Opinion
C.A. PC-2017-1107
11-20-2017
CHAD MITCHELL v. SETH MAGAZINER, in his capacity as GENERAL TREASURER of the STATE of RHODE ISLAND, and ADMINISTRATORS of the CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION PROGRAM PURSUANT TO R.I.G.L. § 12-25-18(a)
For Plaintiff: Chad Mitchell, pro se For Defendant: Amy L. Crane, Esq. Kara DiPaola, Esq.
Providence County Superior Court
For Plaintiff: Chad Mitchell, pro se
For Defendant: Amy L. Crane, Esq. Kara DiPaola, Esq.
DECISION
CARNES, J.
This matter is before the Court for decision on the appeal of Petitioner Chad Mitchell (Petitioner or Mitchell) of the February 6, 2017 decision of the Crime Victim's Compensation Program (CVCP), which denied the application of Petitioner for an injury alleged to have occurred in Newport, Rhode Island on July 19, 2015. Petitioner contends that he satisfied the requirements for receiving compensation, and CVCP erred in finding that he failed to do so. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 42-35-15 and 12-25-18(i).
I
Facts and Travel
Petitioner alleges that on July 19, 2015 he was assaulted by a person unknown to him, sustaining a fracture to his front tooth. (Recons. Decision 1). Petitioner filed his application on December 30, 2016, and the CVCP denied his application on January 3, 2017. Petitioner filed a request for reconsideration on January 19, 2017. Id. In his request for reconsideration, Petitioner asserted that immediately following the incident in which he was injured, he reported the incident to a patrolman of the Newport Police Department, who allegedly told him, "there is nothing I could do." Id. Petitioner further asserted that he was never advised to file a report with the Newport Police Department, and that the patrolman did not write any record of his statements. Id.
Following the application of Petitioner, the CVCP, following its usual procedure, sent inquiry to the Newport Police Department (NPD), requesting any information it had regarding the July 19, 2015 incident in which Petitioner was injured. Id. at 2. The NPD responded that it had no record of the incident. Id. The CVCP therefore, on January 3, 2017, "denied the application on the basis that the Applicant failed to report the crime to law enforcement within 10 days." Id. The CVCP wrote to the Applicant informing him that there was a possibility of a new decision if "the CVCP receives the necessary information about the incident in the future." Id. at 2-3.
The Applicant submitted a Request for Reconsideration to the CVCP on January 18, 2017. Id. at 3. In that Request for Reconsideration, the Applicant stated that he reported the incident to a patrolman of the NPD immediately following the incident in which he was injured, and the patrolman apparently told him, "there is nothing I can do." Id. The Applicant also asserted that the patrolman did not advise him to file a report with the NPD, and he did not write any description of the incident. Petitioner also asserted that on January 20, 2016, the NPD asked him to e-mail a description of the incident, and "they asked for anyone with information to call Newport Police which I did." Id.
The Office of the General Treasurer (Treasurer or Respondent) noted in its Reconsideration Decision that "the NPD reported that it cannot locate any report on file regarding the alleged incident[, ]" and noted further that "the CVCP has no documentation showing the Applicant reported the crime to law enforcement[.]" Id. The Respondent thus concluded, in its Reconsideration Decision of February 6, 2017, "the Applicant is ineligible for compensation." Id.
The Treasurer noted that the CVCP does provide for "an exception to the ten-day deadline when the Administrator finds good cause for delay." Id. However, the Treasurer found that "the Applicant has not provided any information to the CVCP showing circumstances that would amount to good cause for the failure to report the crime." Id. The Treasurer thus upheld the decision of the CVCP. Id.
Petitioner filed the Complaint in the within matter on March 9, 2017, and he filed an Amended Complaint on March 31, 2017. Respondent filed an Answer on April 19, 2017. Petitioner filed a brief in support of his Complaint on August 21, 2017, and Respondent filed a memorandum in opposition on September 15, 2017.
II
Standard of Review
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the act establishing the CVCP. The act provides, in pertinent part, "[a]ppeals of the treasurer's or treasurer designee's decision may be brought to superior court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42." Sec. 12-25-18(i).
The review of a decision by a state agency by this Court is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act. Section 42-35-15(g) of the act provides that:
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
"(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
"(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
"(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
"(4) Affected by other error or law;
"(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
"(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact. Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I. 1988). The court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the department's decision. Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. R.I. Comm'n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893, 897 (R.I. 1984). If '"competent evidence exists in the record, the Superior Court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions."' Auto Body Ass'n of R.I. v. State Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 996 A.2d 91, 95 (R.I. 2010) (quoting R.I. Pub. Telecomms. Auth. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 650 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I. 1994)).
It is well settled that '"deference will be accorded to an administrative agency when it interprets a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency . . . even when the agency's interpretation is not the only permissible interpretation that could be applied."' Id. at 97. (quoting Pawtucket Power Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456-57 (R.I. 1993)); see also Unistrut Corp. v. State Dep't of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d 93, 99 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Arnold v. R.I. Dep't of Labor and Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 169 (R.I. 2003)) ('"[W]hen the administration of a statute has been entrusted to a governmental agency, deference is due to that agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous or unauthorized."').
III
Arguments
Petitioner contends on appeal that the Treasurer failed to properly interpret a statute enacted in 1996 that governs the determination of compensation for injuries incurred as the result of the criminal activity of other persons. Section 12-25-22(a) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (the Act) provides that "no compensation shall be awarded for an injury or death resulting from a crime that was not reported to the appropriate law enforcement authority within fifteen (15) days of its occurrence, " and the Act further provides that the CVCP may "allow a claim that was not reported pursuant to this section when the victim or secondary victim was below the age of eighteen (18) years of age, or of unsound mind, or for good cause shown." Petitioner contends that this Court should find that he did report the crime within the statutorily prescribed time frame or, in the alternative, should find that "good cause" has been shown for Petitioner's failure to do so.
The Court notes that at the time of the incident, the statute prescribed a ten-day time limit, as opposed to the current fifteen-day limit.
Respondent counters that it properly applied the above-referenced statute. Respondent specifically argues that Petitioner did not file his claim within the statutorily prescribed time frame. Respondent further contends that there has been no showing of good cause for not reporting the incident within said time frame, and this Court should therefore uphold Respondent's denial of Petitioner's request for relief.
IV
Analysis
A
"Report"
Here, the CVCP denied the Petitioner's claim upon being informed by the NPD that there was no record of the incident in which Petitioner sustained the injury for which he was making a claim. As explained above, Petitioner filed a timely appeal, and the matter went to the Respondent for reconsideration. Respondent found that the CVCP did not have documentation of the Petitioner's claim, and he did not show good cause for failing to report the incident. Respondent thus upheld the denial of the Petitioner's request for compensation.
Petitioner argues that the meaning of the aforementioned statute is '"clear and unambiguous, "' and therefore, this Court '"must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings."' State v. Gordon, 30 A.3d 636, 638 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Tanner v. Town Council of E. Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 796 (R.I. 2005) (further quotation omitted)). Petitioner urges this Court to apply this well-settled principle to interpret "report" to mean that the Petitioner satisfied the requirements of § 12-25-22(a) when he "reported" the incident to an NPD patrolman immediately following the incident.
Petitioner further asserts that he reported the crime to Newport Hospital "very shortly after the incident occurred." Pet'r's Br. 8. (citing R. 29). He argues that the medical report from Newport Hospital and the verbal report to the NPD, taken together, satisfy the reporting requirement of the Act, because they contain the same information that would be found in a report from the NPD.
Respondent argues that the statute does not specify what it means to "report" the incident, and therefore, this Court should look to the relevant rules of the agency that interprets the statute. The Rules and Regulations governing the CVCP provide guidance as to the burden on an applicant for compensation pursuant to the Act. Section 1.06(2) of the Rules and Regulations provides that "[a]n applicant must demonstrate that the crime for which he/she seeks compensation was reported to police or other appropriate law enforcement authorities[.]" Section 1.10(3) of the Rules and Regulations provides that an "applicant must provide written documentation to establish the facts supporting his/her application for compensation[, ]" and it further provides that the documentation "shall include, where appropriate, all expenses, lost wage verifications, W-2 forms, tax returns, death and birth certificates, and the incident report from the appropriate law enforcement authorities."
It is well settled in Rhode Island that "deference will be accorded to an administrative agency when it interprets a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency." Pawtucket Power Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 622 A.2d at 456 (citing Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (further citation omitted)). Further, our highest Court has held that "proper judicial deference to [an agency's] interpretation of its regulations require[s] [a] Court to presume the validity and reasonableness of that construction until and unless the party challenging its interpretation prove[s] otherwise." State v. Cluley, 808 A.2d 1098, 1104 (R.I. 2002). In the within matter, Respondent examined the findings of the CVCP, and it upheld those findings. Respondent and the CVCP both found that "report" meant the filing of a report, and it did not mean merely a verbal "report" to a patrolman bystander. Absent clear error, this Court will not overturn this finding.
B
"Good Cause"
Petitioner also contends that the Treasurer erred in finding that there existed no "good cause" that would exempt Petitioner from the ten (now fifteen) day limitation on the reporting of the incident which caused his injury. Conversely, Respondent maintains that the record reveals no "good cause" for the Petitioner not reporting the incident within the time specified by statute.
Petitioner argues that in the event that this Court determines that Petitioner failed to report the incident within the prescribed time frame, said failure was in fact due to "good cause" as referenced in § 12-25-22(a). Petitioner asserts that it would have been "fruitless" to further pursue the matter. Pet'r's Br. 8 (citing R. 12).
Respondent counters that none of Petitioner's reasons in the within matter for failure to file a written police report constitute "good cause" as contemplated by the applicable statute. Respondent notes that Section 1.06(3)(b) of the Rules and Regulations governing the CVCP reads, in pertinent part: "Good cause for delay shall include, but not be limited to, delay caused by physical or psychological incapacity which prevented the making of a report; or by reasonable fear of retaliation by the offender or others." Section 1.06(3)(d) of the Rules and Regulations elaborates, "[a] finding of good cause for delay does not excuse the reporting requirement which must be satisfied as a condition of receiving compensation."
The Court acknowledges that Mitchell suffered serious injury. Mitchell sustained significant facial and dental damage, and from July 20, 2015 through July 14, 2016, he underwent multiple dental procedures. (R. 20-25.) However, the CVCP found that Mitchell's verbal statement to a patrolman and his admission to Newport Hospital did not satisfy the requirement that relief can only be granted when the applicant has "reported [the incident] to the appropriate law enforcement authority[.]" (Recons. Decision 2). The Treasurer, on February 6, 2017, upheld this finding. The Treasurer further found that "the Applicant has not provided any information to the CVCP showing circumstances that would amount to good cause for the failure to report the crime." Id. at 3. Absent clear error, this Court will not disturb these findings.
V
Conclusion
The Court is sensitive to Petitioner's position. However, Petitioner is required to demonstrate his entitlement to compensation. This Court has reviewed the entire record before it. A thorough review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support the Treasurer's conclusion that Petitioner was not entitled to relief from the CVCP. The CVCP's decision on Petitioner's application for compensation was thus not in excess of its statutory authority. The Court therefore finds that the decision of the Treasurer to deny the application for compensation from the CVCP is supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record, and is not an abuse of discretion, clearly erroneous, or affected by error of law. Substantial rights of the Petitioner have not been prejudiced. Accordingly, the February 6, 2017 decision of the Treasurer, which upheld the January 3, 2017 decision of the CVCP, is affirmed. Counsel shall prepare appropriate judgment for entry.