The subscribers' contingent liability stood in place of capital stock. ( Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 53, 59-60 [ 91 P.2d 176]; Couch, supra, § 18.11, pp. 614-615; Reinmuth, supra, ch. I, p. 2.) Originally, funds for the payment of losses and other debts were collected from subscribers as they occurred.

The latter corporation generally speaking is in charge of the business of the exchange. ( Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 33 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 91 P.2d 176].) In the agreement with the attorney in fact each subscriber agreed to deposit a sum, "computed as required by the terms and conditions of his policy.

an identification stub, was denied tickets before the promised 7,500 had been sold, presented himself at the Rose Bowl as a "sober, moral person," demanded admission, tendered the price, and was refused, entitling him "to recover . . . his actual damages" as well as the fixed statutory penalty of $100. [5] In general, a representative suit is proper because it is in behalf of a common or joint interest of an ascertained class in the subject-matter of the controversy: Farmers MerchantsNational Bank of Los Angeles v. Peterson, 5 Cal.2d 601 [ 55 P.2d 867], a suit by one creditor for an accounting on a trust fund held under an assignment for the benefit of all creditors of the company; Moore v. Bowes, 8 Cal.2d 162 [ 64 P.2d 423], an equitable proceeding by some of the stockholders and beneficiaries of a voting trust agreement to remove the trustees; Goes v. Perry, 18 Cal.2d 373 [ 115 P.2d 441], an attempt to impress a trust upon certain property in behalf of ascertainable beneficiaries; Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 33 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 91 P.2d 176], litigation by a court-appointed liquidator to "settle certain questions common to all of the subscribers" of a "reciprocal or interinsurance exchange"; Peterson v. Donnelley, 33 Cal.App.2d 133 [ 91 P.2d 123], an action involving the management of trust property on behalf of "approximately three thousand unit holders" constituting the owners of the beneficial interests therein; and Baumann v. Harrison, 46 Cal.App.2d 84 [ 115 P.2d 530], a foreclosure proceeding on behalf of plaintiff and other bondholders. In the present case there is no ascertainable class, such as the stockholders, bondholders, or creditors of an organization.

riod of time: In re Farina, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 987; Bank of Hawaii v. Wilder (9th C.C.A.) 8 F.2d 845. Legislative action must be limited to a construction of its own acts and not the action of a preceding and far-removed legislature: 25 R.C.L. 1029. Although the meaning of a statute may have been in doubt, an amendment to such statute settling the doubt can have no effect on the interpretation of the statute prior to the amendment: Hood Rubber Company v. Commissioner, 167 N.E. 670. The failure of a legislature to enact an amendment is valueless as an aid to the court in determining intention: City of Vanceburg v. Plummer, 122 S.W.2d 772, 275 Ky. 713 (1938); In re Coburn, 131 P. 352, 165 Cal. 202. A later Act is usually construed in such manner as not to destroy an existing property right: People v. Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, 150 N.E. 290; Murray Hospital v. Angrove, 10 P.2d 577, 583; 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, page 893 (2d Ed.). The word "exchange" is used to indicate an entity: Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 91 P.2d 176. OPINION

It would require the receiver to levy assessments repeatedly, and frequently. Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 91 P.2d 176], involved the liquidation of a reciprocal or interinsurance exchange and a statutory scheme that did not expressly provide for subscriber assessments. ( Id. at p. 64.)

They concern whether a particular claim is allowable against the insolvency trustee at the time the liquidation order or conservation order is filed, or the setoff rights of claimants based on the actual value of mutual obligations between the insolvent and the particular creditor. (See Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1118 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 749, 842 P.2d 48]; ( Carpenter v. Coast Surety Corp. (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 209, 211-212 [ 77 P.2d 294]; Downey v. Humphreys (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 323, 331, 337 [ 227 P.2d 484]; Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 53, 68-69 [ 91 P.2d 176]; Kinder v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 308, 315 [178 Cal.Rptr. 57].) None of the other cases cited by real parties on this point addresses the construction of section 1019; they concern the status of allowable claimants, the amount of contract damages, or the amount of permissible setoff.

All the cases arising under section 1019 concern the determination whether particular claims exist at the time a liquidation order is filed and thus may be allowed. ( Carpenter v. Coast Surety Corp., supra, 25 Cal.App.2d at pp. 211-212; Downey v. Humphreys, supra, 102 Cal.App.2d at pp. 331, 337; Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 53, 68-69 [ 91 P.2d 176]; Kinder v. Superior Court, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 308.) Appellants cite no case, and independent research has revealed no case, indicating section 1019 may serve the function attributed to it by appellants.

The allegations of the complaint, which must be taken as true, clearly show that there was an intermingling of this cotton seed so that it was impossible to segregate the interests of the various growers therein, and that there was a common ownership by this class of growers in the common fund or property which was withheld by the defendants. It has frequently been held that a suit by one or some of the beneficiaries of a fund or of property, established or existing for the benefit of many beneficiaries and based on their common interest, is a proper class action. ( Farmers etc. Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 5 Cal.2d 601 [ 55 P.2d 867]; Moore v. Bowes, 8 Cal.2d 162 [ 64 P.2d 423]; Goes v. Perry, 18 Cal.2d 373 [ 115 P.2d 441]; Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 33 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 91 P.2d 176]; Peterson v. Donelley, 33 Cal.App.2d 133 [ 91 P.2d 123]; Baumann v. Harrison, 46 Cal.App.2d 84 [ 115 P.2d 530].) [6] Under the general principles applied in these and other cases, the courts should not be powerless to protect this large class of growers because the situation disclosed does not involve one simultaneous act affecting all of these growers but, on the other hand, discloses a systematic course of dealing in exactly the same manner which affects each of the growers in the same way as it affects the others, and which has resulted in the withholding of a common fund in which all are interested.

For various purposes, the law has treated such an organization as if it were a separate entity. Thus, persons, natural or corporate, holding the powers of attorney must procure a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commissioner (Ins. Code, § 1350); its finances are minutely regulated (Ins. Code, §§ 1370-1375); it can sue or be sued in its own name (Ins. Code, § 1450); a member or subscriber cannot be sued on any obligation contained in the power of attorney until a final judgment against the inter-insurance bureau has been unsatisfied for 30 days (Ins. Code, § 1451); all moneys received from members and not returned are subject to the gross premium tax placed on insurance companies (Ins. Code, § 1530; Industrial Indem. Exch. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 26 Cal.2d 772 [ 161 P.2d 222]); and for purposes of liquidation it is an entity ( Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 33 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 91 P.2d 176]). History of the Assigned Risk Law

The exchange had no capital, and funds for the payment of losses were collected from subscribers after losses occurred. Id. at 703, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 798 (citing Mitchell v. Pac.Greyhound Lines, 33 Cal.App.2d 53, 59-60, 91 P.2d 176 (1939); Couch, supra, §§ 18:11, at 614-15; Reinmuth, supra, at 2). To avoid delays, exchanges began collecting advance annual deposits, which were kept in a separate account for each subscriber, with the subscriber's pro rata share of losses and expenses being deducted as needed. If a subscriber's account had a positive balance at the end of the year, that amount became part of a subscriber's "savings" or "surplus," and was either distributed to subscribers or held until the subscriber withdrew from the exchange. If the balance was negative, the subscriber could be assessed for a specified maximum amount beyond their deposit.