Opinion
1:21-CV-00131-SPB-RAL
06-08-2022
DAMILE Q. MITCHELL, Plaintiff v. EARL JONES, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT FOR FACILITY; BRYAN FLINCHBAUGH, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT FOR CENTRALIZED SERVICES; CAMBPELL, CAPTAIN AT SCI-ALBION; DR. GERI SMOCK, CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATOR; JOHN DOE #1, SHIFT COMMANDER ON 2/5-6/2020; JOHN DOE #2, RESPONDING CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ON 2/5-6/2020; JOHN DOE #3, RESPONDING OFFICER ON 2/5-6/2020; MICHAEL CLARK, SUPERINTENDENT AT SCI-ALBION; JANE DOE #1, INITIAL RESPONDING MEDICAL DIR. ON 2/56/2020; AND JANE DOE #2, INITIAL RESPONDING PSYCHOLOGIST ON 2/56/2020, Defendants
ECF NO. 20
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
L Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint filed on behalf of Defendants Michael Clark, Earl Jones, Bryan Flinchbaugh, Captain Campbell, and Geri Smock (ECF No. 20) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
II. Background and Procedural Posture
Plaintiff Damile Q. Mitchell (“Mitchell”), proceeding pro se, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violation of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care while he was in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at its State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”). His Complaint listed ten defendants, five of whom he identified by name and the remaining five he designated as “Doe” defendants. (ECF No. 6). The specifically named defendants, Michael Clark (“Clark”), Superintendent at SCI-Albion, Earl Jones (“Jones”), Deputy Superintendent for SCI-Albion, Bryan Flinchbaugh (“Flinchbaugh”), Deputy Superintendent for SCI-Albion, Captain Campbell (“Campbell”), a corrections officer at SCI-Albion, and Geri Smock (“Smock”), Healthcare Administrator at SCI-Albion, (collectively “Moving Defendants”) have moved to dismiss Mitchell's Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12 (b)(6) (ECF No. 20) and filed a Brief in support of their motion. (ECF No. 21). Mitchell has filed a Response to the motion. (ECF No. 32). This matter is ripe for decision.
III. Material Facts and Nature of Claims
The Court accepts Mitchell's factual allegations as true for purposes of the pending motion. See Miller v. Knight, 2021 WL 4445014, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2021) (citing US Express Lines Ltd., v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (accepting allegations in a complaint as true when ruling on a motion to dismiss)). Mitchell is an inmate at SCI-Albion serving a life sentence without parole. He has a recognized history of mental illness, including severe, chronic depression and anxiety, and a history of attempted suicide. See id. at ¶ 1. Mitchell's claim in this case arises from a mental health crisis he experienced at SCI-Albion on February 5-6, 2021. ECF No. 6, ¶¶ IV. A, B. On the evening of February 5 and continuing into 2 the early morning hours of February 6, Mitchell had a complete mental health breakdown and seizure. See id. at ¶ 2. Mitchell's cellmate pressed an emergency call button to alert staff that Mitchell needed medical assistance. See id. at ¶ 3. Mitchell believes that correctional officers John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 responded to the call. See id. at ¶ 4.
John Doe # 1 is identified as the “Shift Commander” on the dates at issue. John Doe #2 is identified as the “Responding Correctional Officer” on the dates at issue. ECF No. 6, p. 3.
John Doe #2 and John Doe #3 transported Mitchell to the medical department where he was placed in a “suicide smock” and housed in a “hard cell” for psychiatric observation. See Id. at ¶ 5. A hard cell, otherwise known as an “OB-cell” (observation cell) or a “POC” (psychiatric observation cell), contains no bedding or amenities beyond necessities. These sparse accommodations are for the safety of the prisoner placed in observation. Mitchell told John Doe #2 and John Doe #3 that he was unaware of what was going on and was scared and he wanted to see a psychologist and/or a commissioned officer. See id. No psychologist or officer was provided. Mitchell had a panic attack and passed out. When he regained consciousness, he asked Jane Doe #2 for a psychologist or an officer and Jane Doe #2 responded that no psychologists or commissioned officers were on duty. See id. at ¶¶ 6, 7. Mitchell became more fearful, screamed for help, and threatened to kill himself by slamming his head into the concrete brick wall. When Jane Doe #2 came to the cell he repeated his intention to kill himself. Jane Doe #2 responded, “Go ahead, do it, cause no one is coming to help you.” Id. at ¶ 8. Mitchell repeatedly warned that he was going to kill himself and eventually “ran as fast as he could, head first into the concrete brick wall, striking his head, knocking himself unconscious.” Id. at ¶ 9. Mitchell awoke to find an unknown correctional officer on his back and his face and stomach facing the ground. Defendant Campbell was standing over Mitchell screaming for him to place his hands behind his back or he was going to spray him with OC Spray. See id. at ¶ 10. Mitchell was taken to medical and returned to the same cell without any measures to address his mental health needs. See id. at ¶ 11. Mitchell was released from medical the morning of February 6. See id. at ¶ 12.
John Doe #3 is identified as the “Responding Officer” on the dates at issue. ECF No. 6, p. 3.
Jane Doe #2 is described at the “Initial Responding Psychologist.” This identification appears inconsistent with Mitchell's allegations that no psychologist visited him while he was in the OB-cell. Jane Doe #1 is identified as the “Initial Responding Medical Director.” ECF No. 6, p. 3. Mitchell does not allege what involvement Jane Doe #1 had in the events at issue.
This officer is not named as a defendant in this case.
Mitchell reports having lasting concussive symptoms from the injury he inflicted upon himself in the OB-Cell. He suffers from headaches, dizziness, lightheadedness, migraines, memory loss, irritation, hallucinations, and difficulty sleeping. See id. at ¶¶ 13-15. His mental health has declined as well with “episodes of crippling depression and anxiety, as well as a constant fear of mistreatment, harassment and retaliation by correctional staff.” Id. at ¶ 15.
According to Mitchell's Complaint, “[a]ll 10 Defendants are being sued in their Individual Capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Rights under the U.S. Constitution for their deliberate indifference towards his medical needs and health care.” ECF No. 6, p. 3. Mitchell seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $400,000 against each Defendant, and punitive damages in the amount of $ 100, 000 against each Defendant. See ECF No. 6, VI, p. 6. He also asserts claims for injunctive relief against Clark, Jones, Flinchbaugh, and Smock in their official capacities in the form of an order mandating installation of padded cells, proper restraints in the SCI-Albion Psychiatric Cells, and more professionals and corrections officers trained in mental health caretaking. See ECF No. 6, p. 3.
IV. Standard and Scope of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Mitchell is representing himself, the allegations in the Complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States exrel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”). Thus, the Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate. But “any pleading must still contain sufficient factual allegations that, when accepted as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd, 826 Fed.Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). See also Baez v. Mooney, 2021 WL 816013, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 808726 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2021).
V. Discussion and Analysis
The Moving Defendants contest the legal sufficiency of Mitchell's Complaint on two bases: First, they assert that Eleventh Amendment immunity shields them from liability in their official capacities. Second, Defendants Clark, Jones, Flinchbaugh, and Smock (“Supervisory Defendants”) assert that the Complaint fails to allege facts to support their personal involvement in the incident on February 5-6, 2021, or any other actionable conduct.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions in the federal courts to recover damages against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacities. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity). A state, state agency, or state official is subject to suit for damages in federal court only if: (1) the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), or (2) Congress has made it unmistakably clear in either the language of a statute or in its legislative history that it is its intention to permit such suits. See Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)). Neither circumstance exists here.
Mitchell acknowledges this proposition of law but argues that it does not apply to his official capacity claims against the Supervisory Defendants because these claims do not seek compensatory damages but, rather, only injunctive relief. Mitchell is correct. “The Eleventh Amendment... does not bar claims against state officials for declaratory or prospective injunctive relief based upon federal law.” Mertz ex rel. Mertz v. Houstoun, 155 F.Supp.2d 415, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2001). See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (holding that a suit seeking to enjoin a state official's unconstitutional action is not one against the State and therefore not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity). Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude Mitchell's claim for injunctive relief against the Supervisory Defendants in their official capacities.
As noted, Mitchell seeks prospective equitable relief against the Supervisory Defendants in the form of an order mandating installation of padded cells, proper restraints in the SCI-Albion psychiatric cells, and more professionals and corrections officers trained in mental health caretaking. See ECF No. 6, p. 3. The Moving Defendants' motion does not challenge the substance of this claim, whether the equitable relief requested is appropriate, or whether the Supervisory Defendants are in positions that would allow them to implement the relief requested. Accordingly, these issues are not presently before the Court and will not be addressed in this Report and Recommendation.
B. Eighth Amendment Claim
a. Personal Involvement/Supervisory Liability
Section 1983 “provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012). Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but instead “provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A plaintiff must plead facts to demonstrate each defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. See, e.g, Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). This requirement arises from the text of § 1983 itself, which provides that only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation is subject to liability under the statute. Thus, each defendant is liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g., id.', see also Parked v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev'dsub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en bancf). The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer automatically responsible for the wrongdoing of its employees, does not apply in a § 1983 action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see, e.g, Rode, 845 F.2dat 1207.
Mitchell argues that all Defendants were personally involved in violating his constitutional rights because “they all reasonably knew - or should have known” that deficiencies in prison procedures and practices would result in poor care for any inmate experiencing a mental health crisis. See ECF No. 32, p. 4. He also asserts that the roles of the Supervisory Defendants make them responsible for the inadequacies in care at SCI-Albion. See id. at 4-5. Thus, he bases their liability exclusively on their supervisory roles at SCI-Albion, which Mitchell alleges is designated as a “Mental Health Facility and is required by Law and Rule to have such trained and Certified Psychologist [sic] available to diagnose and treat inmates' Mental Health needs.” ECF No. 6, p. 7. Based on these roles, Mitchell contends that the Supervisory Defendants knew or should have known that deficiencies in mental health care and services at the prison posed an unreasonable risk to the safety and well-being of mentally ill prisoners. See ECF No. 6, ¶¶ 23-33. Such conclusory allegations, however, are insufficient to support supervisory liability. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that although a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels, conclusions, or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”) (citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals has identified two ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts or omissions committed by subordinates. First, liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm. ” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). Second, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995)). “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208. Furthermore, a prison official's mere participation in the prison grievance process “is insufficient to confer knowledge of, and acquiescence to, a constitutional violation.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Ramos v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2006 WL 2129148 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
The Supervisory Defendants correctly observe that the factual allegations of Mitchell's Complaint do not support that they participated in any of the alleged conduct on February 5-6, 2021, or that they knew of the conduct and acquiesced in it. The allegations of the Complaint likewise fail to support that any Supervisory Defendant adopted a policy, custom, or practice that led to his injury. “Policy is made when a ‘decision maker possessing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action' issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072, § 102. A course of conduct not expressly authorized by law becomes a “custom” when the challenged “practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled” as to virtually constitute law. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1979). To establish a policy or custom under § 1983, “it is incumbent upon [Mitchell] to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). The “policymaker” is the person who “has final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action, ” and who is or is not a policymaker is determined by reference to state law. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481; Perez v. Larson, 2020 WL 5507227, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2020). Mitchell has not alleged facts to support that any Supervisory Defendant adopted a policy or through acquiesced in conduct to establish a custom that caused his injury.
The facts alleged in the Complaint are also insufficient to support a “failure to train” claim under § 1983, The Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for failure to train employees under § 1983 where the need for different or additional training was apparent and the defendant's failure to respond to this need amounted to a “deliberate indifference to the rights of [others].” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). “Deliberate indifference” in this context is an objective standard and thus differs from the subjective deliberate indifference standard applied under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840-847 (1984). Canton teaches that the failure to train an employee must be a choice on the part of the supervisor or supervising entity knowing that the training that is (or is not) being provided is not sufficient for the employees and the choices they encounter on the job. 489 U.S. at 388-90.
To maintain a § 1983 claim for failure to properly train subordinates, a plaintiff must show that “a responsible municipal policymaker had contemporaneous knowledge of the offending occurrence or knowledge of a pattern of prior incidents of similar violations of constitutional rights and failed to take adequate measures to ensure the particular right in question or otherwise communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinates.” Garcia v. Cnty. of Bucks, Pa, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for ... failure to train.” Simpson v. Ferry, 2016 WL 4247546, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2016) (internal quotation marks and further quotations omitted). “A need for training or other corrective action to avoid imminent deprivations of a constitutional right must be so apparent that any reasonable policymaker or supervisor would have taken appropriate preventive measures.” Garcia, 155 F.Supp.2d at 268. A failure to train claim also requires a plaintiff to identify specific training not provided that could reasonably be expected to prevent the injury that occurred. Joines v. Twp. of Ridley, 229 Fed.Appx. 161, 163 (3d Cir. 2007). Mitchell has not alleged facts to support any of the requirements necessary to support a failure to train claim.
The Complaint does not allege facts to show a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees. Mitchell cannot rely solely upon the allegedly inadequate response to his mental health crisis to support liability against supervisors. “Generally, deficient training can only amount to the requisite deliberate indifference ‘where the failure to train has caused a pattern of violations.'” Tirado v. Montgomery Cty., Pa., 2013 WL 1285487, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013) (quoting Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000)). And it is not enough for Mitchell to allege in conclusory terms that all Supervisory Defendants knew or should have known of deficiencies in subordinates' response to mental health crises. See Yoast v. Pottstown Borough, 437 F.Supp.3d 403, 431 (E.D. Pa, 2020). He must identify a specific training deficiency or deficiencies that led directly to his injury. See id.', see also Joines, Z29 Fed. Appx. at 163. Mitchell has failed to do so. Finally, Mitchell has not adequately identified any “municipal policymaker” responsible for the training of subordinates. Although he identifies certain individuals as supervisors, this allegation alone does not elevate them to the status of a “policymaker” responsible for formulating and adopting training policies. See Yoast, 437 F.Supp.3d at 431. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Mitchell's § 1983 claim for damages against the Supervisor Defendants, without prejudice.
This does not end the inquiry on Mitchell's claim for injunctive relief, however. Mitchell is seeking changes in prison facilities and procedures as they relate to inmates with serious mental health needs. The Moving Defendants' motion does not address the merits of this request. As noted, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not preclude this claim. Furthermore, the Supervisory Defendants' lack of personal involvement in the underlying claim does not necessarily negate the claim or make them improper parties to the claim. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Our conclusion that the State Defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude [plaintiffs] from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations.”); Megginson v. Caldwell, 2015 WL 13229496, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2015) (holding that prison Warden may be a proper defendant to a claim seeking an injunction based on denial of necessary medical care despite his lack of personal involvement in unconstitutional conduct) (citing Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] corrections department secretary and prison warden were proper defendants in a § 1983 case because ‘[a] plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege a named official's personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional violation. Rather, a plaintiff need only identify the law or policy challenged as a constitutional violation and name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief.'”); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Though Gonzalez does not allege any specific involvement by Gaetz in the treatment of his hernia, the warden of Menard is a proper defendant since Gonzalez seeks injunctive relief... If Gonzalez was seeking only damages, the warden's lack of personal involvement would be conclusive, but since Gonzalez also seeks injunctive relief it is irrelevant whether the warden participated in the alleged violations.”)). Thus, Mitchell's claim for injunctive relief remains viable at this stage of the litigation.
b. “Deliberate Indifference”
Having determined that the factual allegations of Mitchell's Complaint do not support the personal involvement of the Supervisory Defendants necessary to state a § 1983 claim against them, the Court turns to Campbell's involvement. Mitchell's factual allegations against Campbell place him in the OB-Cell after Mitchell ran head-first into the concrete wall. According to the Complaint, Mitchell awoke to discover an unnamed corrections officer on his back and his face and stomach against the ground. Campbell was standing over Mitchell screaming for him to place his hands behind his back or he was going to spray him with OC spray. See ECF No. 6, ¶ 10. The Complaint alleges no other involvement on the part of Campbell in events upon which Mitchell bases his claim.
Two requirements must be met to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment: First, the deprivation of rights alleged must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious, ” and second, a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations omitted). To satisfy the second prong of the test, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (citations omitted). “In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. “A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 825.
Campbell's alleged involvement came after Mitchell's act of self-harm, and while his reaction to it was uncaring, it does not alone support an inference of the type of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need necessary to support a § 1983 claim. See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Oki. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (holding that plaintiff must demonstrate “a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights”); see also Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff must “establish that the government policy or custom was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered”). Campbell is alleged to have threatened Mitchell with O.C. spray after his act of self-harm, but he is not alleged to have used O.C. spray against Mitchell. This threat alone cannot be considered to have denied Mitchell “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” necessary to support an Eighth Amendment claim against Campbell. Therefore, this claim also should be dismissed, albeit, without prejudice.
The Court expresses no position or opinion regarding the legal sufficiency of the allegations against the various Doe Defendants as they have yet to be identified or served.
VI. Amendment
Having determined that the Complaint fails to state a claim for damages against Moving Defendants, the Court must now determine whether Mitchell should be granted leave to amend his pleading in an effort to cure the deficiencies identified in this Report and Recommendation. Because it cannot be said that leave to amend would necessarily be futile or inequitable as to Mitchell possibly alleging facts to support a damages claim against some or all of the Moving Defendants, it is recommended that such leave be granted. See Hockenberry v. SCI Cambridge Springs/Pennsylvania Dep 't of Corr., 2019 WL 2270345, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2019) (stating “[t]he U.S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile”).
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the motion should be granted as to Mitchell's claim for damages against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but denied as to his claim for injunctive relief. It is further recommended that Mitchell be granted leave to file an amended complaint as to his claim for damages against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
VIII. Notice to the Parties Concerning Objections
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the Parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. The failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of their appellate rights.