Opinion
Case No. 5:05cv1890, Resolving Doc. Nos. 42, 44, 56, 60.
May 9, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the dueling motions for summary judgment of Plaintiff Columbus Mitchell and Defendants DaimlerChrysler Corp. ("Daimler"), DaimlerChrysler Employee Benefits Committee (the "Committee"), and DaimlerChrysler Salaried Employees' Retirement Plan (the "Plan"). [Docs. 42, 44]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants' motion for summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Court also DENIES AS MOOT the plaintiff's motion to exclude expert testimony and motion to strike. [Docs. 56, 60].
I. Background
A. Mitchell I
On July 26, 2002, Plaintiff Columbus Mitchell sued Daimler and the Committee in this Court. With his complaint, the plaintiff made claims of race discrimination under state and federal law and failure to provide requested information in violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. By the time the plaintiff filed Mitchell I, he no longer worked for Daimler and received retirement benefits through the Plan. The plaintiff sought damages for lost wages and lost benefits, including retirement benefits beyond those he already received. [Mitchell Dep. at 80-81]. The plaintiff alleged that racial discrimination at Daimler caused him to lose enhanced retirement benefits that he would have received but for his termination at age 61 instead of retirement at age 65. [Mitchell Dep. at 78].
Case no. 5:02cv1465 ("Mitchell I").
The parties mediated the case and reached a settlement. Daimler complied with the settlement agreement by paying Mitchell the lump sum agreed to in section 1(a) of the settlement agreement. Daimler issued an IRS Form W-2 for a portion of the payment designated as "lost wages sustained by Mitchell." [Doc. 10 § 1(a)(1)]. Daimler paid another portion of the lump sum to a "Retiree Choice Account for the benefit of Columbus Mitchell." Id. § 1(a)(4). Mitchell did not negotiate for a settlement agreement to provide enhanced retirement benefits. [Mitchell Dep. at 169-71]. The Court dismissed the case with prejudice on June 6, 2003.
B. The Plan
The Plan designates the Committee as plan administrator. The Plan gives the Committee "discretionary authority to construe and interpret the Plan and decide all questions of eligibility, benefit entitlement and payment." [Doc. 44 Ex. 4].
The Plan provides an administrative framework for benefits appeals. The first step is for a Plan participant with a question about his benefits to contact DaimlerChrysler Benefit Express. [Doc. 44 Ex. 2]. If the phone contact does not resolve the issue, the participant must follow a three-step procedure: (1) discuss the matter with Benefit Express, (2) submit a written statement to the Committee, and (3) submit a written request for review to the Committee. [Doc. 44 Exs. 3, 4].
The Plan requires the Committee to respond to a participant's written statement within 90 days of its receipt. After the participant receives the initial response from the Committee, he can request further review within 60 days. The Committee must respond to the request for further review within another 60 days.
C. Dispute Over Benefits
After he negotiated for and signed the settlement agreement, the plaintiff contacted Benefit Express to ask if the settlement would increase his pension benefits. In response, Benefit Express asked Mitchell to submit the settlement agreement. Mitchell declined, saying the agreement contained a confidentiality provision that might prevent disclosure. [Mitchell Dep. at 36]. Mitchell directed Benefit Express to get a copy of the settlement agreement from Chrysler's general counsel.
In February 2004, Mitchell received word that the Committee would not consider his request for review, but that he should check again after filing his 2003 tax return. In November 2004, a Benefit Express representative told Mitchell to submit a written request for review.
On November 24, 2004, Plaintiff Mitchell wrote the Committee to request "an adjustment to my basic retirement payment." [Doc 42 Ex. B; Mitchell Dep. at 30]. Mitchell's "understanding" was that the payment for lost wages "would result in an increase in [his] basic pension benefit." There was nothing in the W-2 or in his letter that attributed the lump sum payment specifically to pre- or post-termination wages. Mitchell asked for a written response to his request.
The Committee did not receive Mitchell's November 2004 letter. Instead, Daimler's Pension and Savings Plans Administration Office received the letter and forwarded it to Gregory Ridella in Daimler's Office of the General Counsel. Ridella had helped negotiate the Mitchell I settlement agreement on Daimler's behalf. Ridella forwarded the letter to outside counsel, who responded to Mitchell's attorney by letter dated January 4, 2005. The response letter addressed the terms of the Settlement Agreement, but did not purport to be a written decision from the Committee and did not refer to specific Plan provisions.
Daimler's outside counsel sent another letter to Mitchell's counsel on January 26, 2005. The letter did not refer to specific Plan provisions. Rather, the letter said that Mitchell had no right to submit a claim to the Committee based on the payment from his 2003 settlement.
On March 4, 2005, Mitchell's attorney sent a letter to the Committee, enclosing Mitchell's 2003 Form W-2, Mitchell's November 2004 letter, and a copy of the complaint from Mitchell I. In the letter, Mitchell's attorney requested a copy of the Plan. Daimler's Pension Office sent a participant authorization form to plaintiff's counsel on March 25. The Pension Office needed Mitchell's authorization to send a copy of the Plan to his attorney. Mitchell signed the authorization letter on March 31, but it is not clear when the Daimler Pension Office received it. [Mitchell Dep. at 100-02]. Mitchell asserts that his attorney received the requested Plan documents on May 26, 2005.
The March 4 letter from Mitchell's counsel eventually made its way through Daimler's in-house mail system to Ridella on April 1, 2005. Ridella interpreted the March 4 letter as raising a legal issue as to the settlement agreement, and forwarded the letter to outside counsel. Outside counsel prepared a response letter dated May 9, 2005. That letter reiterated that Mitchell could not submit a claim for benefits review to the Committee based on the 2003 settlement payment.
D. The Instant Litigation
On August 1, 2005, the plaintiff sued again, naming Daimler and the Committee as defendants. The plaintiff added the Plan as a third defendant. This time around, the plaintiff charges the defendants with: (1) denying enhanced benefits under the Plan; (2) breach of fiduciary duty, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1); (3) failure to provide a requested copy of the Plan, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132; and (4) retaliation for filing a civil rights claim, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01 and 4112.99. The defendants move for summary judgment on all claims, and the plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment.
II. Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence submitted shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In seeking summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 2001). A fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In deciding whether the moving party has met this burden, a court must view the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). However, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party merely to show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See id. Additionally, the Court has no duty to "search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989).
A factual dispute precludes summary judgment only if it is material, that is, if it relates to a matter essential to adjudication. The dispute must concern facts that, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The factual dispute also must be genuine. The facts must be such that if proven at trial a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248. "The disputed issue does not have to be resolved conclusively in favor of the non-moving party, but that party is required to present significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the parties' differing versions of the dispute at trial." 60 Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
III. Analysis
A. Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment
The defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) the July 2003 settlement agreement in Mitchell I and res judicata bars the plaintiff's ERISA benefits claim; (2) Mitchell's ERISA benefits claim fails as a matter of law; (3) there is no evidence that the Committee breached its fiduciary duties; (4) the retaliation claims fail as a matter of law; and (5) the circumstances of the case do not warrant penalties for failure to timely provide Mitchell with a copy of the Plan.
1. The ERISA Claim For Denial Of Benefits
Plaintiff Mitchell alleges that the defendants violated ERISA by not redetermining his Plan benefits after he received the monetary settlement from Daimler. As discussed below, the Court grants summary judgment to the defendants on this issue.
a. The Mitchell I Settlement
In interpreting settlement agreements, "courts should uphold settlements whenever equitable and policy considerations allow." Henley v. Cuyahoga Ct. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 141 Fed. Appx. 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2005). Further, a "fundamental principle of contract interpretation is that primary importance should be placed upon the words of the contract." U.S. v. Luebbert, 411 F.3d 602, 604 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court will enforce a contract's unambiguous terms. See University Hosp. v. South Lorain Merc. Assoc., 441 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir. 2006).
The parties' settlement agreement in Mitchell I included the following terms:
1. Consideration Provided by DAIMLERCHRYSLER. In complete settlement of all claims asserted by Mitchell for lost wages and benefits, general compensatory damages for mental anguish, emotional distress, physical injuries and disabilities, punitive or exemplary damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and any other amounts that Mitchell could or should have sought against DAIMLERCHRYSLER in the Lawsuit, DAIMLERCHRYSLER shall:
(a) pay a lump sum in the amount of [REDACTED], allocated as follows: (1) To Mitchell: the sum of [REDACTED], minus tax withholdings, which shall be allocated to alleged lost wages sustained by Mitchell. DAIMLERCHRYSLER will issue a form W-2 to Mitchell for such payments.
* * *
2. Release of Claims; Dismissal of Lawsuit. Mitchell hereby releases and forever discharges DAIMLERCHRYSLER and its related parties . . . (collectively, the "Released Parties") from any and all known or unknown grievances disputes, actions, causes of action, claims of appointment, employment, reemployment or reinstatement, claims at law or in equity, or sounding in contract (including breach of express or implied employment contract) or tort, arising under the common law, any federal, state or local statute or ordinance, . . . and any and all actions, charges, complaints or allegations which have been or could in the future be filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the United States Department of Labor, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and any other local, state or federal administrative agency, which arise out of, or are connected with, in any way, the employment of Mitchell with DAIMLERCHRYSLER, based upon any events occurring up to and including the date of the execution of this Settlement and Release Agreement; however, nothing contained herein should be construed as a waiver or release of Mitchell of (a) his entitlement to vested or accrued pension benefits, as defined by the applicable pension plans, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, and (b) his rights under Ohio's workers' compensation laws.
The settlement agreement contained a confidentiality provision. The Court will redact dollar figures cited in the settlement agreement to maintain confidentiality.
[Doc. 10] (emphasis added).
The defendants say that the settlement agreement bars Mitchell's claim for increased pension benefits. The record supports the defendants' interpretation. In Mitchell I, the plaintiff sued the defendants to recover "damages which include lost wages and other compensation and benefits. . . ." [Doc. 44, Ex. A ¶¶ 16, 33]. The plaintiff also sued because the defendants' conduct allegedly caused him to suffer "a reduction of monthly income," and to receive "lesser retirement benefits." Id. ¶ 28. At his deposition, Mitchell agreed that in Mitchell I he claimed that one of the ways he was "damaged by being terminated was losing higher [Plan] benefits." [Mitchell Dep. at 81]. Pursuant to the Mitchell I settlement agreement, the defendants paid Mitchell cash "[i]n complete settlement of all claims asserted by Mitchell for lost wages and benefits, . . . . and any other amounts that Mitchell could or should have sought. . . ." [Doc. 10].
Mitchell's new benefits claim is essentially an attempt to make an end-run around the release of his earlier claims. Mitchell received large cash payments compensating him for "lost wages" and "miscellaneous/other income." [Doc. 10 at 2]. Daimler also made a contribution to his Daimler Retiree Choice Account. Id. The defendants did not contract to make any other payments to the plaintiff. In return for these payments, Mitchell released all claims that he either did or could have raised.
Daimler terminated Mitchell's employment before he filed Mitchell I. At the time of the settlement, Mitchell was merely a settling litigant, and not a Daimler employee. The agreement itself states the parties "agree that the monies and other actions set forth herein constitute extra consideration to which Mitchell would not otherwise be entitled but for Mitchell executing this Settlement and Release Agreement." Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Finally, Mitchell released all claims "which arise out of, or are connected with, in any way, the employment of Mitchell with DAIMLERCHRYSLER, based upon any events occurring up to and including the date of the execution of this Settlement and Release Agreement." The language of the release is sufficiently broad to encompass claims that Mitchell's pension should increase because of the settlement payment.
Based on the language of the settlement agreement, Mitchell released his present claim for enhanced benefits. The settlement agreement thus bars Mitchell's benefits claim.
b. Res Judicata
The Court finds that res judicata does not bar Mitchell's benefits claim. "The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, provides that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from re-litigating issues that were or could have been raised in the prior action." Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 1998). Federal claim preclusion stemming from a final judgment precludes not only re-litigation of issues that were raised, but also theories of recovery that could have been litigated. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1 (1984); J.Z.G. Resources, Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1996). Res judicata involves four elements: (1) a final decision on the merits; (2) the section action involves the same parties as the first action; (3) the second action involves an issue actually litigated or that should have been litigated in the first action; and (4) an identity of causes of action. Sanders Confectionary Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 480 (6th Cir. 1992).
The first and second elements are clearly present here. Even after the defendants submitted additional evidence on summary judgment, the Court finds that the benefit claim does not satisfy the third element. Here, Mitchell challenges a benefits determination arising out of his settlement. The settlement occurred well after the conduct challenged in Mitchell I. It stands to reason that Mitchell could not have litigated the settlement at the time he filed his first lawsuit.
Nor does this case satisfy the fourth requirement that there be an identity of causes of action. The present benefit claim relies largely on evidence that developed after Mitchell filed his complaints in the original suit.
c. The Benefits Claim Fails As A Matter Of Law
The plaintiff's benefits claim also fails because he is not entitled to the requested benefits.
The settlement agreement states the parties "agree that the monies and other actions set forth herein constitute extra consideration to which Mitchell would not otherwise be entitled but for Mitchell executing this Settlement and Release Agreement." [Doc. 10 at 3] (emphasis added). The parties agree that a Plan participant's benefits are based on formulas that ultimately depend on the participant's "salary." The plaintiff refers to a "Final Average Salary," while the defendants refer to "Salary" or "Average Monthly Salary." Either way, the participant's salary is the key to his benefits.
Under the Plan, "Salary" means:
the base salary payable monthly or, if salary payments are made more than once a month, the aggregate of base salary payments which would be payable for a month, not including any contingent, incentive or deferred compensation, cost of living payments, bonuses, amounts paid for or in lieu of overtime, premium pay, shift differentials or other forms of extra compensation.
[Doc. 42 Ex. E § 2.46] (emphasis added).
The Plan thus excludes "extra compensation" from a participant's salary. Again, the parties agreed that the settlement payments were "extra consideration to which Mitchell would not otherwise be entitled," but for the settlement. Under the plain language of the Plan and the settlement agreement, the settlement funds are not relevant to the plaintiff's Plan benefits. Further, under section 5.01(B) of the Plan, pension contributions end "on the date [the employee's] employment by the Corporation terminates." Because the plaintiff's employment ended two years before the settlement, the settlement did not entitle him to additional benefits.
2. Fiduciary Duty Claim
A claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA involves three elements: (1) the defendant was a fiduciary of an ERISA plan who, (2) acting in his fiduciary capacity, (3) breached his fiduciary duty. See In re Cardinal Health ERISA Litig., No. C2-04-643, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15050, at *22 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2006). The plaintiff says that the Committee breached its duty by referring his requests for enhanced Plan benefits to Daimler's legal counsel. Daimler's counsel responded that the settlement agreement barred the requested benefits. The defendants argue that the Committee's conduct did not breach any fiduciary duty.
Mitchell's based his requests for enhanced benefits on his "understanding" of the settlement agreement. [Doc. 42, Ex. B]. Mitchell agreed that it was "very probable" that his letters to the Committee did not provide the Committee with sufficient information to make a determination on his request. [Mitchell Dep. at 65]. Mitchell then explained that he expected the Committee would need to contact legal counsel:
[M]y intent was that the most important reliance [the plan administrator] had was the legal department itself, was Ridella [a Daimler attorney from its Office of the General Counsel], so I mean, I would think that since they negotiated the settlement and they would have all the particulars that that would be the most credible reliance even over and above what you're narrowly defining.Id. Mitchell reiterated that "[The Committee] would have to rely on — on the corporation's legal department, I would think, who negotiated the settlement. . . ." [Mitchell Dep. at 66]. Given Mitchell's own testimony, it strains credulity for him to argue that the Committee breached its fiduciary duty by referring the matter to legal counsel.
Mitchell's claim also fails at a more basic level. As discussed above, his claim for benefits fails as a matter of law. Under the language of the Plan and the settlement agreement, the settlement payment can not properly included as "salary" for purposes of determining his benefits. As a result, Mitchell cannot show that the Committee's conduct caused him to suffer any harm. He must make such a showing to survive summary judgment on the fiduciary duty claim. See Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing fiduciary duty claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1104; holding that "a plaintiff must show a causal link between the [breach of fiduciary duty] and the harm suffered by the plan"). See also Mira v. Nuclear Measurements Corp., 107 F.3d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment on ERISA fiduciary duty claim based on the "longstanding principle in civil law that there can be no monetary recovery unless the plaintiff has suffered harm"); Diduck v. Kaszycki Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that proof of a causal connection "is required between a breach of fiduciary duty and the loss alleged"). Cf. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., 285 F.3d 415, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2002) (limiting Kuper's "causal link" requirement to fiduciary duty claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1104, and finding no such requirement for claims challenging prohibited transactions under 29 U.S.C. § 1106).
The plaintiff's fiduciary duty claim against the Committee fails as a matter of law.
3. Retaliation Claims
The plaintiff claims that Daimler retaliated against him for filing Mitchell I by causing him to suffer a material loss of pension benefits. The Sixth Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas framework to workplace retaliation claims. See McDaniel v. Transcender, LLC, 119 Fed. Appx. 774, 779 (6th Cir. 2005). The same analysis applies to discrimination claims under the Ohio Civil Rights Act. See Plumbers Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 66 Ohio St. 2d 192, 196 (1981).
To establish a prima facie retaliation case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer knew about the protected activity, (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant can demonstrate a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff must then show that the proffered reason for the action was pretext for retaliation. Id.
The first and second McDonnell Douglas elements — protected activity and employer knowledge — are present here. The defendants contend that the plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action and there is no causal connection between the protected activity and the supposed harm.
A "material loss of benefits" satisfies the adverse action requirement. See Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff fails to demonstrate any such loss. As discussed above, the settlement agreement and the Plan place the plaintiff's settlement funds outside the scope of his "salary." The settlement funds thus were not a factor in the plaintiff's Plan benefits. Because the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a material loss of benefits, he does not make a prima facie case of retaliation.
The plaintiff also fails to demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and the proper denial of enhanced pension benefits. Mitchell offers no direct evidence of any causal connection. Instead, he essentially speculates that because he filed an earlier civil rights lawsuit, the lawsuit must have caused the denial. Mitchell first sued the defendants in Mitchell I on July 26, 2002. The denial of enhanced pension benefits occurred no earlier than November 2004, more than two years after Mitchell I. The extensive temporal disconnect between Mitchell's filing his lawsuit and the denial of enhanced benefits undermines any causal connection between the two events. See Parnell v. West, No. 95-2131, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12023, at *8 (6th Cir. May 21, 1997) (affirming summary judgment for defendant employer on retaliation claim and holding that "[a] time lag of seven months does not necessarily support an inference of a causal link; previous cases that have permitted a prima facie case to be made based on the proximity of time have all been short periods of time, usually less than six months"); Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986) (reversing finding of retaliatory discharge and holding that "[t]he mere fact that [the plaintiff] was discharged four months after filing a discrimination claim is insufficient to support an inference of retaliation").
Even if the plaintiff succeeded in making a prima facie case of retaliation, he cannot demonstrate that the defendants' proffered reasons for the denial of benefits were pretextual. Again, Mitchell was not entitled to the requested benefits under the settlement agreement and the Plan.
The retaliation claims fail as a matter of law.
4. Failure To Timely Provide A Copy Of The Plan
The plaintiff also seeks a statutory penalty against the defendants for failing to provide him with a copy of the Plan on a timely basis. ERISA requires plan administrators to provide participants with copies of plan documents within 30 days of any request for such documents. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). If the administrator does not meet this deadline, the Court may impose up to a $100 penalty for every day the documents are past due. The statutory penalty is subject to the Court's discretion. Id. In deciding whether to impose statutory penalties, courts consider bad faith on the part of the administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests, and whether the delay damaged the beneficiary. See Pagovich v. Moskowitz, 865 F. Supp. 130, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The circumstances of this case do merit the imposition of a penalty.
As to the length of the delay, the plaintiff's attorney first requested a copy of the Plan by letter on March 4, 2005. Committee representatives informed the attorney that they would need a signed authorization form from the plaintiff before they could provide the requested documents. Mitchell signed the authorization from on March 31, 2005. It is not clear when Mitchell actually returned the form to the Committee. Mitchell's attorney states that she did not receive the requested documents until May 26, 2005. The Committee thus sent the documents 83 days after the initial request, and 56 days after Mitchell signed the authorization form. Again, ERISA requires a response within 30 days. According to Mitchell's attorney, she made three additional telephone calls to request the documents.
There is no evidence that the delay was due to bad faith. Nor is there any evidence that the delay damaged Mitchell. At his deposition, Mitchell admitted that the delay did not harm him. [Mitchell Dep. at 102].
Based on the absence of bad faith and harm, and also on the relatively short length of the delay, the Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages, although the statutory damages will be limited to $50 for each day, or $2,800.
B. Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment
The plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of the standard of review for the denial of the enhanced pension benefits. The plaintiff argues that the Court should review the denial of benefits de novo. The defendants ask the Court to determine the contractual issues in the settlement agreement, and then remand the case to the Committee for a decision based on the Plan.
The Plan gives the Committee "discretionary authority to construe and interpret the Plan and decide all questions of eligibility, benefit entitlement and payment." [Doc. 44 Ex. 4]. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution the Court reviewed the denial of benefits de novo. In so doing, the Court took a "fresh look" at the record as the plaintiff requested. See Doc. 44 at 10; Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 1998). Even under this less forgiving standard of review, the Court finds that the denial of enhanced benefits was proper.
The Court also denies the plaintiff's request to make the material terms of the settlement agreement a matter of public record. The plaintiff agreed to keep the terms of the settlement agreement confidential. The Court will not excuse the plaintiff from his contractual obligations now that he seeks another dip at the well.
C. Plaintiff's Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony And Motion To Strike
Finally, the plaintiff moves to exclude the testimony of Larry T. Hendrick. Hendrick is the defendants' proffered benefits expert. The plaintiff argues that Hendrick is unqualified and that his findings are unreliable. The Court did not consider Hendrick's opinions in granting summary judgment to the defendants. As a result, the Court denies the plaintiff's motion to exclude his testimony as moot.
The plaintiff also moves to strike the defendants' opposition to the motion to exclude Hendrick's testimony. The plaintiff moves to strike because the defendants filed their opposition brief three days late. Again, the Court did not consider Hendrick's opinions in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court thus denies the plaintiff's motion to strike as moot.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants' motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 42]. The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 44]. The Court DENIES AS MOOT the plaintiff's motion to exclude expert testimony and motion to strike. [Docs. 56, 60].
The Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) from the defendants in the amount of $2,800. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter to enforce the terms of this order.
Accordingly, this action is terminated pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58.
IT IS SO ORDERED.