¶ 17 D–Mil correctly notes that a pipeline company is not expressly required to be named as such. See e.g. Mo.–Kan.–Tex.R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, ¶ 35, 712 P.2d 40, 46; French v. Ayres, 1949 OK 88, 207 P.2d 308 (recognizing a pipeline company as a “public service corporation” even though it was not expressly named as such). Under title 52, a company's business name is not required to be consistent with its business purpose. See Okla. Stat. tit. 52, §§ 1–707 (2001).
Generally, preemption is a matter of Congressional intent that occurs under four instances: (1) express statutory language; (2) a pervasive regulatory scheme that infers by its presence that Congress felt the federal regulation did not need supplemental state law provisions; (3) an actual conflict between state and federal laws making it physically impossible to comply with both; or (4) where the objectives and purpose of Congress are thwarted by state law. Todd v. Frank's Tong Service, Inc. , 1989 OK 121, ¶ 5, 784 P.2d 47 ; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. State , 1985 OK 108, ¶ 41, 712 P.2d 40. The Supreme Court of the United States effectively summarized the doctrine in Arizona v. U.S. , where it stated:
Preemption occurs in four distinct instances (1) by express statutory language, (2) by a pervasive regulatory scheme which infers the presence of congressional intent that the federal regulation did not need supplemental state-law provisions, (3) when an actual conflict between state and federal laws makes it impossible to comply with both, or (4) where the objectives and purposes of Congress are thwarted by state law. Lewis v. Sac and Fox Tribe, 1994 OK 20 at ¶ 16, n. 49, 896 P.2d at 511, n. 49 (citing Todd v. Frank's Tong Service, Inc., 1989 OK 121, ¶ 5, 784 P.2d 47, 49; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, ¶ 41, 712 P.2d 40, 47). See also Smith Cogeneration Mgmt., Inc., supra note 8, at ¶ 21.
This Court has recognized that an association can have standing to seek relief on behalf of its members. State ex rel. Henry v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 1991 OK 134, ¶ 8-9, 825 P.2d 1305, 1309; Private Truck Council of America, Inc., v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1990 OK 54, ¶ 31, 806 P.2d 598, 607, vacated and remanded on other grounds by National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 115 L.Ed.2d 1048, 501 U.S. 1247, 111 S.Ct. 2882 (1991); Missouri-Kansas Texas R. R. v. State, 1985 OK 108, ¶ 19, 712 P.2d 40, 42; Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep, 1982 OK 106, ¶ 7-8; 652 P.2d 271, 274. Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite for resort to the courts as a general rule, this cause was brought pursuant to 75 O.S. 1991 § 706[75-706] (D) which dispenses with the exhaustion requirement. Title 14A O.S. 1991 § 3-508A[ 14A-3-508A] , see note 3, supra; 14A O.S. 1991 § 3-508[14A-3-508], see note 4, supra.
Numerous decisions of this Court have equated the term "person deeming himself aggrieved" with the more common "aggrieved person" or "aggrieved party." See Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. State, 712 P.2d 40, 42 (Okla. 1985); see also State ex rel. Henry v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 825 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Okla. 1991); Application of Central Okla. Milk Producers Ass'n., 312 P.2d 500, 501 (Okla. 1957). In light of these decisions interpreting section 20 of article IX of the Oklahoma Constitution, OEC must qualify as an "aggrieved person" to have standing to appeal.
(4) Where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Smith Cogeneration Mgt. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 1993 OK 147, ¶ 21, 863 P.2d 1227, 1239; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, ¶ 41, 712 P.2d 40, 46-7; Attocknie v. Carpenter Mfg., Inc., 1995 OK CIV APP 54, ¶ 8, 901 P.2d 221, 224. ¶ 30 Here, the Act expressly addresses the matter.
It is this judicial adjudication of the personal privacy right and the public's right to the information in the context of the coercive order which makes the order sealing a record the functional equivalent to an injunction and an appealable interlocutory order. Missouri–Kansas–Texas R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, 712 P.2d 40, 52;Warren v. Myers, 1976 OK 118, 554 P.2d 1171, 1174. Powell Briscoe, Inc. v. Peters, 1954 OK 107, 269 P.2d 787, 791, quoting Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., 1941 OK 77, 188 Okla. 690, 112 P.2d 792 (“An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action ”) (emphasis added).
It is this judicial adjudication of the personal privacy right and the public's right to the information in the context of the coercive order which makes the order sealing a record the functional equivalent to an injunction and an appealable interlocutory order. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, 712 P.2d 40, 52; Warren v. Myers, 1976 OK 118, 554 P.2d 1171, 1174. Powell Briscoe, Inc. v. Peters, 1954 OK 107, 269 P.2d 787, 791, quoting Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., 1941 OK 77, 112 P.2d 792 ("An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.") (emphasis added).
Competitive harm or the threat of competitive harm from the lifting of regulatory oversight has also been held to be a sufficiently concrete injury to confer standing by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which has been faced many times with appellate complaints of injurious actions by federal agencies. Okla. Gas and Electric Co. v. Okla. Electric Coop. Inc., 1973 OK 158, 517 P.2d 1127 (allegation of illegal competition sufficient to confer standing); Bank of the Lakes v. First State Bank, 1985 OK 81, 708 P.2d 1089 (no standing to appeal from Banking Commission's order permitting another bank to compete with appellant based on increased lawful competition); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. State, 1985 OK 108, 712 P.2d 40 (allegation that grant of license to competitor to build and operate a coal slurry pipeline was unconstitutional and unsupported by the evidence together with evidence of pecuniary injury sufficient to confer standing); Community Bankers Ass'n v. Okla. State Banking Bd., 1999 OK 24, 979 P.2d 751 (order of the State Banking Board authorizing a bank located in Vian to operate a branch bank in Checotah violated the statutes on branch banking, created unlawful competition for the existing bank in Checotah, and therefore gave the existing bank standing to appeal from the order). See also Heritage Village Apartments, Ltd. v. Okla. Housing Finance Agency, 2001 OK CIV APP 4, 18 P.3d 1085 (competitors of apartment builder did not have standing to appeal from order of state agency awarding federal tax credits to apartment builder to be used for building apartments and low income housing because competitors' sole injury was from lawful competition).
The complained of harm must be substantial and immediate as opposed to contingent.Toxic Waste, supra note 4 at 910; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, 712 P.2d 40, 42; Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison, 621 P.2d 528, 530 (1980).Id. at 42-43.