Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. FAMVS701526, Robert Lemkau, Judge.
Abernathy Howington and Christopher R. Abernathy for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Zumbrunn Law Corporation and Gregory L. Zumbrunn for Defendant and Respondent.
MILLER, J.
Plaintiffs and appellants Kenneth Mitchell and Rebecca Mitchell (Grandmother) (collectively referred to as the Grandparents) petitioned the family court for visitation with their grandson, D.M. The family court denied the Grandparents’ petition. The Grandparents raise four arguments on appeal. First, the Grandparents assert the family court erred by concluding that Family Code section 3102, which concerns visitation, is unconstitutional as written. Second, the Grandparents contend the family court erred by not determining if section 3102 is constitutional as it relates to the facts of the instant case. Third, the Grandparents assert the family court did not adequately analyze the position of D.M.’s mother, Victoria (Mother) regarding visitation. Fourth, the Grandparents contend the family court erred by considering the Grandparents’ lack of a preexisting relationship with D.M. We affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references will be to the Family Code, unless indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
D.M. was born in April 2004. The Grandparents are D.M.’s paternal grandparents. D.M.’s father, Jeffrey (Father), is deceased; he died in October 2006, as the result of an automobile accident. Mother met Father in 1998. Approximately one year later they eloped. Mother is part American Indian. Mother and Father eloped due to concerns about the Grandparents not wanting Father to be romantically involved with a woman who was not White. Mother believed the Grandparents were racist; Grandmother believed Mother engaged in a campaign to isolate Father from his family.
Mother stated Father joined the military when he was young so that he could “get away from his family.” Mother said Father felt the Grandparents never believed in him, because he was sick as a child. When Mother was pregnant with D.M., Father called the Grandparents to inform them of the news. After speaking to the Grandparents, Father was upset because Grandmother questioned the child’s paternity and made a comment about the child looking “like an immigrant.” After D.M. was born, Father waited two months before calling the Grandparents to tell them the news. Mother stated before Father was deployed to Iraq, he suggested that Mother change their home telephone number so the Grandparents would not “harass” her while he was in Iraq. The Grandparents live in Texas. The Grandparents met D.M. for the first time at Father’s funeral; they spent approximately 15 minutes with D.M. at the funeral. Mother expressed concern the Grandparents would not be able to “contain their anger or resentment” towards Mother and D.M., if visitation were granted.
In support of the Grandparents’ petition, they presented the testimony of two doctors. Dr. Suiter never observed D.M. with the Grandparents. Dr. Suiter concluded the Grandparents did not pose a safety risk to D.M. Dr. Suiter did not believe the Grandparents were racist. Dr. Suiter opined it would be in D.M.’s best interests to have visitation with the Grandparents because he would benefit from (1) their love and support; and (2) learning about “his heritage from [Father’s] side of the family.”
Dr. Morgan, a psychologist, met with Mother and the Grandparents separately and together, for a total of four sessions. Dr. Morgan did not believe the Grandparents posed a safety risk to D.M. Dr. Morgan believed the Grandparents cared for D.M. Dr. Morgan believed visitation between the Grandparents and D.M. would benefit D.M. because the Grandparents would be able to teach D.M. about “[F]ather’s upbringing and ancestry.”
Grandmother testified she is not racist. She stated Father had friends of various races during childhood, and the friends were welcome in the Grandparents’ house. Grandmother believed she and Father had a good relationship while Father was growing up. Grandmother testified she had been caught off-guard by Father’s decision to join the military, but she was proud of him. Grandmother stated after Father left boot camp, he stayed in Houston with them, and they took a family vacation. Grandmother testified that after Father met Mother, he did not call home as often or visit home as often.
Grandmother stated Father seemed fine when he was alone. Grandmother felt Father’s calls from locations other than home were relaxed and comfortable, while his calls from home—where Mother was—were tense. Grandmother testified she asked to meet Mother, but Mother said she did not want to travel to Texas and Father “always said it wasn’t a good time” for the Grandparents to travel to California. Grandmother found the conversations she had with Mother to be “disturbing” because Grandmother does not like to argue, and she felt every conversation with Mother turned into an argument. Grandmother said she wrote letters to Mother, after Father died, to apologize for past misunderstandings, but Mother returned the letters unopened.
The family court noted there is a legal presumption in favor of Mother’s decision to not give the Grandparents visitation. The family court found the only evidence of visitation being in D.M.’s best interests was the testimonies of Dr. Suiter and Dr. Morgan. The family court found the doctors’ testimonies to be “generic, ” and therefore insufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of Mother’s decision. The family court wrote that it also considered the lack of preexisting relationship between D.M. and the grandparents, as well as the distance between the Grandparents, in Texas, and D.M., in California. The family court denied the Grandparents’ petition.
DISCUSSION
A. SECTION 3102
Section 3102 provides: “(a) If either parent of an unemancipated minor child is deceased, the children, siblings, parents, and grandparents of the deceased parent may be granted reasonable visitation with the child during the child’s minority upon a finding that the visitation would be in the best interest of the minor child. [¶] (b) In granting visitation pursuant to this section to a person other than a grandparent of the child, the court shall consider the amount of personal contact between the person and the child before the application for the visitation order.”
B. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS WRITTEN
The Grandparents contend the family court erred by concluding that section 3102 is unconstitutional as written. The Grandparents argue, “Respondent Court therefore committed reversible error and the Judgment should be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial.” We disagree.
For the sake of clarity, we note that the family court is not the respondent in this matter; rather, Mother is the respondent.
A “tentative decision does not constitute a judgment and is not binding on [a] court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(b); In re Marriage of Hafferkamp (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 789, 794.) “‘“It has frequently been held that the orders actually entered are the official pronouncements and that it is the orders themselves which are reviewable and not the reasons which the [family] court may have given for its action. [Citations.]” [Citation.] It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning or argument which is the subject of [appellate] review [citation] and oral opinions or statements of the court may not be considered to reverse or impeach the final decision of the court.... [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Mulalley v. Mulalley (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 69, 72-73.)
When giving its tentative opinion, the family court stated section 3102 “is unconstitutional as written.” However, when the family court issued its written statement of decision, it did not conclude section 3102 is unconstitutional as written. The Grandparents’ argument is structured around the family court’s tentative reasoning. Since we review final judgments, not tentative reasoning, it would be a purely academic exercise for us to analyze the Grandparent’s contention. We decline to engage in such an academic exercise, since it is beyond the role of this court. (See Campbell v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1322 [declining academic exercise].) In sum, the Grandparents’ contention does not raise an argument that would support reversal of the judgment, and therefore, we decline to discuss it further.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 3102 AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE
The Grandparents point out that in the family court’s statement of decision, the court noted that four California appellate opinions have found section 3102 unconstitutional as applied to the facts of those four cases. The Grandparents note the four appellate holdings were based upon the facts of the individual cases. The Grandparents argue, “Respondent Court failed to do such an analysis.”
We interpret statutes by looking at the plain and commonsense meanings of the statute’s words. If the words are clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to review legislative history or look for other indicia of legislative intent. (In re Marriage of Wilcox (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 492, 499.) Section 3102 authorizes a family court to order grandparent visitation if such visitation “would be in the best interest of the minor child.” (§ 3102, subd. (a).) Accordingly, based upon the plain language of the statute, the family court is required to perform a best-interests analysis, not a constitutional analysis. As a result, we conclude that the family court did not err by not performing a constitutional analysis.
D. SCRUTINIZING MOTHER’S POSITION
The Grandparents assert the family court afforded significant weight to Mother’s decision regarding not letting them visit D.M. The Grandparents contend the family court should not have given so much weight to Mother’s decision, and should have scrutinized Mother’s decision to not allow the Grandparents to visit D.M. The Grandparents assert that since Mother’s position was not scrutinized, “the matter should be remanded for a new trial on the merits.” We disagree.
At the outset, we note the Grandparents’ contention is problematic, because it does not explain why the family court’s order is incorrect, it merely criticizes the family court’s methodology. As noted ante, this court reviews final judgments, not reasoning. Nevertheless, we will address the Grandparents’ argument, because it is easily resolved.
If a fit parent decides not to allow grandparents visitation with their grandchild, then the parent’s decision is entitled to “special weight” by the family court. (Fenn v. Sherriff (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1479.) “Special weight” has been interpreted as creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of the parent’s decision. (Id. at p. 1479, fn. 4.)
In the family court’s statement of decision, it wrote that Mother’s position “must be given special weight, i.e., a rebuttable presumption.” The family court then explained why the Grandparents failed to rebut the presumption. The family court cited the testimony of the doctors and criticized their opinions for the generic conclusions that grandparent visitation “is always in the best interest of a grandchild.” The family court reasoned that such generic testimony was insufficient to overcome the presumption. As a result of the family court’s correct citation of the legal standard and reasoned analysis of the Grandparents’ evidence, it does not appear that the family court afforded undue weight to Mother’s position.
E. PREEXISTING RELATIONSHIP
The Grandparents contend the family court erred by considering the lack of a preexisting relationship between D.M. and the Grandparents. We disagree.
In the family court’s statement of decision, it wrote: “Additionally, this court considered the following factors: the lack of any preexisting relationship between [D.M.] and the [Grandparents], and the distances between the residences of the [Grandparents] in Texas and [Mother] in California.”
We interpret statutes by looking at the plain and commonsense meanings of the statute’s words. If the words are clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to review legislative history or look for other indicia of legislative intent. (In re Marriage of Wilcox, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.) Section 3102, subdivision (b), provides: “In granting visitation pursuant to this section to a person other than a grandparent of the child, the court shall consider the amount of personal contact between the person and the child before the application for the visitation order.”
There is nothing in section 3102 prohibiting the family court from considering the lack of a preexisting relationship when considering a petition for grandparent visitation; rather, the section provides for situations wherein the family court must consider the amount of personal contact between the child and the petitioner. It would require a leap of statutory interpretation to infer from this plain mandate language that a family court is prohibited from considering the lack of a relationship between the grandparents and the child when ruling on a grandparents’ visitation petition. In other words, the statute creates a mandatory action; it does not prohibit action. Accordingly, we conclude that the family court did not err.
The Grandparents argue, “all which must be proven is that visitation is in the child’s best interest.” We agree, section 3102, subdivision (a), provides that visitation may be granted “upon a finding that the visitation would be in the best interest of the minor child.” Nevertheless, there is nothing prohibiting the family court from considering the lack of a preexisting relationship when deciding whether visitation would be in the child’s best interest. As a result, we find the Grandparents’ argument to be unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J., RICHLI, J.