of the nature of the plaintiff's activity in terms of its social utility and whether it is dangerous by nature. In this case, Ms. Mitchell was simply trying to enter the school to verify that her granddaughter would be allowed to stay for the Student Adjustment Center. Clearly, there was nothing dangerous or out of the ordinary regarding the manner in which Ms. Mitchell opened and walked through the door. Further, from viewing the video, the doorway does not appear to be propped wide open, but rather appears to be nearly shut. The floor mat was propped in the doorway in such a way as to barely keep the door from completely closing. So, it cannot be said that the mere fact that the door was kept open by the floor mat should have somehow alerted Ms. Mitchell to take notice of the mat before crossing the threshold of the doorway.
Thus, taking into consideration the foregoing analysis of the four factors of the risk-utility balancing test relative to the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong in holding that the floor mat, as it was used at the time of Ms. Mitchell's injury, presented an unreasonable risk of harm. While the positioning of the floor mat in the doorway was not hidden in any way, as previously stated, this fact does not preclude a finding that the floor mat posed an unreasonable risk of harm. The other factors, particularly the questionable utility of using the floor mat in such a manner, especially when compared to the safety and security risk created, weigh in favor of finding that such a use of the floor mat presents an unreasonable risk of harm. Hence, we reject the School Board's assertion of error on this basis.
The School Board also contends that it had no actual or constructive notice that the floor mat was being used to prop open a school door at the time of the accident, as the evidence presented at trial showed that no School Board employee either witnessed the floor mat being placed in the school doorway nor placed the floor mat in the doorway on the date of the accident. Thus, the School Board argues that this evidence is sufficient to prove it had no notice, actual or constructive, of the alleged defect presented by the floor mat being used to prop open the school door. We disagree.
In her deposition, Ms. Warren testified regarding a written report she had made of the accident. In the report, which was attached to her deposition, Ms. Warren described what actions she took on the date of the accident: "I immediately proceeded downstairs to check on Mrs. Mitchell. I found Mrs. Mitchell standing in the hallway and she ... told me that she had tripped on a rug which had been placed in the doorway which allows the students access into the school." When asked if it was "common for the rug to be placed in the doorway to allow students access" to the school, Ms. Warren replied: "Sometimes students will do that. They've been doing that for years. We - - we do ask the kids not to do that for several reasons. Mostly not to allow unwanted, you know, people into the school."
Ms. Mitchell and her daughter, Sheila Oliver, testified that Ms. Warren made similar comments to them on the date of the accident. Ms. Redding, reluctantly acknowledged, when confronted with her prior deposition testimony, that she knew of times when teachers had placed the floor mat in the doorway to keep the locked door from closing and that a similar use of the floor mat was not an "unlikely occurrence" on Student Adjustment Center days.
Sheila and her husband picked up Ms. Mitchell from the school following the accident and took her to the hospital.
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Constructive notice is defined as the existence of facts that imply actual knowledge. La. R.S. 9:2800(D). To prove constructive notice, plaintiffs must produce facts demonstrating that the defect existed for a sufficient period of time, such that it should have been discovered and repaired if the public entity had exercised reasonable diligence. Goza v. Parish of West Baton Rouge, 08-0086, p. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/09), 21 So. 3d 320, 329, writ denied, 09-2146 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 919, cert. denied, 560 U.S. 904, 130 S.Ct. 3277, 176 L.Ed.2d 1184 (2010); Benson v. State, 48,300, p. 3 (La. App. 2d Cir. 10/9/13), 124 So. 3d 544, 546.
The evidence outlined above is sufficient to find that the School Board had constructive notice of the floor mat being used in the manner at issue, as Ms. Warren testified that such action had been taking place for years. Ms. Warren also stated that she had knowledge of the floor mat being used in the manner at issue and admitted such use was "likely" to occur. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that the School Board had notice of the floor mat being used to prop open doors at Franklin Junior High School.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the use of a floor mat to prop open a locked door at the Franklin Junior High School presented an unreasonable risk of harm and that the St. Mary Parish School Board had notice of the condition. Thus, we affirm the trial court's judgment finding the St. Mary Parish School Board liable for the injuries sustained by Ms. Mitchell when she tripped over the floor mat while attempting to enter Franklin Junior High School on November 6, 2010. We assess all costs of this appeal, in the amount of $812.50, to the St. Mary Parish School Board.
AFFIRMED.