Opinion
No. 1301 C.D. 2012
03-08-2013
Howard Mitchell, Appellant v. Stephen Chatcavage, Correction Officer; Sargent Bonass; Richard Spaide, SCI Mahanoy Unit Manager; John Kerestes, Superintendent SCI Mahanoy and John E. Wetzel, Secretary PA Dept of Corrections
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Appellant Howard Mitchell (Mitchell) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court). The trial court sustained the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' (DOC) preliminary objections to Mitchell's Complaint. Mitchell's Complaint sought compensatory damages in excess of "20,000.00" and "in excess of $20,000.00 as exemplary and/or punitive damages," against the defendants, based upon injuries he sustained during his incarceration at the SCI Mahanoy. We affirm the trial court's order.
The defendants are: Stephen Chatcavage (a Correctional Officer at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy (SCI Mahanoy)); Bonass (no first name given; a "Correctional Sergeant" at SCI Mahanoy); Richard Spaide (a "Block Unit Manager" at SCI Mahanoy); John Kerestes (Superintendent at SCI Mahanoy); and John Wetzel (Secretary of Corrections).
Mitchell's Complaint sets forth the following factual averments. On or about October 5, 2011, Mitchell and another inmate were in an area of SCI Mahanoy where inmates can make telephone calls. According to his Complaint, Mitchell approached the inmate, who was using the phone, and he engaged in a conversation with the inmate regarding the amount of time the inmate was using the telephone. After the other inmate was done using the telephone, Mitchell began to use the telephone. As Mitchell completed his use of the telephone, but was still facing the telephone, the other inmate stabbed Mitchell in the neck and back. When Mitchell turned to face the inmate, the inmate "caught" Mitchell on the right side of his face. The inmate reached to strike Mitchell again and struck Mitchell under his left collar bone. The inmate continued to swipe at Mitchell, and Mitchell blocked those attempts to strike him. Guards arrived at that time to address the conflict. Mitchell obtained medical treatment for his injuries, which required five stitches to close the wound on his neck.
Mitchell averred that the alleged negligence of the defendants caused him to suffer his injuries and consequential pain and mental anguish. Mitchell alleged that defendant Chatcavage's acts or omissions have resulted in an "inability to maintain his usual and daily activities, which will continue for an indefinite time into the future." (Complaint ¶ 42.) With regard to the other defendants, Mitchell claimed that those defendants had knowledge of the other defendants' "history [and/or] a propensity toward, negligent acts and/or omissions." (Complaint ¶¶ 48, 49, 55, 56, 62, 63, 69, 70.) Mitchell essentially claimed that the defendants' knowledge of such negligence and/or omissions, relative to the conduct of other inmates, resulted in their failure to protect inmates from the potential assaults of other inmates. The essence of the Complaint is that the defendants neglected a duty of care they owed to Mitchell to ensure his safety from the other inmate. Notably, Mitchell did not identify a particular legal cause of action in his Complaint, but rather he referred to the alleged general negligence of the defendants with regard to the alleged failure to ensure his safety.
DOC viewed the vague references in the Complaint as Mitchell's attempt to bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. DOC filed preliminary objections to Mitchell's Complaint, seeking dismissal of any claims arising under Section 1983. In its preliminary objections, DOC argued that, in order to raise a claim under Section 1983, an inmate must allege a violation of a recognized constitutional right. DOC identified the only possible constitutional violation as arising under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition to pleading facts demonstrating that DOC violated a right secured by the United States Constitution, an inmate must also plead facts establishing that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. DOC noted that because Mitchell essentially alleged that the conditions of his confinement constituted a violation of his Eighth Amendment right, he was required to plead facts demonstrating that the alleged violation was objectively "sufficiently serious" and that in a subjective light, the prison authorities had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." (DOC Preliminary Objections at 5, quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (1994).)
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
As discussed more fully below, conditions of confinement, including, in some circumstances, the right to be free from violence inflicted by other prisoners, is a subject that courts have identified as encompassed under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
The trial court sustained DOC's demurrer, concluding that Mitchell failed to plead facts, which, if proven, would establish that the conditions of his incarceration constitute a substantial risk of serious harm. The trial court also concluded that Mitchell failed to plead facts to demonstrate that the defendants' state of mind was sufficiently culpable, because none of the facts Mitchell averred indicated that the defendants knew or should have known of the risk of harm by the other inmate and recklessly disregarded the risk. The trial court observed that the Complaint did not allege that the defendants were aware of a threat of harm or aware of facts that would suggest a threat of harm existed.
On appeal, Mitchell raises the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his Complaint "alleging negligence in failing to use reasonable care in the provision of security and monitoring resulting in [his] injuries from being stabbed by another prisoner." Before beginning our analysis of this appeal, we note that Mitchell addresses two distinct claims for relief in his brief: (1) under the law applicable to Section 1983 claims, Mitchell contends that his pleadings demonstrate that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference for the purpose of demonstrating an action under the Eighth Amendment; and (2) his Complaint encompasses a recognizable cause of action as an intentional tort, such that the defendants are not entitled to immunity under Section 8542 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542.
This Court's review of a trial court's order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is limited to considering whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion. Braun v. Borough of Millersburg, 44 A.3d 1213, 1215 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 55 A.3d 525 (2012). In ruling on preliminary objections, courts must accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in a complaint and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the averments. Meier v. Maleski, 648 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Courts, however, are not bound by legal conclusions encompassed in a complaint, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. Id. Courts may sustain preliminary objections only when the law makes clear that the plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id. Courts review preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer under these guidelines and may sustain a demurrer only when a plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 158 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
Because Mitchell has failed to plead sufficient facts in his Complaint to state a cause of action for an intentional tort and has failed to adequately brief the merits of such a claim, we conclude that he has waived this issue. Mitchell's Complaint identifies only negligence or omissions as the basis for his claim for relief. When a plaintiff seeks to recover upon such a claim for intentional tort, mere characterization of a defendant's conduct as gross negligence or wanton and reckless is "not the equivalent of willful and intentional misconduct." Scott v. Willis, 543 A.2d 165, 169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Mitchell includes no allegations suggesting any specific intentional conduct on the part of the defendants caused harm to Mitchell. Moreover, Mitchell has failed to adequately discuss the issue in his brief. This Court will not address new theories that a plaintiff raises for the first time in an appeal to this Court, and may deem an issue waived if a party fails to provide adequate discussion in its brief. Victoria Gardens Condo. Assoc. v. Kennett Twp. of Chester Cnty., 23 A.3d 1098, 1107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (holding appellant's failure to indicate where theory was raised before trial court resulted in waiver under Pa. R.A.P. 302(a)). --------
We begin with a discussion regarding Mitchell's apparent claim under Section 1983. In Farmer, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the protection of inmates from violence inflicted by other inmates is a matter that relates to conditions of confinement, and that conditions of confinement may be subject to evaluation under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 833. Nevertheless, "not . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Id. at 834. As the trial court noted, a prisoner must plead and prove two elements. The first element is that the alleged deprivation is "objectively, 'sufficiently serious.'" Id. "For a claim [such as Mitchell's] based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." See id. The second element that a prisoner must demonstrate is that the prison officials "have a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind,'" which requires a showing that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety. Id. The Supreme Court summarized the standard for determining whether a prison official has acted with the necessary deliberate indifference as follows:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.Id. at 837. The Supreme Court also observed that "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Id. at 838.
With regard to the first element—substantial risk of harm—we agree with the trial court's conclusion that Mitchell did not plead sufficient facts from which a court could conclude objectively that a serious risk of harm existed. Mitchell's primary injuries resulted when another inmate stabbed him with a knife. He pleaded that a single inmate had a knife, which the inmate used to assault Mitchell, and that the prison guards ultimately broke up the fight. Mitchell does not identify the period of time that lapsed between the initiation of the attack and the point at which the guards intervened. Mitchell's averments are insufficient to demonstrate that the defendants knew of or should have known of the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm—in this case, that Mitchell would be stabbed by the other inmate. Consequently, we perceive no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court with regard to this element of Mitchell's case.
With regard to the second requirement—the culpable state of mind—Mitchell does not plead facts indicating that officials were deliberately indifferent to Mitchell's safety at the time he was attacked by another inmate. Thus, we agree with the trial court's assessment that, even viewing the facts Mitchell pleaded in the most favorable light, the facts do not, as a matter of law, set forth a violation of the Eighth Amendment. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion in sustaining DOC's preliminary objections to Mitchell's Complaint.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing Mitchell's Complaint.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of March, 2013, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge