Opinion
Civil Action 20-314-BAJ-SDJ
08-04-2021
KENNETH WAYNE MITCHELL (#120166) v. MARCUS JONES, ET AL.
NOTICE
SCOTT D. JOHNSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants, Marcus Jones, David Voorhies, and Vincent Knight (R. Doc. 12). The Motion is not opposed.
The pro se Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), filed this proceeding against Defendants, Jones, Voorhies, and Knight, complaining that his constitutional rights were violated due to the use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
Defendants first seek dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities. In this regard, Defendants are correct that § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a state or its officials acting in their official capacities, specifically because these officials are not seen to be “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state official in an official capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25. Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims asserted against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages are subject to dismissal.
Turning to Plaintiff's claims that are not subject to dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Defendants next assert, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra, at 555. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. It follows that, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Id. at 679. “Where a Complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' ” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed' ... and ‘a pro se Complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' ” Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding this, the court need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or “naked assertions [of unlawful conduct] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: While waiting in line for chow, Defendants Jones and Voorhies were riding bikes on the walk. Defendant Jones was yelling for everyone to get their “a$$es in line.” Plaintiff responded by stating that he was already in line, and Defendant Jones yelled, “get your mother f*cking a$$es in line.” Plaintiff threatened to write Defendant Jones up for cursing. Major Jones responded that he didn't “give a f*ck” about a writeup.
Plaintiff was then placed in restraints by Defendant Voorhies. As Plaintiff was being escorted to the cells blocks, Defendant Jones swiped Plaintiff's feet, causing Plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff's head struck the concrete floor, and he was rendered unconscious. Defendant Knight ordered for the blood to be cleaned off the walk.
After an EMT was called, Plaintiff was taken to the treatment center. Four staples were used to close the wound on Plaintiff's head, and he was rushed to St. Francisville Medical Center for a CT scan. Upon returning to the prison, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation rather than a medical ward. No photos were taken, no body camera footage was recorded, and no investigation was conducted.
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity in connection with Plaintiff's claims. The qualified immunity defense is a familiar one and, employing a two-step process, operates to protect public officials who are performing discretionary tasks. Huff v. Crites, 473 F. App'x. 398 (5th Cir. 2012). As enunciated in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the first step in the analysis is to consider whether, taking the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 201. Second, the district court looks to whether the rights allegedly violated were clearly established. Id. This inquiry, the Court stated, is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad, general proposition. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation which he confronted. Id.
Undertaking the qualified immunity analysis, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion should be granted in part. Specifically, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants Voorhies and Knight, but he has stated a claim against Defendant Jones for excessive use of force.
A use of force by a prison official is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution only when such force is applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010), quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Not every malicious or malevolent action by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action, however, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that such force is not of a sort “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson v. McMillian, supra, 503 U.S. at 10, quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
The fact that an inmate may have sustained only minimal injury, however, does not end the inquiry, and an inmate who has been subjected to gratuitous force by prison guards “does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, supra, 559 U.S. at 38. Notwithstanding this, the Court may consider the extent of injury, if any, as potentially relevant to a determination whether an alleged use of force was excessive under the circumstances. In addition, other factors that may be considered in determining whether an alleged use of force has been excessive include the perceived need for the application of force, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force utilized, the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson v. McMillian, supra, 503 U.S. at 7.
In the instant matter, accepting as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to state claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant Jones. Plaintiff alleges that, after he was restrained and was being escorted by Defendant Voorhies, Defendant Jones swiped his feet, causing him to fall and injure his head. Based upon the allegations of the Complaint, specifically that Plaintiff had been restrained and was being escorted to a cell when force was used against him by Defendant Jones, it appears the force was applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. As such, Plaintiff has stated a claim for the use of excessive force against defendant Jones, and Defendants' Motion should be denied in this regard.
With regards to Defendants Voorhies and Knight, in order for a prison official to be found liable under § 1983, the official must have been personally and directly involved in conduct causing an alleged deprivation of an inmate's constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the actions of the official and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Any allegation that the defendants are responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or co-employees under a theory of vicarious responsibility or respondeat superior is alone insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston, 356 F. App'x. 715, 716-17 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). Further, in the absence of direct personal participation by a supervisory official in an alleged constitutional violation, an inmate plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred as a result of a subordinate's implementation of the supervisor's affirmative wrongful policies or as a result of a breach by the supervisor of an affirmative duty specially imposed by state law. Lozano v. Smith, supra, 718 F.2d at 768.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Voorhies and Knight were personally involved in the use of excessive force by Defendant Jones. Nor does Plaintiff allege that the use of excessive force by Jones occurred as a result of Jones's implementation of Defendant Voorhies or Knight's affirmative wrongful policies or as a result of a breach by Defendant Voorhies or Knight of an affirmative duty specially imposed by state law.
A defendant security officer may be found responsible for failure to intervene and take reasonable measures to protect an inmate from another officer's excessive use of force under a theory of bystander liability. An officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander liability where the officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1995). In this regard, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Voorhies or Knight had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm caused by Defendant Jones and chose not to act.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if the official shows deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1976). The official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety” and “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists”. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The official also must draw that inference. Id.
Failed treatments, negligence, and medical malpractice are insufficient to give rise to a claim of deliberate indifference. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). A prisoner who disagrees with the course of treatment or alleges that he should have received further treatment also does not raise a claim of deliberate indifference. Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Instead, an inmate must show that prison officials denied him treatment, purposefully provided him improper treatment, or ignored his medical complaints. Id. A delay in treatment may violate the Eighth Amendment if the delay was the result of the prison official's deliberate indifference and substantial harm-including suffering-occurred during the delay. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2006).
In the instant matter, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendants denied him treatment, purposefully provided him improper treatment, or ignored his medical complaints. Plaintiff does not allege any involvement on the part of any Defendant regarding his placement in administrative segregation rather than a medical ward upon his return from the hospital.
RECOMMENDATION
It is the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 12) be granted, in part, and Plaintiff claims against Defendants Voorhies and Knight be dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice. It is further recommended that Plaintiff's claims asserted against Defendant Jones in his official capacity for monetary damages and for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs asserted against Defendant Jones in his individual capacity be dismissed, with prejudice. It is further recommended that this matter be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings herein.