The ultimate test here is whether the conflict is such that one answer would require a verdict for the plaintiff and the other a verdict for the defendant. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tide LPG., Inc 462 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Civ.App. 1970); Turner v. Victoria County Electric Cooperative Co., 428 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Civ.App., 1968). In assessing the verdict and the evidentiary basis for it, we must remember that the answers to these interrogatories determined the question of the award of punitive or exemplary damages against appellant: From one answer, punitive damages were clearly justified. From the other they were not. It is not a sufficient answer to say that the interrogatory to Ford should not have been submitted, because Russell testified that he showed the lines to the Thompsons and Ford, but Ford said that he did not and Thompson was not sure about the matter.
Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949)." Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tide LPG, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also, Junkermann v. Carruth, 620 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
The test in determining whether jury findings are irreconcilable is whether when taking the finding alone in the one instance, a judgment should be entered in favor of plaintiff; and taking it alone in the other, judgment should be rendered in favor of defendant. Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453 (1944); Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Tide LPG, 462 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Defendant argues that these findings are in conflict because the affirmative answers to the first two issues established her defense of permissive use, while the affirmative answers to the last two issues established the repudiation and hostile use necessary for J. W. Carruth to prevail. We disagree. By taking the answers to the first two issues, the jury could have found that the letter of March 1, 1960, constituted a recognition of ownership in Dr. McCaleb prior to March 1, 1960.
To apply this test, the courts consider each of the answers claimed to be in conflict, disregarding the alleged conflicting answer, but taking into consideration all the rest of the verdict, and if, so considered, one of the answers would require a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the other would require a judgment in favor of the defendant, then the answers are fatally in conflict. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949); Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Tide LPG, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The major difficulty presented in this case is the vague and confusing form in which the special issues were submitted to the jury.
See 57 Tex.Jur.2d, Trial, § 549, pp. 277 — 287. Where the jury findings are reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one of which would reconcile the findings in favor of the judgment, such reconciliation is mandatory in favor of the judgment that was rendered on the jury verdict. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Tide LPG, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Before a judgment based on a verdict containing conflicting answers will be set aside, it must be shown that the conflict between the answers is such that one answer would establish a cause of action, while the other would destroy it. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949). There are three reasons why plaintiff's point relating to conflicting answers cannot be sustained.