Opinion
No. CV 05-4001987
August 24, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In this matter the Plaintiff, Beverly Mitchell, appeals from the decision of the State of Connecticut, Department of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review affirming the decision of the referee, dismissing her appeal, and finding her ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits effective April 18, 2004 because she had not been paid sufficient wages in covered employment during her base period to establish that she is monetarily eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Board found that the Plaintiff was not eligible for unemployment benefits because she only received wages during her regular base period as a result of services which she performed for a church that did not elect to be covered by the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act.
The Administrator has moved that judgment be entered dismissing the Plaintiff's appeal and has submitted a memorandum of law in support of his motion. The Plaintiff has submitted an objection to the Administrator's motion as well as a memorandum of law in support of her objection.
Appeals from the Board's decisions to the Superior Court are allowed pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b. That statute states: "At any time before the board's decision has become final, any party, including the administrator, may appeal to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford or for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides. Any or all parties similarly situated may join in one appeal. In such judicial proceeding the original and five copies of a petition, which shall state the grounds on which a review is sought shall be filed in the office of the board. The chairman of the board shall, within the third business day thereafter, cause the original petition or petitions to be mailed to the clerk of the Superior Court and copy or copies thereof to the administrator and to each other party to the proceeding in which such appeal was taken; and said clerk shall docket such appeal as returned to CT Page 11738-fo the next return day after the receipt of such petition or petitions. In all cases, the board shall certify the record to the court. The record shall consist of the notice of appeal to the referee and the board, the notices of hearing before them, the referee's findings of fact and decision, the findings and decision of the board, all documents admitted into evidence before the referee and the board or both and all other evidentiary material accepted by them. Upon request of the court, the board shall (1) in cases in which its decision was rendered on the record of such hearing before the referee, prepare and verify to the court a transcript of such hearing before the referee; and (2) in cases in which its decision was rendered on the record of its own evidentiary hearing, provide and verify to the court a transcript of such hearing of the board. In any appeal, any finding of the referee or the board shall be subject to correction only to the extent provided by section 22-9 of the Connecticut Practice Book . . ."
Practice Book § 22-9 in turn provides: "(a) Such appeals are heard by the court upon the certified copy of the record filed by the board. The court does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the board when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . ."
Thus, the scope of the court's review with regard to the issues presented in this appeal is very limited. "`To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review. The court must not retry facts nor hear evidence.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mattatuck Museum-Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, 238 Conn. 273, 276, 679 A.2d 347 (1996). The Superior Court, therefore, `is bound by the findings of subordinate facts and the reasonable conclusions of fact made by the appeals referee.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Westport Development Mfg. Co. v. Administrator, 9 Conn.App. 189, 190, 517 A.2d 1050 (1986)." Latina v. Administrator Unemployment Comp. Act, 54 Conn.App. 154, 159 (1999).
The decision of the Board of Review reveals that the Board found the following facts. The only employer that paid wages to the Plaintiff during her regular base period was the United Congregational Church of Tolland. Although the Plaintiff taught at the Tolland Green Learning Center she was employed by the church which sponsored the school. The Tolland Green Leaning Center and the United Congregational Church of CT Page 11738-fp Tolland are not separately incorporated. The church paid for the Plaintiff's services as a teacher. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-222(a)(1)(E) "employment" within the meaning of the state's Unemployment Compensation Act "does not apply to service performed (i) in the employ of (I) a church or convention or association of churches . . ." Based on the provisions of General Statutes § 31-222(a)(1)(E)(i)(I) the Board found that the Plaintiff's employment at the Tolland Green Learning Center was exempt from unemployment compensation coverage.
"In appeals of this nature, `the Superior Court does not try the matter de novo. It is not its function to adjudicate questions of fact. Nor may it substitute its own conclusions for those of the [board].' Guevara v. Administrator, 172 Conn. 492, 495, 374 A.2d 1101 (1977). Rather, it is the function of the court to determine, on the record, `whether there is a logical and rational basis for the decision of the [board] or whether, in the light of the evidence, [the board] has acted illegally or in abuse of [its] discretion.' Taminski v. Administrator, 168 Conn. 324, 326, 362 A.2d 868 (1975)." Calnan v. Administrator, 43 Conn.App. 779, 784-85 (1996).
Thus this court cannot review the evidence and make its own determination of facts or judgments regarding the credibility of witnesses or what conclusions should be reached from the evidence, those are matters reserved to the Board. Calnan v. Administrator, 43 Conn.App. 779, 785 (1996). The court may review the findings of the Board but only where a motion to correct has been filed with the Board pursuant to Practice Book § 22-4 within two weeks of the filing of the record in court. Such was not done in this case. Since the plaintiff failed to file a motion to correct the Board's findings the court cannot review facts found by the Board. Reeder v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 88 Conn.App. 556, 558 (2005). The court cannot retry the case in the context of this appeal. "It is axiomatic that the power of the trial court in appeals of this kind is very limited: `[T]he Superior Court does not try the mater de novo; it is not its function to adjudicate questions of fact, nor may it substitute its own conclusions for those of the board. Guevara v. Administrator, 172 Conn. 492, 495, 374 A.2d 1101.'" Johnson v. Administrator, 3 Conn.App. 264, 267 (1985).
The court can, however, determine whether the Board correctly applied the law to the facts the Board found. "`If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own CT Page 11738-fq conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mattatuck Museum-Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, supra, 276. Moreover, we note that `[a]s a general rule, [t]he application of statutory criteria to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation under General Statutes §§ 31-235 and 31-236 involves mixed questions of fact and law in which the expertise of the administrative agency is highly relevant.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, 209 Conn. 381, 386, 551 A.2d 724 (1988)." Latina v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 54 Conn.App. 154, 159-60 (1999).
Both sides here cite the Supreme Court's decision in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 783-5 (1972). There the Supreme Court, in interpreting the same language of the federal statute, stated: "Section 3309(b), exempting `service performed — (1) in the employ of (A) a church . . .' is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer, and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works. Congress further defined `employer' in § 3306(a) as ` any person who — . . . paid wages . . . or . . . employed at least one individual' (emphasis added). It defined `employee' as `any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee.' §§ 3306(I) and 3121(d)(2). Thus, to hold `church' synonymous solely with a physical building that is a house of worship contradicts the phrasing of the statute. The word `church' in § 3309(b) must be construed, instead, to refer to the congregation or the hierarchy itself, that is, the church authorities who conduct the business of hiring, discharging, and directing church employees. We conclude that, at the time of its enactment in 1970, § 3309(b)(1)(A) was meant to apply to schools, like petitioners,' that have no separate legal existence from a church, or, as in the Academy's case, from a `convention or association of churches.' As the Referee found, St. Martin directly finances, supervises, and controls its school's operations. The Synod similarly supports and controls the Academy . . . Neither school has a separate legal existence. Thus, the employees working within these schools plainly are `in the employ . . . of a church or convention or association of churches . . .' § 3309(b)(1)(A)." (Footnotes omitted.) The decision in St. Martin, contrary to the Plaintiff's claim, supports the Board's interpretation of the Connecticut statute. Although the Plaintiff claims that St. Martin is limited to religious schools and not to a secular school like the Tolland Green Leaning Center, as noted above the Court's decision did not rest on the nature of the school but on the nature of the employer. CT Page 11738-fr
The facts here as found by the Board disclose that the Tolland Green Leaning Center was not separately incorporated, it was sponsored by the United Congregational Church of Tolland, and the Church paid the Plaintiff for her services. Viewing these facts in light of the law, the court cannot conclude that the Board's action, determining the Plaintiff ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because she was not monetarily eligible for benefits, was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion. The Administrator's motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed.
Jane S. Scholl, J. CT Page 11738-fs