Opinion
No. 41201.
September 12, 1949.
The facts and holding of the case are adequately summarized by headnote No. 2.
1. WILLS: Beneficiary Sufficiently Named. It is stipulated that the mistake in the name of the Federal Soldiers' Home as a residuary beneficiary is so slight as to be immaterial.
2. WILLS: Charities: States: Bequest to Federal Soldiers' Home Valid. The bequest of an interest in the residuary estate of the testatrix to the Federal Soldiers' Home, which is owned by the State of Missouri, is valid both under common law and by express statutory provisions.
Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Francis E. Williams, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Harry A. Frank for appellants.
(1) The Laws of 1897, pages 28 to 30, providing for the acceptance of a conveyance of the St. James Soldiers' Home from the Woman's Relief Corps Soldiers' Home, a private corporation, and providing that the expenses and maintenance of the Home shall be borne by the State and paid out of appropriations by the Legislature, were contractual and by this solemn contract said State institution at St. James, Missouri, was not authorized to accept gifts and bequests from private sources. Laws 1897, pp. 28-30; Secs. 15136-15411, R.S. 1939; 49 Amer. Jur., sec. 33, p. 251, and sec. 62, p. 275; Hale v. Stimson, 198 Mo. 134, 95 S.W. 885. (2) Laws 1945, p. 1758, amending Sec. 15138, R.S. approved July 15, 1946, and 18 months after the death of testatrix on January 3, 1945, which specifically authorized the St. James Home to accept gifts and bequests from private individuals could not act retrospectively and retroactively to the date of the testatrix's death and did not give said St. James Home capacity to accept the bequest under the Ruhland will on the date said will became effective, as that would impair the obligation of the aforesaid contract. Constitution 1875, Sec. 15, Art. II; Constitution 1945, Sec. 13, Art. I; Lucas v. Murphy, 156 S.W.2d 686, 348 Mo. 1078; Graham Paper Co. v. Gehner, 59 S.W.2d 49, 332 Mo. 155; 50 Amer. Jur., sec. 480, p. 503. (3) The right to take property under a will is not a natural right, but is a creature of law. Under the Missouri Statutes, it is the policy of the Legislature to prohibit and deny to a State institution the power and capacity to receive and accept gifts and bequests by wills from private individuals, unless specific authority is given by legislative enactment. 59 C.J., sec. 276, p. 164; 68 C.J., sec. 122, p. 503; In re Rogers Estate, 250 S.W. 576. (4) This is demonstrated by the following laws of Missouri, in effect at date of testatrix's death, January 3, 1945. Gifts to the State for educational purposes, Sec. 643, R.S. 1939; State Eleemosynary Hospitals at Fulton, St. Joseph, Nevada, Farmington, Mt. Vernon and Marshall, Sec. 9272; Feeble-Minded Colony at Marshall, Sec. 9389; Public School Fund of the State of Missouri, Sec. 10887; Confederate Soldiers' Home at Higginsville, Sec. 15134; Cities of Various Classes for Public Parks, Secs. 7638, 15339, 15347 and 15387; Counties to act as trustees and execute trusts for charitable purposes, Sec. 13786; Counties for tuberculosis hospitals, Secs. 15180 and 15191, and for County hospitals, Sec. 15204; Firemen's Pension Fund, Sec. 9503. (5) In January, 1945, there was no statutory law authorizing the Federal Soldiers' Home at St. James, Missouri, to accept and receive gifts and legacies, and said Home had no capacity to receive and accept the bequest in this Ruhland Will. The Laws of 1945, p. 1758, were approved July 15, 1946, more than 18 months after the testatrix's death, and said law cannot act retroactively. (6) Courts cannot by implication read into a statute that which the said statute does not warrant. 50 Amer. Jur., sec. 274, p. 261, and sec. 243, p. 238; Caldwell v. Ryan, 210 Mo. 17, 108 S.W. 533. (7) Sec. 15137 and Sec. 9366, R.S. 1939, provided no specific authority to accept legacies and bequests, but designed the accounting, bookkeeping, manner and method by which funds derived from products or employment of inmates, from use and sale of property, grants from the Federal Government and such sources were to be handled and paid into the State treasury and subject to release only by appropriation enactment by the General Assembly. (8) Under a contractual obligation, or a constitutional restriction, or a statutory limitation, and where the State has not given its consent to the acquisition of property in a particular way, a gift or bequest to a State institution is null and void. 59 C.J., sec. 276, p. 164; In re Beck Estate, 44 Mont. 561, 121 P. 784; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, aff. 52 N.Y.S. 530; Lehnherr v. Feldman, 110 Kan. 115, 202 P. 624; Kennett v. Kidd, 87 Kan. 652, 125 P. 36; Proctor v. Board of Trustees M.E. Church South, 225 Mo. 51, 123 S.W. 862; Succession of Hardesty, 22 La. Ann. 332; Wait v. Society of Political Study, 123 N.Y.S. 637; Daniel v. Fain, 73 Tenn. 319. (9) To constitute a public charity the gift must first be lawful, valid, proper and consistent with existing laws before the court will inquire into the charitable uses and purposes thereof. An absolute and outright bequest free from trust which is invalid, null and void cannot be a charitable gift. Putman's Estate v. Gideon, 232 Mo. App. 460, 119 S.W.2d 6; 10 Amer. Jur., sec. 3, p. 586, and sec. 14, p. 594; 65 C.J., sec. 59, p. 276; Daniel v. Fain, 73 Tenn. 319; Burrier v. Jones, 338 Mo. 679, 92 S.W.2d 885; Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Hoehn, 355 Mo. 257, 196 S.W.2d 134.
Lashly, Lashly, Miller Clifford, Jacob M. Lashly and George S. Roudebush for plaintiff-respondent.
J.E. Taylor, Attorney General, Hugh P. Williamson and Frank P. Motherway, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendants-respondents.
(1) The Federal Soldiers' Home at St. James, Missouri, had the capacity to receive a bequest from a private individual on January 3, 1945, the date of Rosa Ruhland's death. 1 Page on Wills, p. 393; Fulbright v. Perry County, 145 Mo. 432, 46 S.W. 955; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Adkins v. Kalter, 287 S.W. 388, 171 Ark. 1111; Dixon v. U.S., 125 Mass. 311; 49 Am. Jur. 269; Secs. 643, 6403, 9363, 9366, 15137, R.S. 1939; Laws 1945, p. 1758; 59 C.J., p. 164, sec. 276. (2) It is the contention of the respondent that, in view of the authorities quoted above in Point (1), the Federal Soldiers' Home at St. James had the power to accept bequests from private individuals on January 3, 1945, the date of Rosa Ruhland's death, but that even if it did not have such power on said date that such power was conferred upon it by an act of the Missouri Legislature, effective July 15, 1946, referred to above, (Laws 1945, page 1758). Memorandum from office of Attorney General, May 19, 1948, to Honorable Phil M. Donnelly, Governor of Missouri, In re — House Bill No. 420; Legg v. Wagner, 155 S.W.2d 146; Lansdale v. Dearing, 173 S.W.2d 25, 356 Mo. 356; Laws 1945, p. 1758; McManus v. Park, 287 Mo. 109; Clarke v. Railroad, 219 Mo. 524; Benas v. Maher, 128 F.2d 247; State ex rel. v. Haid, 52 S.W.2d 183, 330 Mo. 1093; Aetna Insurance Co. v. O'Malley, 118 S.W.2d 3, 342 Mo. 800; 59 C.J., p. 164, sec. 276; 147 A.L.R. 728. (3) The will of Rosa Ruhland (Item 8 of which is the subject of the present controversy) was drawn August 25, 1938, with a codicil executed January 23, 1939. At the time that this will was drawn, and for the preceding 42 years (the transfer of the Federal Soldiers' Home at St. James from the Woman's Relief Corps to the State of Missouri, having been effected in 1897) this Home had been owned by the State of Missouri. It is to be presumed that Rosa Ruhland knew of this fact, that she made her bequest to the Home with this fact in mind, and intended that it be made under the conditions that existed with respect to the Home at the time the will was drawn, which were the same conditions that existed at the time (Jan. 3, 1945) that the will and the bequest under it became operative. That this is true, that all persons are presumed to know the law, from a strictly legal point of view, there can be no doubt. Isaac T. Cook Co. v. Craddock-Terry Co., 109 S.W.2d 731; Garrett v. Wiltse, 252 Mo. 699; State v. Douglas, 312 Mo. 373; State v. Crumes, 319 Mo. 24; Eastman v. U.S., 328 U.S. 852; Poe v. Ill. Central R., 339 Mo. 1025. (4) However, more particularly, the law presumes that testators know the law and prepare their wills accordingly. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580; Graham v. Karr, 331 Mo. 1157; Hood v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 334 Mo. 404; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17; Long v. Long, 38 S.W.2d 288. (5) The object of the bequest was in existence and was ascertainable at the time the will and the bequest became operative. McGregory v. Gaskill, 296 S.W. 833; Society of Helpers of Holy Souls v. Law, 267 Mo. 667. (6) In his brief the appellant states that on March 21, 1946, an assistant attorney general of Missouri, at the request of the superintendent of the Home, held that: "An examination of the statutes of Missouri reveals no statute which would authorize any Commission or officer of the State to accept such a gift as we are dealing with here." It is obvious that such an opinion is not binding upon the State of Missouri or any of its departments, nor upon any court in Missouri, nor upon the office of the Attorney General, which claims the prerogative to change its official mind in the light of subsequent developments and additional facts. (7) We believe that in this instance the testatrix intended the bequest as a charitable trust since it was grouped in a residuary clause with five other charities, and that as of the date of the death of Rosa Ruhland the bequest to the Home vested. Missouri Historical Society of Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S.W. 346; Harger v. Barrett, 5 S.W.2d 1100; In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492; Lehnherr v. Feldman, 110 Kan. 115, 202 P. 1921.
The Mississippi Valley Trust Company, a corporation, as co-executor under the will of Rosa Ruhland, deceased, instituted this suit for a declaratory judgment, presenting two principal questions in the trial court: "a) Were bequests to four of the six residuary legatees valid despite slight errors in the corporate names by which they were described; and b) was one of these residuary bequests to the Federal Old Soldiers' Home, apart from the apparently erroneous inclusion of the word `Old' in its name, a valid bequest, and if not a valid bequest, to whom should its share of the residue be paid?"
The defendants are the residuary beneficiaries mentioned in "Item Eight" of Rosa Ruhland's will, infra, and the heirs at law of said testatrix, descendants of deceased brothers. They need not be specifically named.
All issues respecting the validity of the gift to any residuary beneficiary arising out of an inaccuracy in the description of such beneficiary were removed by a stipulation at the trial that the several misdescriptions were so slight as not to affect any right under the will of the misdescribed beneficiary. Consult McGregory v. Gaskill (Mo. App.) 296 S.W. 833; St. Louis Hospital Ass'n v. Williams, 19 Mo. 609; Society of Helpers of Holy Souls v. Law, 267 Mo. 667, 186 S.W. 718.
The remaining issue involves whether the Federal Soldiers' Home at St. James, Missouri, may receive (that is, has the legal capacity to accept) assets of an approximate value of $90,000, embracing an interest in certain real estate situate in St. Louis, Missouri, under Rosa Ruhland's will. The trial court answered in the affirmative. The heirs at law of Rosa Ruhland, deceased, have appealed, contending said gift is void and the property passes as intestate property to them as testatrix's heirs at law.
A written stipulation covering many facts was filed. It need not be set out in full. The material facts are: Rosa Ruhland died on January 3, 1945, at the age of 79. She had never married and had no children. She executed her will on August 25, 1938, and a codicil on January 23, 1939. This will was probated January 18, 1945. Her estate, appraised for inheritance tax purposes at $637,860.22, is in the course of administration. All specific bequests and all claims allowed against the estate have been paid, as have all expenses of administration and taxes payable up to the institution of this action.
After making specific gifts of less than $95,000, Rosa Ruhland, by "Item Eight" of her will, devised and bequeathed "all the rest, residue and remainder" of her property "absolutely in equal shares to the following institutions:" German General Protestant Orphans' Association; Blind Girls' Home; Good Samaritan Hospital; "Federal Old Soldiers' Home, at the date hereof located at St. James, Missouri;" Home of the Friendless; and St. Louis Women's Christian Association.
By an Act approved March 1, 1897 (Laws 1897, pp. 28-30, §§ 1-6, now §§ 15136-15141), the appointment of a Board of Trustees was authorized for the establishment and maintenance of a home for Federal soldiers and sailors and army nurses, and the aged wives of such soldiers and sailors (§ 1); and said Board of Trustees was authorized "to receive for a nominal consideration" from the "`Woman's Relief Corps Soldiers' Home'" a conveyance of the property known as the Soldiers' Home at St. James, Missouri, "vesting the title to said property in the State of Missouri" (§ 3).
Statutory references are to R.S. Mo. 1939 and Mo. R.S.A., unless otherwise specifically designated.
Thereafter, by deed dated May 20, 1897, the Woman's Relief Corps Soldiers' Home [752] aforesaid conveyed said property to the State of Missouri for a stated consideration of $1.00.
The Home has been maintained by the appropriation of public funds (see, for instance, I Laws 1947, pp. 132, 133) and the receipt of Federal aid (see U.S.C.A., Tit. 24, § 134 as amended).
The heirs say the right to take property by testamentary gift "is not a natural right but a creature of law," subject to the power of the sovereign to restrict or prohibit entirely [Re Rogers Estate (Mo.) 250 S.W. 576, 577(I); State ex rel. v. Guinotte, 275 Mo. 298, 310(I), 204 S.W. 806, 807(I); 68 C.J. 503, § 122; 59 C.J. 164, § 276; 56 Am. Jur. 138, § 153]; and contend that, in the absence of specific legislative authority, it is the policy of Missouri to deny to State institutions the capacity to accept gifts, including testamentary gifts, from private individuals. The trial court, in a well considered opinion, reached the opposite result; and we agree thereto.
We have said the policy of the law favors freedom in the testamentary disposition of property as expressed in wills provided an established rule of law is not contravened. Re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 502(II), 291 S.W. 120, 124(2), 51 A.L.R. 577.
"A state board empowered to take and hold the title to property for state purposes does not own such property in any proprietary sense. It is state property, to all intents and purposes, the same as where title thereto is formally vested in the state." 49 Am. Jur., 269, n. 10. See School Dist. of Oakland v. School Dist. of Joplin, 340 Mo. 779, 102 S.W.2d 909, 910(2). Testatrix was charged with knowledge that the title to the Federal Soldiers' Home was in the State of Missouri. Laws 1897, p. 30, § 3; § 15138.
"As the sovereign at common law could take by will so there is no question that under our modern law either the nation, or a state, can be a beneficiary under a will." 1 Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators (6th Ed.), 44, § 44, and see § 31. The common law is in force in Missouri. § 645.
"Since the statutes of mortmain are not in force in this country, and our wills acts seldom impose restrictions on public corporations taking by will, there is no valid reason for denying such corporations the right to receive a legacy or devise in trust for a proper public purpose. So, in the absence of any specific constitutional or statutory restriction, a municipal corporation may take a devise or bequest under a will, not only in its own right but in trust for any purpose germane to the object of its organization . . . Among the public and quasi-public corporations that have been held capable of taking property under a will are the United States, a state . . ." Thompson, Wills (1947) 132, nn. 76, 79, 80. Consult Rollison, Wills (1939), 306, § 168 et seq.
In the absence of self-imposed constitutional or statutory prohibitions or restrictions, the right of a sovereign government to be a beneficiary under a will appears to be as unqualified and absolute as those of an individual. 68 C.J. 527, § 146; 59 C.J. 164, § 276; 49 Am. Jur. 269, n. 19 et seq. See 57 Am. Jur. 142, §§ 157, 158; 1 Page, Wills (3d Ed.) 461, n. 1.
Statutory enactments provide for the escheat of property to the state in certain events, such as the failure of heirs or representatives capable of taking. §§ 620-642. If the State may take in such events, it should have capacity to take upon gift from the owner. Logically, a sovereign with power to bestow, restrict or prohibit the privilege of taking by testamentary gift upon its subjects, should itself, in the first instance, possess the power of taking. If it does not, from whence springs its source to bestow or restrict or prohibit the privilege to others? "It may be stated generally that a devise or bequest to a country or political division, which tends to reduce taxation, and lessen the burdens of government, will be held valid as a charitable gift, although no particular purpose is specified." Annotation, 82 A.L.R., 476.
[753] We are not directed to any applicable restrictions in the instant case. Sections 518, 519 and 550 impose no restrictions. It has been held that a county (Fulbright v. Perry County, 145 Mo. 432, 444, 46 S.W. 955, 959) and the City of St. Louis (Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543, 574, the first Mullanphy case, Scott, J. writing) may take by devise. "While affirmative legislative action would be binding as expressing the intention of the State, either in accepting or rejecting a gift of property to the State, yet such affirmative action is not essential in order to render a gift of property to the State valid." Adkins v. Kalter, 171 Ark. 1111, 287 S.W. 388, 390. Consult Dickinson v. United States, 125 Mass. 311, 28 Am. Rep. 230, a leading case, and other cases cited to the texts mentioned above.
Express statutory provisions contemplate the receipt of private gifts of money and property for the use of the Federal Soldiers' Home and refute the contention of the heirs that it may be maintained only by the appropriation of State funds therefor. Section 15137, supra, expressly requires the Trustees of said Home to periodically report under oath "giving a detailed statement of all moneys and other property received on account of such home"; and requires said Trustees "to immediately transmit to the state treasurer all moneys received by them, or by any financial officer of the institution, from whatsoever source, except . . . [not material here], and the state treasurer shall . . . credit the same to the federal soldiers' home fund, which is hereby created and established." (Emphasis ours). This harmonizes with § 2 of the original act (Laws 1897, p. 29). The provision in said § 2 of the original act that the Trustees' "actual expenses incident to the care and maintenance and establishment of said home shall be borne by the state and be paid out of any moneys appropriated for its maintenance" is not to be tortured into a covenant by the State to reject gifts for the maintenance of said Home. The extent of the authority conferred upon the Trustees by the original act to covenant with respect to the acquisition of said Home was explicitly limited to receive the property "for a nominal consideration." Laws 1897, p. 30, § 3; § 15138. Sections 9363 and 9366 likewise recognize the right of the State to accept gifts on behalf of said Home.
In 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 409, now § 643) Missouri enacted a law providing, so far as here material: "Whenever any devise, bequest, donation, gift . . ." et cetera "shall be made or offered to be made to this state," a commission thereby created was "authorized to receive and accept the same on such terms, conditions and limitations as may be agreed upon between the grantor, donor or assignor of said property and said officials constituting said" commission, "so that the right and title to shall pass to and vest in this state; and all such property so vested in this state . . . may be appropriated for educational purposes, or for such other purposes as the legislature may direct." [Emphasis ours.] In 1933 (Laws 1933, p. 251) the State Board of Education was substituted for the commission named in the original act to accept such gifts.
Thus, in addition to its common law privilege, express statutory provisions authorized the acceptance of the absolute gift made by Rosa Ruhland's will to the Federal Soldiers' Home on behalf of the State.
In connection with the receipt of said gift and the sale of the interest of said Home in real estate constituting a part thereof, the office of the Attorney General of Missouri was of the opinion the Board of Trustees of said Home did not have legal capacity to accept said testamentary gift and dispose of said interest in said real estate, and recommended the passage of legislation vesting designated officials with such authority. Thereafter, § 15138, supra, was amended (Laws 1945, p. 1758) and said Board of Trustees was expressly "authorized and directed to receive any grant or devise of land, or any gift or bequest of money or other personal property to the Federal Soldiers' Home, at St. James, Missouri, as an endowment of the said Federal Soldiers' Home, at St. James, Missouri, thereby vesting title to any such property in the State of Missouri for the [754] sole use and benefit of said Home." This amendment, as well as other similar enactments with respect to other State agencies, was in affirmance of the common law, as developed hereinbefore; and, so far as the capacity of the State to accept testamentary gifts is involved, was declaratory thereof and the more clearly established the common law as being in force and effect.
The cases (cited infra) stressed by the heirs are, so far as necessary to a determination of the instant issue, readily distinguished in that they involved statutes imposing specific prohibitions as to what character of corporations might accept testamentary gifts, and the statutes involved were construed to preclude acceptance by the named governmental agency. In re Beck's Estate, 44 Mont. 561, 121 P. 784, 787, 1057, was by a divided court. In United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 24 L.Ed. 192 [affirming, (1873) 52 N.Y. 530, 11 Am. Rep. 751], a testator's will to the United States of his estate was considered inoperative as to the real estate on account of a statutory prohibition [N.Y.R.S., Pt. II, Ch. VI. Tit. I, Art. I, § 3, 2 Edmunds Ed. 1863, also 3 Banks Brothers, 6th Ed. 1875], but operative as to the personal estate. Our search discloses no like prohibition respecting personal property. Id., Arts, II and III.
What we have said rules the case. However, we also mention, without discussion or passing upon the holding, that the trial court was of the opinion said Laws 1945, p. 1758, if additional authority were needed, was effective to authorize the Federal Soldiers' Home to accept the gift under Rosa Ruhland's will, for the reason said Home is a charitable institution and the rule is well settled that a court will not permit a bequest to such an institution to fail; citing; Missouri Historical Society v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 466, 8 S.W. 346, 347; Harger v. Barrett, 319 Mo. 633, 642, 5 S.W.2d 1100, 1104(9); Re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 510(III), 291 S.W. 120, 127 (5, 6), 130; § 9363; Lehnherr v. Feldman, 110 Kan. 115, 202 P. 624, 625, 627.
The judgment is affirmed. Westhues and Barrett, CC., concur.
The foregoing opinion by BOHLING, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.