Mitchell v. Mitchell

4 Citing cases

  1. Estate of Cavenaugh v. C.I.R

    51 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1995)   Cited 13 times
    Finding trust distributions not absolutely discretionary where the trustee was required to make income distributions "monthly or at the end of such other periods as may be necessary or desirable in the discretion of the Trustee"

    To illustrate in the term insurance context, consider a policy "worthless" as measured by cash surrender or interpolated reserve value. If the insured could no longer obtain insurance for health or other eligibility reasons, the right to renewal at a set annual premium would suddenly represent considerable value.Mitchell v. Mitchell, 448 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex.App. 1969), does not hold otherwise. That case resolved a dispute between the original wife and the second wife of the deceased over an interest in the proceeds of his federal group life insurance policy.

  2. Kerr v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Cavenaugh)

    100 T.C. 407 (U.S.T.C. 1993)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the addition to tax is mandatory unless reasonable cause is shown

    Mrs. Cavenaugh's community interest in the policy equalled no more than one-half of any cash surrender value or interpolated terminal reserve value of the policy at her death. See id. at 696; Bullock v. City National Bank, 550 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex.Civ.App.1977); see also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 448 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex.Civ.App.1969). The record in this case does not establish that the policy had any cash surrender or terminal reserve value on the date of Mrs. Cavenaugh's death.

  3. Mccraw v. Maris

    837 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App. 1990)   Cited 9 times
    In McCraw v. Maris, 837 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.App. 1990) the court held a duplicate beneficiary form in the handwriting of the deceased inadmissible because it did not "affect an interest in property" because it had no legal force or effect.

    Based on the expressed intention of Congress, we hold that the evidence offered by McCraw and Wiggins was rendered irrelevant by controlling federal law. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 448 S.W.2d 807 passim (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (implicitly acknowledging the controlling nature of federal law in this area). The evidence was therefore inadmissible.

  4. Farley v. Prudential Insurance Company

    468 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)   Cited 1 times

    Consequently, the construction placed on the statute in Stribling v. United States, supra, holding that substantial compliance is not sufficient, is controlling. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 448 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1st District, 1969, writ ref., n.r.e.). While the cases relied on by appellant do hold that a change of beneficiary may be effectuated by proof that the serviceman intended the change of beneficiary and that he performed some overt act directed toward accomplishing that end, the cases cited by appellant involve National Service Life Insurance policies issued under the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.