Mitchell v. Lindly

13 Citing cases

  1. Conterez v. O'Donnell

    2002 OK 67 (Okla. 2002)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Collecting authority, and noting the adequate opportunity which occurred in the Supreme Court to challenge the sua sponte actions by a different court

    A voluntarily released and satisfied judgment moots both an appeal that is lodged against it and against all nisi prius vacation process. Mitchell v. Lindly, 1960 OK 115, ¶ 12, 351 P.2d 1063, 1067. This is so because any errors in its entry become abstract, hypothetical or academic and hence no longer available for the exercise of judicial cognizance.

  2. Grace Hospice of Oklahoma, LLC v. Bradley

    159 P.3d 297 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007)

    Employer and Insurance Carrier argue that these circumstances demonstrate a "voluntarily satisfied judgment [that] moots" relief by way of appeal or vacation by the trial court, as discussed in Stites v. Duit Construction Co., 1995 OK 69, ¶ 15, 903 P.2d 293. Employer and Insurance Carrier stress that the effect of a voluntarily satisfied judgment is "loss of jurisdiction," because "once a judgment has been paid and fully satisfied according to its terms it becomes extinguished." Mitchell v. Lindly, 1960 OK 115, ¶ 12, 351 P.2d 1063, 1067 (citation omitted). While we agree that this rule governs judgments in cases of law and equity, we do not think it can be applied to adjudications by the workers' compensation court and, in particular, approved joint petition settlements.

  3. Watts v. Pinckney

    752 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1985)   Cited 94 times
    Holding that a judgment by a court without jurisdiction is void or a legal nullity

    We are told that "where the judgment previously entered by a court has been fully paid and satisfied, the judgment no longer exists, the duties and obligations imposed by the judgment are extinguished and there remains nothing from which the party seeking relief can be relieved." The Watts rely on Mitchell v. Lindley, 351 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Okla. 1960) in support of this argument. The Mitchell decision is inapplicable to a challenge of a void judgment.

  4. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes

    307 P.3d 879 (Alaska 2013)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that Leisnoi was entitled to recover the $643,760 it had paid to Merdes & Merdes

    Leisnoi characterizes the first two options as so undesirable—based on both the potential “embarrassment” and disruption of its business associated with involuntary collection procedures and the high cost of posting a supersedeas bond—that it had no choice but to pay the judgment. See, e.g., Haberer v. Newman, 219 Kan. 562, 549 P.2d 975, 976 (1976) (holding that a party who voluntarily complied with trial court judgment by surrendering possession of real estate could not obtain appellate review); Ramsey Fin. Corp. v. Haugland, 719 N.W.2d 346, 350 (N.D.2006) (holding that “voluntary payment of or acquiescence in a judgment waives the right to appeal”); Mitchell v. Lindly, 351 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Okla.1960) (holding that a judgment, once satisfied, may not be vacated, “especially when ... the satisfaction is not claimed to have been involuntary or made under any mistake ... of fact”). We have not directly discussed the question when payment of a judgment will result in waiver of the right to appeal. Some jurisdictions hold that payment of an adverse judgment is compulsory.

  5. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C.

    Supreme Court No. S-13790 (Alaska Feb. 1, 2013)

    Leisnoi characterizes the first two options as so undesirable — based on both the potential "embarrassment" and disruption of its business associated with involuntary collection procedures and the high cost of posting a supersedeas bond — that it had no choice but to pay the judgment. See, e.g., Haberer v. Newman, 549 P.2d 975, 976 (Kan. 1976) (holding that a party who voluntarily complied with trial court judgment by surrendering possession of real estate could not obtain appellate review); Ramsey Fin. Corp. v. Haugland, 719 N.W.2d 346, 350 (N.D. 2006) (holding that "voluntary payment of or acquiescence in a judgment waives the right to appeal"); Mitchell v. Lindly, 351 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Okla. 1960) (holding that a judgment, once satisfied, may not be vacated, "especially when . . . the satisfaction is not claimed to have been involuntary or made under any mistake . . . of fact"). We have not directly discussed the question when payment of a judgment will result in waiver of the right to appeal. Some jurisdictions hold that payment of an adverse judgment is compulsory.

  6. Stites v. DUIT Constr. Co.

    1995 OK 69 (Okla. 1995)   Cited 44 times
    During certiorari review the appeal was dismissed as untimely commenced

    We granted certiorari on DUIT's petition and now, for the reasons to be explained, vacate the Court of Appeals' opinion and dismiss Stites' appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeals relied on Mitchell v. Lindly, Okla., 351 P.2d 1063 (1960), where this court upheld the trial judge's refusal to vacate a voluntarily satisfied judgment based upon the parties' settlement agreement. Mitchell is distinguishable from the present case.

  7. City of Valdez v. Gavora, Inc.

    692 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1984)   Cited 9 times
    Vacating judgment because it was moot and to prevent it having later legal effect

    [O]nce a judgment has been paid and fully satisfied according to its terms it becomes extinguished, a dead thing, and is no longer a judgment in the sense that a judgment fixes and finally establishes the rights and obligations of the parties thereto.Mitchell v. Lindly, 351 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Okla. 1960), quoting Sweeney v. Black River Lumber Co., 4 La. App. 244 (La. 1927). The judgment which fixed and established Gavora's rights in the Alatna Street easement is now "extinguished, a dead thing."

  8. Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n

    657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that the residuary clause of rule 60(b) may be employed only if the ground asserted for relief is “one other than those listed” in the preceding subsections

    Furthermore, both the six-month delay and the fact of prior satisfaction show that the motion was not made within a reasonable time. While we decline plaintiffs' invitation to go so far as to say that a judgment once knowingly and voluntarily satisfied becomes extinguished and is therefore never subject to modification, see Mitchell v. Lindly, Okla., 351 P.2d 1063 (1960), we do consider the fact of prior satisfaction an important consideration in determining whether the motion to modify was made within a reasonable time. The possibility of prejudice to the nonmoving party increases significantly when the judgment has already been paid.

  9. Thompson v. Inman

    1971 OK 32 (Okla. 1971)   Cited 18 times

    Without quoting these remarks, as they were represented in Mrs. Inman's motion for a new trial, we think it sufficient to say that, assuming they were made and that they accurately reflected the court's reasons for his ruling, since they were not incorporated in the journal entry of said ruling, they cannot be made a basis for reversing it (see Diem v. Diem, Okla., 372 P.2d 19, and the cases there cited); and we must affirm the trial court, if said ruling is sustainable on any valid ground, not inconsistent with plaintiff's position. See Seal v. Carroll, Okla., 439 P.2d 185, Mitchell v. Lindly, Okla., 351 P.2d 1063, 1066, and other cases digested in 2A Okla.Dig., "Appeal and Error". Such ground, in this case, is that the cross-petitioner failed to discharged her burden of proving want of probable cause, on plaintiff's part, for naming her a codefendant (with her husband) in the petition he filed in this action, and for charging her (by use of the collective term "defendants" in certain of said petition's allegations) with being a part of a conspiracy and scheme, alleged therein, to defraud the Clyde McNeill Estate of the ownership, and benefits of ownership, of the subject Nevada land. (As to such burden of proof, see Miller v. Bourne, 208 Okla. 362, 256 P.2d 431, and 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malicious Prosecution § 130.)

  10. English v. Rainwater

    403 P.2d 449 (Okla. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    "In [a] case of equitable cognizance the supreme court is not bound either by the reasoning of the trial court or its findings, but will examine the whole record, consider and weigh the evidence, and may, if the law and facts warrant, affirm the case if the trial judge reached the correct ultimate conclusion." Also see Mitchell v. Lindly, Okla., 351 P.2d 1063; McDaniel v. McCauley, Okla., 371 P.2d 486, and authorities therein cited. Our statute, 16 O.S. 1961 § 29[ 16-29] provides: