Opinion
1:21-cv-131
11-22-2023
DAMILE Q. MITCHELL, Plaintiff v. EARL JONES, et al, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF NO. 63
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 63] be granted. It is further recommended that all claims against Defendants Michael Clark, Earl Jones, Brian Flinchbaugh, and Jerri Smock be dismissed, with prejudice, and that the claims against the unidentified Defendants designated as John Does 1-3 and Jane Does 1-2 be dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).
II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Damile Q. Mitchell, an inmate formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (SCI-Albion), initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 5, 2021 ECF No. 1. In his Amended Complaint - the operative pleading in this action - Mitchell alleges that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by displaying deliberate indifference to his medical needs and health care. See ECF No. 49 at 5. As Defendants, Mitchell has named SCI-Albion Superintendent Michael Clark, Deputy Superintendents Earl Jones and Bryan Flinchbaugh, corrections officer Sidney Campbell, Healthcare Administrator Geri Smock, and five John and Jane Does. Id. ¶¶ 2-6.
Mitchell has since been transferred to SCI-Huntingdon.
None of the John or Jane Doe Defendants appear to have been identified during discovery.
Presently pending is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 63. Defendants' motion is supported by a Concise Statement of Material Facts, a supporting Brief, and Appendix of Exhibits. ECF Nos. 64-66. Mitchell has filed a Responsive Concise Statement of Material Facts and a Brief in Opposition to Defendants' motion. ECF Nos. 72-73. The motion is ripe for disposition.
Notably, Defendants failed to respond to the additional material facts set forth in Plaintiffs responsive statement. As such, each of these facts must be deemed admitted. See LCvR 56.E.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Factual Background
Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed. On February 5, 2020, Mitchell experienced a medical emergency while housed on F-A Block at SCI-Albion. ECF No. 64 ¶ 14; ECF No. 73 ¶¶ 14, 109. Although the responding nurse was initially advised by Mitchell's cellmate that Mitchell may have ingested an illicit substance, Mitchell maintains that he was experiencing a seizure. See ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 14-16, 20; ECF No. 73 ¶¶ 108-109; ECF No. 73-2. Whatever the case, Mitchell presented as confused, disoriented, and “altered” in mental status. ECF No. 64 ¶ 20; ECF No. 73 ¶¶ 109. The shift commander, Defendant Campbell, referred Mitchell to a nurse practitioner and placed him in a Psychiatric Observation Cell (POC). ECF No. 65-1 at 65-81.
At some point in the very early hours of February 6, 2020, Mitchell woke up in the POC and experienced a “mental health breakdown.” ECF No. 73 ¶ 159. Mitchell requested access to a psychiatrist or supervising correctional officer from several individuals, including an inmate Certified Peer Specialist (CPS) and a nurse, but each request was denied. Id. ¶¶ 160-161; ECF No. 73-1. When told that “no one was available to help him,” Mitchell expressed a desire to kill himself by striking his head against the cell wall. ECF No. 73 ¶ 162. Mitchell made a similar threat while staring into the cell's security camera. Id. ¶ 163. When no one responded, Mitchell struck his head into the concrete wall of the POC, causing him to lose consciousness. Id. ¶ 164. ECF No. 64¶23.
According to Mitchell, he awoke to find Campbell standing over him and threatening to spray him in the face with pepper spray. ECF No. 73 ¶ 165. He was then cuffed and taken to medical for assessment. ECF No. 64 ¶ 24; ECF No. 73 ¶ 165. Although the nurse performing the initial assessment did not observe any injuries, a physician's assistant later diagnosed Mitchell with concussion symptoms. ECF No. 65-1 at 85, 121. Mitchell maintains that he continues to experience headaches, dizziness, insomnia and mental health deterioration as a result of his self-harm. ECF No. 73 ¶ 170.
On February 10, 2020, Mitchell filed an inmate grievance - Grievance Number 849393 -concerning the incident. ECF No. 64 ¶ 55; ECF No. 65-1 at 46, 48. Mitchell stated:
On 2-6-20,1 experienced a seizure and was takin to medical where my vitals were checked, I was in the middle of a mental breakdown, I suffer from depression and bouts of anxiety, I ask to see a Psych. Doc. or a white shirt LT or CPT. After I was placed in the observation cell where all my clothes were taken and locked in I laid down and passed out and woke up disoriented and asked again to see a Psych or LT, CPT was
denied and sent a CPS worker instead, I asked him to get someone for me and he told me he couldn't so I panicked and told him I was having mental issues and if someone didn't come I was going to run head first into the wall. He left and a nurse came over. I asked her the same thing she denied me and then told me there was no Physc or LT, CPT on 3RDshift. I told her this can't be true. She proceeded to berate me on camera (It's all on there) and say next time don't smoke a claim I denied the whole time, she said she was the best I would receive until 7 AM, I couldn't comprehend what she was saying. My mind was going haywire, I told her if she didn't get someone I was going to run headfirst into the wall and turned around and told the cameras they had 5 min to respond, the nurse told me just run into the wall because no ones coming. So I waited the alotted time and ran into the wall, All I know is once I came to everyone that I asked for was there (except the Physc) (please check the cameras for response and to preserve evidence) they were waiting to see how things would go, to see if I would really go. through with it, I awoke to Capt Campbell standing over me screaming that if I didn't put my hands behind my back he would spray me in the F-ing face. I was mentally abused by those who were supposed to help and neglected for whatever reasons that where their own their actions directly results in mental and physical anguish, since than I've been having severe headaches and am scared to say something to the Admin.
Because of my fear or ridiculed or made up speculations so I'm hereby filing this complaint and lawsuit against the DOC and Administration of Albion Jail for 500,000$ for improper mental medical attention, negligent and blatant disregard for the safety and well being of someone in their care.ECF No. 65-1 at 48. The prison denied Mitchell's grievance on initial, intermediate, and final review. ECF No. 64 ¶¶ 59-61. The instant lawsuit followed.
C. Procedural Background
In his original complaint, Mitchell asserted an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Campbell based on his response to Mitchell's threats of self-harm and against Clark, Jones, Flinchbaugh, and Smock based on their failure, as administrators, to enact adequate procedures to protect inmates suffering from mental health breakdowns. See ECF No. 36 at 9. He also asserted a deliberate indifference claim against five Doe Defendants based on their interactions with him during and after his breakdown. Id. at 2-4. In addition to seeking compensatory and punitive damages, Mitchell sought prospective injunctive relief in the form of an order mandating installation of padded cells, proper restraints in the SCI-Albion psychiatric cells, and more professionals and corrections officers trained in mental health caretaking. Id. at 8.
Defendants moved to dismiss Mitchell's claims in their entirety. See ECF No. 20. On March 9, 2022, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that Defendants' motion be granted as to Mitchell's claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their individual capacities but denied as to Mitchell's claim for prospective injunctive relief against Defendants in their official capacities. Id. at 16-17. With respect to the four “Supervisory Defendants” - Clark, Jones, Flinchbaugh, and Smock - the Court noted that Mitchell's claim was based entirely on their supervisory roles within the prison hierarchy and that he had failed to adequately allege either a failure to train or the existence of a policy, custom, or practice that led to his injury. Id. at 11-13. As to Campbell, the Court found that Mitchell's averment that Campbell yelled at him and threatened to spray him with OC spray was insufficient to support a deliberate indifference claim. Id. at 15. United States District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter adopted the R&R over Mitchell's objections and instructed him to file an amended complaint that included “specific factual details of precisely how his civil rights were allegedly violated.” ECF No. 46. Mitchell filed his amended complaint shortly thereafter. ECF No. 49.
As in the prior R&R, the Court will again refer to these four Defendants as the “Supervisory Defendants” throughout this Report.
D. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartier, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
E. Analysis
In his amended complaint, Mitchell again asserts a single Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Campbell, Clark, Jones, Flinchbaugh, Smock, and five unidentified Doe Defendants. Mitchell is seeking two forms of relief: 1) a permanent injunction against Clark, Jones, Flinchbaugh, and Smock (sued in their official capacities) requiring them to install padded cells at SCI-Albion, hire additional psychiatric and mental health personnel, and provide suicide prevention training to all staff members, and 2) compensatory and punitive damages against each Defendant in his or her individual capacity based on deliberate indifference to Mitchell's “mental breakdown” and resultant act of self-harm. Defendants, in response, maintain that Mitchell never exhausted his claim for prospective injunctive relief at the administrative level and has failed to adduce evidence establishing the personal involvement of any of the Supervisory Defendants. Each of these defenses will be discussed in turn.
Although Campbell has moved for summary judgment on Mitchell's claim for injunctive relief, see ECF No. 66 at 5, he did not move for summary judgment on Mitchell's claim for monetary damages. See id. at 15. This claim should be scheduled for trial.
1. Mitchell failed to exhaust his prospective claim for injunctive relief
In broad brush, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (the “PLRA”), requires a prisoner to exhaust any available administrative remedies before he may bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the statute requires “proper exhaustion,” meaning that a prisoner's completion of the administrative review process must also satisfy the applicable procedural rules of the prison's grievance system. Fennell v. Cambria County Prison, 607 Fed.Appx. 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2015). A procedurally defective administrative grievance, even if pursued to final review, precludes action in federal court. Id. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
The grievance system utilized in Pennsylvania's prison system requires inmates to satisfy a three-step grievance and appeals process. See Grievance System Policy DC ADM-804; Smith v. Sec. of Pa. Dept, of Corrections, 2018 WL 279363, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2018). First, the inmate must “legibly set forth all facts and identify all persons relevant to his claim in a grievance which will then be subject to ‘initial review.'” Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *2 (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2004)). Second, the initial review must be appealed to the Facility Administrator for a second level of review. Id. Finally, “the inmate is required to file an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“the Secretary's Office”).” Id. Once these three steps have been satisfied, a grievance has ordinarily been administratively exhausted for purposes of the PLRA.
Apropos to the instant case, however, DC-ADM 804 contains an additional requirement: that an inmate who “desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court” must “request the relief with specificity in his/her initial grievance.” See Wright v. Sauers, 2017 WL 3731957 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017); Spruill, 372 F.3d 218. Courts characterize the satisfaction of this requirement as “proper exhaustion.” Smith, 2018 WL 279363, at *3 (noting that a grievance must be fully exhausted to final review and “properly exhausted” with respect to remedy). Pursuant to this requirement, an inmate is precluded from seeking legal relief in a lawsuit, including injunctive relief, if the inmate did not request that same relief in his grievances (despite that he may have appealed those grievances to the Secretary's Office for final review). See, e.g., Hobson v. Tiller, 2021 WL 2191282, at *8 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2021) (“Even if an inmate's claim for money damages is procedurally defaulted for failing to include it in the initial grievance, courts still allow claims for injunctive relief to proceed if that was specifically requested in the initial grievance.”) (emphasis added); Wright, 2017 WL 3731957, at *7 (finding lack of proper exhaustion where plaintiff failed to set forth desired relief on his initial grievance form as required by DC-ADM 804); Camacho v. Beers, 2018 WL 6618410, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18,2018) (holding that, because “Plaintiff failed to request the specific relief of monetary compensation in the grievances he filed as to the subjects of this lawsuit... he did not exhaust all administrative remedies with regard to such claims . .. [and] may not pursue an action in federal court based on the claims raised in his procedurally defective grievances.”). This principle forms the primary basis for Defendants' summary judgment motion.
Mitchell's request for an injunction runs afoul of this requirement. In his administrative grievance, the only relief Mitchell sought was monetary compensation in the amount of $500,000. ECF No. 65-1 at 48. None of the injunctive remedies he is seeking - padded cells, adequate restraints, and additional mental health staff - were presented to prison authorities in a properly filed grievance. His failure to request these remedies during the administrative process bars him from seeking that relief in the instant case. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Everett, 2021 WL 4994338, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2021) (inmate precluded from seeking monetary or injunctive relief in federal action because his grievance stated only that he wished to “take legal action” on is claims without requesting any relief); Hobson v. Tiller, 2021 WL 2191282, at *8. Cf. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 2000) (“If, in the available administrative process, the Bureau of Prisons were to give him the injunctive relief he requests, several of his claims for declaratory relief would be rendered moot. Allowing the federal courts to fashion prison remedies before the prisons themselves have had the opportunity (and have the ability) to do so, is surely not what Congress intended when it enacted the PLRA.”).
2. Mitchell has failed to establish that the Supervisory Defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.
It is axiomatic that a § 1983 plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage
constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is “well established that the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiff s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. AM. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). .
In opposing Defendants' motion to dismiss his original complaint, Mitchell argued that “all Defendants were personally involved in violating his constitutional rights because ‘they all reasonably knew - or should have known' that deficiencies in prison procedures and practices would result in poor care for any inmate experiencing a mental health crisis.” ECF No. 36 at 10. The Court held that this conclusory allegation was insufficient to support supervisory liability. Id. As explained in the R&R:
The Court of Appeals has identified two ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts or omissions committed by subordinates. First, liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference
to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm. ” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). Second, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995)). “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208. Furthermore, a prison official's mere participation in the prison grievance process “is insufficient to confer knowledge of, and acquiescence to, a constitutional violation.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Ramos v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2006 WL 2129148 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
The Supervisory Defendants correctly observe that the factual allegations of Mitchell's Complaint do not support that they participated in any of the alleged conduct on February 5-6, 2021, or that they knew of the conduct and acquiesced in it. The allegations of the Complaint likewise fail to support that any Supervisory Defendant adopted a policy, custom, or practice that led to his injury. “Policy is made when a ‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action' issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072, § 102. A course of conduct not expressly authorized by law becomes a “custom” when the challenged “practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled” as to virtually constitute law. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1979). To establish a policy or custom under § 1983, “it is incumbent upon [Mitchell] to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). The “policymaker” is the
person who “has final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action,” and who is or is not a policymaker is determined by reference to state law. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481; Perez v. Larson, 2020 WL 5507227, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2020). Mitchell has not alleged facts to support that any Supervisory Defendant adopted a policy or through acquiesced in conduct to establish a custom that caused his injury.Id. at 11. Judge Baxter agreed, adopting the R&R and directing Mitchell to file a curative amendment.
Mitchell's allegations fare no better the second time around. As an initial matter, there does not appear to be any dispute that none of the four Supervisory Defendants was present at SCI-Albion when the incident occurred. Clark, Flinchbaugh, and Smock have each submitted a sworn declaration stating that, because the incident took place outside of normal working hours, none was physically present at SCI-Albion when Mitchell injured himself. ECF No. 65-1 at 131132, 137-143. Jones, in addition to not being present, was not even employed at SCI-Albion at that time. Id. at 134-135. Mitchell has adduced no evidence to create a triable issue of material fact regarding the direct personal involvement of any of the four Supervisory Defendants in his medical treatment on the date of the incident.
Jones transferred from SCI-Cambridge Springs to SCI-Albion on February 13, 2020. ECF No. 65-1 at 134-135.
Mitchell's attempt to establish individual liability based solely on the Supervisory Defendants' roles within the prison hierarchy is similarly flawed. His averment that Clark had “a direct involvement in the February 5-6, 2020 incident” because he “was the Facility Manager, directly responsible for ensuring that [adequate mental health procedures] were implemented at SCI-Albion” is entirely conclusory. See ECF No. 72 at 13. The same is true of his allegation that Flinchbaugh and Smock were “responsible for coordinating efforts between the prison and the Medical Department” and “monitoring compliance and directing daily operations of the Medical Department at SCI-Albion,” respectively. Id. at 14-16. Indeed, the Court has already held that these precise allegations were insufficient to establish that any Defendant “adopted a policy, custom, or practice that led to his injury” or “knew of the [incident] and acquiesced in it.” See ECF No. 36 at 11.
Mitchell concedes that, because Jones was not employed at SCI-Albion until after the incident, he cannot be liable for monetary damages. ECF No. 72 at 12.
In a final attempt to salvage his claim, Mitchell maintains that Clark, Flinchbaugh and Smock “were fully aware on February 5-6, 2020 that Campbell was not trained and certified in Mental Health Care and Suicide Prevention.” Id. at 18. To establish liability for failing to properly train a subordinate, Mitchell must point to evidence that “a responsible municipal policymaker had contemporaneous knowledge of the offending occurrence or knowledge of a pattern of prior incidents of similar violations of constitutional rights and failed to take adequate measures to ensure the particular right in question or otherwise communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinates.” Garcia v. Cnty. of Bucks, Pa, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). Such claims raise “difficult problems of proof,” Board of County Com 'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997), because they are “a step removed from the constitutional violation resulting from that failure.” Douglas v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 836 F.Supp.2d 329, 364 (W.D. Pa. 2011). See also Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822 (1985) (describing “a ‘policy' of ‘inadequate training'” as “far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation,” than other policies). Thus, an official's “culpability for a deprivation of [constitutional] rights is ... at its most tenuous” where a § 1983 claim turns on a failure to train or failure to act. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011).
Although Mitchell accuses the Supervisory Defendants of generally failing to provide adequate training on suicide prevention and mental health issues, “he cannot rely solely upon the allegedly inadequate response to his mental health crisis to support liability against supervisors.” See ECF No. 36 at 13. This is because, as a general matter, “deficient training can only amount to the requisite deliberate indifference ‘where the failure to train has caused a pattern of violations.'” Tirado v. Montgomery Cty., Pa., 2013 WL 1285487, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013) (quoting Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000)). There is no evidence in the record to support the existence of any such pattern, and Mitchell's conclusory averment that the Supervisory Defendants “knew or should have known of deficiencies in subordinates' response to mental health crises” is insufficient to meet this burden. ECF No. 36 at 13 (citing Yoast v. Pottstown Borough, 437 F.Supp.3d 403, 431 (E.D. Pa, 2020)). Rather, Mitchell must identify a specific training deficiency or deficiencies that led directly to his injury and a final policymaker responsible for the training of subordinates. Joines v. Township o/Ridley, 229 Fed.Appx. 161, 163 (3d Cir. 2007); Yoast, 437 F.Supp.3d at 431. He has failed to do so.
In short, Mitchell has failed to identify any evidence in the record from which a reasonable finder of fact might infer that Clark, Flinchbaugh, Jones, or Smock was personally involved in the alleged violations of his rights, either through their direct participation or their failure to provide adequate staff training. Summary judgment is warranted.
3. The Doe Defendants should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)
Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court - on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant. . .”. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Because the Complaint was filed on May 5, 2021, Mitchell was obligated to identify and serve each Doe Defendant on or before August 5, 2021. Id. The Court has noted on several occasions that Mitchell has yet to identify or serve those Defendants, most recently in the R&R issued on March 9, 2022. See ECF No. 36 at 16 n. 5. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has made clear, however, “Rule 4(m) requires a district court to give notice prior to dismissing an action upon its own motion for failure to effect timely service” so that the plaintiff may have the opportunity to “good cause” for his failure to timely serve the complaint. Liu v. Oriental Buffet, 134 Fed.Appx. 544, 546 (3d Cir. 2005). To date, Mitchell has failed to properly identify or serve the Doe Defendants and the time to do so has long expired. While the Court has previously raised this deficiency during prior proceedings and in its earlier R&R, it hereby expressly notifies Mitchell that the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss this action as to each of the Doe Defendants, without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 4(m) based on his failure to serve these Defendants unless Mitchell shows good cause for this failure within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of this R&R. Absent a showing of good cause for the delay, Rule 4 (m) mandates that the Court “must dismiss the action without prejudice” as to those Defendants. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); Turner v. Tuttle, 2017 WL 1086185, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2017). Therefore, should Mitchell fail to show good cause for his failure to serve the Doe Defendants within the time provided, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action as to any Doe Defendant who has not been properly identified and served.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 63] be granted. Mitchell's claim for prospective injunctive relief against all Defendants and his claim for monetary damages against Defendants Michael Clark, Earl Jones, Brian Flinchbaugh, and Jerri Smock should be dismissed, with prejudice. Defendants Clark, Jones, Flinchbaugh, and Smock should be terminated from this action.
It is further recommended that, should Mitchell fail to show cause for his failure to serve the unidentified Doe Defendants, those Defendants should be dismissed from this action, without prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).
Finally, it is recommended that Mitchell's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Campbell in his individual capacity be scheduled for trial.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).