Mische v. Kaminski

Full title: Mische et al. v. Kaminski et al., Appellants

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Date published: Jul 15, 1937

193 A. 410 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937)

193 A. 410

Opinion

May 5, 1937.

July 15, 1937.

Equity — Labor unions — Right to work Causing discharge of other employees — Unlawful threats and acts of violence — Evidence — Findings of fact — Conclusions of law — Decree.

1. In a proceeding in equity, the evidence supported findings of fact, made by the chancellor and approved by the court in banc, that plaintiffs, who had been members of the defendant labor organizations, were discharged from employment by a coal company employer, although the latter had no fault to find with their work, solely on demand of the defendants, members of grievance committees and officers of defendant labor organizations, who refused to work with plaintiffs and made unlawful threats and committed acts of violence, on account of plaintiffs' membership in a new union; and the findings of fact sustained conclusions of law that the acts recited in the findings were unlawful and in violation of the rights of plaintiffs, that defendants did not have the right to interfere with plaintiffs in their employment or to combine to prevent them from obtaining work from the coal company by acts of violence, intimidations or threats of a strike, and that plaintiffs' right to work was entitled to the protection of equity, under the facts in the case; and such findings warranted a decree enjoining defendants from committing the unlawful acts complained of and awarding damages against defendants, members of the grievance committees and officers of the defendant unions.

2. Plaintiffs had the legal right to leave the defendant labor organizations and were not thereafter governed by the regulations of such organizations pertaining to disputes within the orders.

3. Where it appeared that plaintiffs were injured, in being deprived of the right to work by the unlawful act of defendants, it was not material that no technical "strike" was called by defendants.

Appeal, No. 19, Feb. T., 1938, from decree of C.P. Luzerne Co., Dec. T., 1934, No. 6, in case of Henry Mische et al. v. Frank Kaminski et al.

Before KELLER, P.J., CUNNINGHAM, BALDRIGE, STADTFELD, PARKER, JAMES and RHODES, JJ. Decree affirmed.

Bill in equity.

The Adjudication, etc., of the court below were as follows:

ADJUDICATION

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiffs are residents of Luzerne County and were employees of the Susquehanna Collieries Company.

2. The Susquehanna Collieries Company operates coal mines in and around the City of Nanticoke, in this County.

3. Local Unions No. 898 and No. 211 are branches of District No. 1 of the United Mine Workers of America, an unincorporated association of mine workers, and some of defendants are members thereof and plaintiffs had been members thereof, and both locals are composed of employees of No. 5 and No. 7 collieries of the Susquehanna Collieries Company.

4. Plaintiffs are members of a separate and distinct labor organization, called the United Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania.

5. The United Mine Workers of America are governed by by-laws and a constitution which were binding upon the plaintiffs in this action while members. Article III, Section 3, provides as follows:

"Sec. 3. In all questions of dispute, appeals and grievances (unless restricted by joint agreement) the right of appeal of an individual member shall end with the District Executive Board, and the right of appeal of any branch of the organization shall end with the International Executive Board. This shall not prevent individuals whose membership is at stake from appealing to the International Executive Board, which body's decision shall be final and binding until reversed by the International Convention. When an appeal is taken, the defendants must be furnished a copy of the appeal in ample time to prepare their case. In all cases the decision of the subordinate tribunal must be complied with before the appellant's right of appeal shall be recognized. However, the appellant shall have the right of appeal, provided bond satisfactory to the court of appeal covering the amount of money involved is furnished."

Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 3, provides as follows:

"Sec. 2. When any Local officer or any member not an officer is accused of violating any of the Organiztion's laws or any transgression against the Organization or any of its officers or members, the charge must be first lodged with and prosecuted before the Local Union of which the alleged offender is a member and the decision of the Local Union shall close the case so far as that tribunal is concerned, but should accused or his accuser be dissatisfied with the decision of the tribunal first trying the case, either shall have the right of appeal to the next highest tribunal in authority and so on until a final decision is reached, as provided in Section 3 of Article III, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 3. When Sub-District conventions are in session they shall be recognized as intermediary trial tribunals between the Sub-District and District Executive Boards, and District Conventions in session shall be recognized as intermediary trial tribunals between the District and International Executive Boards and International Conventions in session may assume the functions of the International Executive Board, but if it can be shown that any case prosecuted under this Article has been unnecessarily delayed on account of awaiting the arrival of a Sub-District, District [or] International Convention, said Convention shall refuse to consider the case, and shall refer it back to the respective Executive Board without prejudice."

6. The Susquehanna Collieries Company, employer, and the United Mine Workers of America, are under contract, which provides as to grievances between the men and the Company as follows:

"(d) At each mine there shall be a grievance committee consisting of not more than three employees, and such committee shall under the terms of this agreement take up for adjustment with the proper officials of the company, all grievances referred to them by employees who have first taken up said grievance with the foreman and failed to effect proper settlement of the same. It is also understood that the member of the Board of Conciliation elected by the Mine Workers' Organization, or his representative, may meet with the mine committee and company officials in adjusting disputes. In the event of the mine committee failing to adjust with the company officials any grievance properly referred to them, they may refer the grievance to the members of the Board of Conciliation in their District for adjustment, and in case of their failure to adjust the same they shall refer the grievance to the Board of Conciliation for final settlement, as provided in the Award of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission and the Agreements subsequent thereto, and whatever settlement is made shall date from the time the grievance is raised."

7. Prior to August 27, 1934, plaintiffs were employed at the Susquehanna Collieries Company operations in different capacities in various sections of the mines.

8. Frank Kaminski, John Peasecki, Andrew Piontkowski, Joseph Golembrewski and John Kashinsky, defendants and members of the Grievance Committee of Local No. 898, requested the removal and discharge of Henry Mische, Arthur Jenkins, Theodore Stultz, Joseph McDermott, Einar Lagerholm, Stanley Maylock, plaintiffs, and request denied. On September 11th they made a similar request to the superintendent of the colliery and plaintiffs were suspended until they could make their peace with the United Mine Workers, and between August 22nd and September 11th the colliery was idle.

9. On September 11, 1934, the United Mine Workers refused to work with the Anthracite Miners due to a dispute between the two unions, known as the old and the new unions. The members of the old union refused to work so long as the Company employed any member of the new union, and plaintiffs, members of the new union, were dismissed and remained idle.

10. On or about October 27, 1934, the Grievance Committee, consisting of Charles Buber, chairman, Andrew Modla and Cappy Gorchetski, members of Local No. 211, requested the superintendent of the colliery to discharge Charles Jones, Fred Holbrook, Gomer Thomas, plaintiffs, and Pat McNamara, from the operations of the colliery company, threatening to refuse to work with the Anthracite Miners, or new union, and the request granted and the men laid off.

11. The effect of the members of the old union refusing to work would stop operations, because there were not sufficient members in the new union to operate the colliery, and the same condition would exist if the members of the new union walked out.

. . . . . .

13. Grievance Committee of Local No. 211 requested the discharge of Goodwin Jones, plaintiff, and threatened a strike because he was three or four months in arrears in his dues, and the request was granted and Jones was discharged.

14. The first meeting of the Grievance Committee of Local No. 898, for the purpose of securing the discharge of plaintiffs, was about August 22, 1934, when the committees of both Locals No. 898 and No. 211 met in the City building in Nanticoke, together with international organizer, Frank Schifka, and voted to hold the colliery idle if plaintiffs were permitted to work. No strike was ordered, but it was agreed that the men should remain from work.

15. Efforts were made by members of both Locals No. 898 and No. 211 to get the officials of the Collieries Company to recognize the United Mine Workers' demand to discharge plaintiffs and a list of names presented.

16. A strike was called which began on August 27th and continued until September 11th, for the purpose of securing the discharge of complainants ordered by the Grievance Committee of Locals No. 898 and No. 211, but not through action of the locals in session; it was later declared illegal by the Conciliation Board. The Grievance Committee enforced their order by requesting the men to remain from going to work.

17. The action of the joint meeting of the Grievance Committees was reported back to their respective Locals, but no action was taken.

18. After the action of the Grievance Committee, when plaintiffs and others attempted to work, members of the United Mine Workers were picketing on the road to the colliery, making threats and comments, using the word "scabs" and expression — "we will get you scabs" — and also using profanity and obscene language.

19. During a meeting of the Anthracite Miners while the strike was on, Stanley Buber, defendant, an official of Local No. 211, Andrew Modla, Frank Kaminsky, chairman of the Grievance Committee of Local No. 898, and Joseph Golembrewski, members of the Grievance Committee, and others, gathered outside of the hall where the meeting was being held and the doors of the hall were broken in and several men injured.

20. Frank Kaminski, defendant and chairman of the Grievance Committee of Local No. 898, informed the assistant mine foreman of the Collieries Company to advise Arthur Jenkins, plaintiff, that the members of Local No. 898 would refuse to work with him and he was suspended until peace would be restored between the two unions, and the foreman informed the court that he could return to work the following day.

21. Goodwin Jones, a plaintiff, on November 14, 1934, received a letter from the secretary of Local Union No. 211 of the United Mine Workers of America, to appear before a commission on November 14, 1934, at 6:30, to explain his activities in the union known as the Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania, and appeared as requested. There were no officers of the union on the commission, just members thereof, and, after hearing, he was told his job was taken away from him and to go back on the waiting list; the following day, when he appeared at the colliery, he was informed by the mine foreman that he was stopped, no employment for him.

22. John Jonathan, general mine foreman of No. 5 colliery of the Company, on September 11, 1934, notified Henry Mische, Stanley Maylock, Joseph McDermott, and Theodore Stultz, that they were discharged because members of the United Mine Workers had notified him that they would not work if these men were allowed to enter the mines. As foreman, he had no complaint against them; so far as their work was concerned, it was satisfactory, and if he could be reasonably assured that there would be no strike or violence, he would continue to employ them.

23. Evan Davis, inside foreman of No. 8 shaft, on September 11, 1934, told Einar Lagerholm, a plaintiff, that it was better for him to go home that day and try and settle the trouble between himself and the United Mine Workers. He discharged him for the day. His work was satisfactory. The demand for his discharge was made by Miles Sweeney of the old union, not a defendant.

24. That Frank Kaminski, John Peasecki and Andrew Piontkowski, in demanding the discharge of the plaintiffs, acted in concert and in their line of duty as members of the Grievance Committee of said Local Union No. 898, and that Charles Buber, Andrew Modla and "Cappy" Gorchetski, in demanding the discharge of the plaintiffs acted in concert and in their line of duty as members of the Grievance Committee of Local Union No. 211.

. . . . . .

26. The sole reason for the discharge of the above named plaintiffs from their employment with the said Susquehanna Collieries Company was predicated upon the insistent demands, threats and intimidating menaces of the Grievance Committees and members of the United Mine Workers of America directed against the plaintiffs' employer on account of plaintiffs' [membership in the new union, United Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania].

27. That up to the time of final hearing, June 25, 1935, the employment condition of which plaintiffs complain has continued and remained unchanged.

28. The following named plaintiffs have sustained damages ascertained and assessed individually and separately as follows:

Arthur Jenkins has suffered a loss of 117 working days, at a wage rate of $6.44 for a total of $753.48. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board, the sum of $277.67, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $475.81.

Joseph McDermott has suffered a loss of 117 working days, at a wage rate of $6.16 for a total of $720.72. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board the sum of $287.31, and in addition thereto has earned at labor performed by him the sum of $32.00, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $401.41.

Henry Mische has suffered a loss of 117 working days, at a wage rate of $9.00 for a total of $1,053.00. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board the sum of $479.73, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $573.27.

Theodore Stultz has suffered a loss of 117 working days, at a wage rate of $6.16 for a total of $720.72. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board the sum of $339.70, and in addition thereto has earned at labor performed by him the sum of $45.00, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $336.02.

Einar Lagerholm has suffered a loss of 117 working days, at a wage rate of $9.50 for a total of $1,111.50. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board, the sum of $303.38, and in addition thereto has earned at labor performed by him the sum of $21.80, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $786.32.

Charles Jones has suffered a loss of 94 working days, at a wage rate of $10.50 for a total of $987.00. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board, the sum of $146.91, and in addition thereto has earned at labor performed by him the sum of $60.00, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff the sum of $780.00.

Stanley Maylock has suffered a loss of 117 working days, at a wage rate of $6.16 for a total of $720.72. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board, the sum of $334.59, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $386.13.

Fred Holbrook has suffered a loss of 94 working days, at a wage rate of $7.72 for a total of $724.68. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board, the sum of $296.91, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $427.77.

Goodwin Jones has suffered a loss of 83 working days at a wage rate of $6.16 for a total of $511.28. During this period of enforced idleness, this plaintiff received from the Luzerne County Emergency Relief Board, the sum of $200.32, and in addition thereto has earned at labor performed by him the sum of $48.00, leaving as the actual amount of the damages suffered by this plaintiff, the sum of $262.96.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs, former employees of the Susquehanna Collieries Company, hereinafter called "the company", also former members of Local Unions Nos. 898 and 211, each a branch of District No. 1 of the United Mine Workers of America, seek by bill in equity to recover damages from the defendants upon an allegation that they lost their employment with the company through a combination and conspiracy on the part of the defendant organizations and their officers, agents and organizers, to prevent plaintiffs from continuing their employment with the company, by threats of a strike, unlawful picketing, and by refusing to work with plaintiffs, forcing the mining operations to close down; further that defendants combined and conspired to compel the company arbitrarily to discharge complainants and others similarly situated by threats of a strike, unlawful picketing and stopping its operations, and that on or about August 22, 1934, carried out their threats and their unlawful combination by putting a strike into effect.

Testimony to support the bill was furnished by complainants. Defendants did not introduce any testimony.

The difficulty arises from dissension among the members of the United Mine Workers of America. Complainants, with others, withdrew and organized a new union, called the Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania. . . . . .

Upon a preliminary hearing, a temporary injunction issued enjoining and prohibiting the following specific acts by defendants:

(a) From continuing any combination to prevent by threats of a strike, or by menaces, force or display of force, the complainants from obtaining reinstatement to their former positions. (b) From interfering by the same means, or by putting the employees or employer in fear of forced suspension of its operations.

(c) From interfering with or preventing men who are not members of said local unions, who may hereafter desire to enter the employ of the company from securing employment.

(d) From entering into, forming or conducting any combination for the purpose of using any intimidation, threats of a strike or violence against the complainants while seeking or following their occupations or for the purpose of forcing or coercing the Susquehanna Collieries Company to discharge complainants.

(e) From interfering with the officers of the Collieries Company or with their employees by way of threats, personal violence, intimidation, epithets or ridicule, and from congregating or loitering about or near the premises of the Collieries Company for the purpose of interfering with the employees.

The injunction is still in force. The new union has since been abandoned and [most of] its members [have] returned to the fold. It seems to the court that to continue this litigation will not promote the moral and physical welfare of the members of the union, but provoke, antagonize and injure the usefulness of the union, which, if properly conducted, is capable of promoting great good to its members and the public.

Having issued the temporary restraining order and injunction, Judge FINE, who heard the case upon its merits, referred the matter to us for disposition, subject to further consideration thereof by the court en banc.

The legal rights of these two rival unions are fully defined in the able opinion of Justice DEAN in the case of Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327, wherein it was said — "Trades unions may cease to work for reasons satisfactory to their members, but if they combine to prevent others from obtaining work by threats of a strike or combine to prevent an employer from employing others by threats of a strike, they combine to accomplish an unlawful purpose, a purpose as unlawful now as it ever was, though not punishable by indictment. Such combination is a despotic and tyrannical violation of the inefeasible right of labor to acquire property which courts are bound to restrain. It is utterly subversive of the letter and spirit of the Declaration of Rights."

Upon the preliminary hearing for a restraining order and temporary injunction to preserve the peace and law and order, an injunction was granted as herein stated, and at the time we said to counsel for the plaintiff — "Draw up an order and submit it to the court and counsel for the defendants." Pursuant thereto counsel prepared a temporary order with requests for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which we adopted, doing so under the belief that all parties to the case had agreed to them. All these requests cannot be adopted upon this record and we attach hereto our own separate Findings of Fact.

Plaintiffs had worked for the Susquehanna Collieries Company for several years prior to August 27, 1934, and the work of each was satisfactory to their employer, and on that date the Grievance Committees of the defendant local unions called at the office of the company and requested and demanded the discharge of the plaintiffs unless they resigned from the new union and became reinstated in the old union, threatening to shut down mining operations by refusing to work with plaintiffs.

Such conduct constituted a discrimination under paragraph 9 of the award of the Coal Strike Commission of 1903, which was adopted, confirmed and continued until April 1, 1936. Said paragraph reads as follows:

"9. The Commission adjudges and awards that no person shall be refused employment or in any way discriminated against on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor organization and that there shall be no discrimination against or interference with any employee who is not a member of any labor organization by members of such organization."

The officers of the company refused to comply with the demand or request of the Grievance Committee, whereupon members of the old union refused to work, throwing the mines idle and the Board of Conciliation later passed a resolution directing all the employees to return to work immediately and present to the Board for adjustment any grievances in the manner prescribed in their agreement.

Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the president and vice-president of District No. 1, and other members of the District Executive Board, should have taken official action in repudiating or disallowing the tie-up in violation of the joint agreement and of the constitution of the United Mine Workers of America. Their failure, however, did not make them liable for damages under this bill. They are not charged with official misconduct or any dereliction or neglect of duty, but of a conspiracy to do certain unlawful acts. Both Grievance Committees were active in furthering the tie-up.

Mr. Thomas, foreman, stated that on August 22nd Local No. 211 called a strike and the colliery was idle until September 11th. Local No. 898 did not declare a strike. That none of the defendants threatened to strike if he did not discharge complainants. The Grievance Committees and other members of the old union stated that they would not work with plaintiffs. He said that the Grievance Committee of Local 898 met with him and stated that the men would refuse to work with plaintiffs. He replied that he would take the matter under consideration and allowed the men to work. Subsequently, the committee returned with another request to dismiss plaintiffs. Members of the old union refused to work so long as he employed members of the new union. He complied with their demand. The colliery became idle. No strike was declared, but there was trouble between the old union, the new union, and the company. The company was anxious to work, but unable due to lack of men. The miners affiliated with operations at Nos. 5 and 7 collieries, and Locals Nos. 211 and 898, refused to work.

On September 5, 1934, while plaintiffs and a number of other persons similarly situated were meeting in their own local hall in the City of Nanticoke, a crowd congregated in front of the meeting hall, broke into the building, and created a disturbance, which was broken up by the City Police. Two days later, when plaintiffs and others reported at the colliery in their working clothes, ready to work, a large number of the members of the United Mine Workers of America, and several car loads of pickets came upon the company's premises, including members of the Grievance Committees of both locals, and used vile and threatening language towards plaintiffs and threatened them with serious bodily harm; plaintiffs returned home and the colliery was unable to operate.

This tie-up continued until September 11, 1934. The company was forced to yield to the demands made by the joint Grievance Committees of both Locals, and when plaintiffs reported for work they were informed that through fear of a strike or trouble or stoppage of the mining operations, they were dismissed from their employment and later four additional employees, one [of them] Goodwin Jones, a plaintiff, in obedience to the same [sort of] demand, were discharged.

The dismissal of these plaintiffs from their employment was due to the conduct of the Grievance Committees and other members of the locals, in their insistent demands and threats directed against the Collieries Company on account of plaintiffs' [membership in the new union, United Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania.]

Some violence was employed by some of the defendants and their purpose was to [force] plaintiffs to leave the new union and adhere to the old union, and in doing so, they exceeded their rights under the law. Plaintiffs did not yield. Their employer, however, was intimidated and to prevent further intimidation, it submitted to the demands of the Grievance Committees and discharged plaintiffs. The company had no complaint against them. They were anxious to work and refused to resign from the new union and join the old union, and the purpose of the Grievance Committees was to drive them, through loss of work, and compel their employer to aid them by discharging plaintiffs.

In Purvis v. United Brotherhood, 214 Pa. 348-354, 63 A. 585, it was said — "The question is the unlawfulness of the conspiracy of the appellants to injure and destroy the property of others, if their demands as to the employment of workmen are not complied with. The question is not as to the unlawfulness of the demands which they make, but is as to their conduct upon learning that these demands are ignored by the appellees. The demands in themselves can do no harm to the latter; it results from the means employed to coerce compliance with them. The appellants contend that they seek only to persuade, and not to coerce; but their means of persuasion are the destruction of the property of those whom they would persuade. . . . . . Putting one in actual fear of loss of his property or of injury to his business, unless he submits to demands made upon him, is often no less potent in coercing than fear of violence to his person"; and in 16 R.C.L. 452, sec. 32, it is stated — "There are also decisions to the effect that an agent of a labor union has no right to enter upon the premises of an employer to induce the quitting of work by employees engaged at work."

Defendants, either individually or as a grievance committee, had the right to peacefully persuade plaintiffs and others not to work and their employer not to hire them. Erdman v. Mitchell, supra.

There is no evidence of any strike having been called by any of the locals involved in District No. 1 because of conditions then existing at the Susequehanna Collieries. The rights of bodies of men to combine and to refuse to work for insufficient wages, or because of inhuman, offensive or unjust treatment, and to procure others to do likewise, have been recognized by the courts and legislature for many years. Such combinations have elsewhere been declared lawful. Labor unions are therefore not only legitimate but, because their aim and purpose is to better the living conditions of a large part of the body politic, they are a necessary part of the physical structure. . . . . . It is to be remembered, however, in connection with this subject, that equality of conduct is impossible, and any abridgment or curtailment of this right is against the fundamental law. Jefferson Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks et al., 287 Pa. 171-175, 134 A. 430.

Such acts as hostile assemblages, marches, parades or acts of individuals, separately, collectively in combinations, or under a system, which annoy or embarrass, intimidate or terrify those who desire to work, have more potency over men of ordinary nerve than actual violence, and are unlawful. O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, and a court of equity will interfere to protect persons and property by restraining such acts, threatened, done or likely to be done.

Such acts were committed by members of both Grievance Committees and contravened the rights of plaintiffs, working men. Their conduct did not constitute a peaceful effort, but obstructed the peace, good order and safety of the public and the rights of the employer and employee.

We have here an employer intimidated and forced to dismiss plaintiffs from its employ, their work being satisfactory to the employer and no complaint by plaintiffs. As was said in Jefferson Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks et al., supra, a person may work for whom he pleases, at the particular wages he pleases and as to this right no association of men can lawfully interfere. "A government which admits its inability to protect an honest workman in the pursuit of useful employment, simply admits its inability to function properly. This right has its corresponding right in the employer, to engage and have him work"; and a reading of the decision in the Coal Company v. Marks, supra, will be of interest to the officers and members of labor organizations, in which they are advised that the law does not look with favor on an enforced discussion of the merits of the issue between individuals who wish to work, and groups of those who do not, under conditions which subject the individuals who wish to work to a severe test of their nerve and physical strength and courage.

The court treats strikers as a collective term and what is done by one is done by all, but in this case there was no strike. Defendants and others in groups met plaintiffs on the highways, at their homes and on their employer's premises and sought their dismissal by threats and abuse and picketing to compel their dismissal.

However, we find no combination between the Locals and District No. 1 of the United Mine Workers, and the other defendants, to assure the discharge of the plaintiffs or to prevent them from being employed by the Collieries Company, or of forcing or coercing the Company to discharge them.

There is nothing in the testimony, or in the circumstances, to indicate that these defendant locals, by resolution or by conduct, approved the unlawful conduct of the Grievance Committees. There is no evidence that these Grievance Committees, in the conduct of their unlawful acts, were doing the work of the Locals or of District No. 1, or carrying out their policies, and there is no evidence that the unions and the District Branch assumed the responsibility. The Grievance Committees and the individual members were solely responsible so far as the testimony discloses and there was no ratification by the Locals or Branch so as to create liability for the conduct of the Grievance Committees, or its other officers. No strike of any kind had been ordered and the officers of the union, through its president, John Boylan, directed the members of the union to return to work.

The acts of defendants, Frank Kaminski, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and John Peasecki, Andrew Piontkowski, Joseph Golembrewski, and John Kashinsky, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union No. 898, and Charles Buber, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and Andrew Modla and "Cappy" Gorchetski, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union, No. 211, were prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs and they were injured thereby. They were removed from their work at the Susquehanna Collieries and all of them have been more or less without work since, and all have suffered in consequence loss of wages. They were wholly dependent for their living upon their labor around the mines and all have made some effort to earn their means of livelihood by other employment and have been unsuccessful, and if such conduct would continue, it would reduce them to beggary. They are without an adequate remedy at law. They are entitled to security against the recurrence of such conduct in the future and their commission and continuance should be prevented and restrained by injunction and they should be reimbursed for the damage suffered.

In conclusion upon the whole case, we find that the acts of the defendants, Frank Kaminski, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and John Peasecki, Andrew Piontkowski, Joseph Golembrewski, and John Kashinsky, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union No. 898, and Charles Buber, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and Andrew Modla and "Cappy" Gorchetski, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union No. 211, as complained of by the bill and established by the evidence are unlawful and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs, and their commission and continuance should be restrained in conformity with the foregoing findings of fact and law and discussion of the court attached hereto.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Equity affords a remedy for the relief of the plaintiffs under the facts found by the court in this case.

2. The acts recited in the foregoing findings were unlawful and in violation of the rights of the plaintiffs, and that said acts will continue unless permanently enjoined.

3. Neither the defendant unions, their officers, members or any other person has the right to interfere with the plaintiffs in their employment or to combine to prevent them or any of them from obtaining work from the Susquehanna Collieries Company by acts of violence, intimidations or threats of a strike.

. . . . . .

5. The right of acquiring property, inherent and indefeasible, in every man, includes the right of a workman to work when, where and for whom he pleases and is, in a legal sense, property entitled to the protection of the law.

6. From the testimony and from the Findings of Fact heretofore made, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the defendants, Frank Kaminski, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and John Peasecki, Andrew Piontkowski, Joseph Golembrewski, and John Kashinsky, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union No. 898, and Charles Buber, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and Andrew Modla and "Cappy" Gorchetski, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union No. 211, the amounts specifically set forth opposite the plaintiffs' names in the twenty-eighth Finding of Fact hereof, together with additional damages for delay in the amount of six per cent from the date of discharge.

PERMANENT INJUNCTION

And now, [July 15, 1936,] on the basis of the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law made and filed by the court in the record of this case, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that a permanent injunction shall issue forthwith enjoining and prohibiting the following specific acts, to-wit:

1. The defendants above named, their officers, organizers and agents, and all members of said Local Unions No. 898 and No. 211 are hereby restrained and enjoined from continuing any combination to prevent by threats of a strike, or by menace, force or display of force, the complainants above named, who have already been discharged on the demand of certain defendants, from obtaining reinstatement to their respective positions with their employer, the Susquehanna Collieries Company.

2. The defendants above named, their officers, organizers and agents, and all members of said Local Unions No. 898 and No. 211 are hereby restrained and enjoined from interfering by threats of a strike, menaces, force, display of force, or by putting the employees or the employer in fear of forced suspension of its operations, with the Susquehanna Collieries Company from continuing in its employment persons who are not members of said defendant Local Unions.

3. The defendants above named, their officers, organizers and agents, and all members of said Local Unions No. 898 and No. 211 are hereby restrained and enjoined by any of the methods or means aforesaid from interfering with or preventing men who are not members of said Local Unions, who may hereafter desire to enter the employ of the said Susquehanna Collieries Company, from securing such employment.

4. The defendants above named, their officers, organizers and agents, and all members of said Local Unions No. 898 and No. 211 are hereby restrained and enjoined from entering into, forming or continuing any combination for the purpose of using any intimidation, threats of a strike or violence against the complainants while seeking or following their occupations or for the purpose of forcing or coercing the Susquehanna Collieries Company to discharge the complainants or others similarly situated.

5. The defendants above named, their officers, organizers and agents, and all members of said Local Unions No. 898 and No. 211, are hereby restrained and enjoined from interfering with the officers of the Susquehanna Collieries Company or with the employees by way of threats, personal violence, intimidation, epithets or ridicule, and from congregating or loitering about or near the premises of the said Susquehanna Collieries Company, or at any other place, for the purpose of interfering with the employees of said Company by any of the means aforesaid.

It is further ordered that said permanent injunction shall be in force and binding upon all defendants hereinbefore named, their officers, organizers, associates and confederates, as well as those in active concert and in participation with them and upon all other persons whomsoever, who are not named therein, from and after the time when such persons shall, by personal service or otherwise, have knowledge or receive notice of the issuance of this permanent injunction.

DECREE NISI

Accordingly, now, July 15th, 1936, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed: —

1. That the temporary injunction heretofore issued in this cause be made permanent and that the New Amsterdam Surety Company, the surety upon the bond when said temporary injunction was issued, be released from further liability thereon.

2. That damages be awarded in favor of Arthur Jenkins for $475.81; in favor of Joseph McDermott for $401.41; in favor of Henry Mische for $573.27; in favor of Theodore Stultz for $336.02; in favor of Einar Lagerholm for $786.32; in favor of Charles Jones for $780.09; in favor of Stanley Maylock for $386.13; in favor of Fred Holbrook for $427.77; and in favor of Goodwin Jones for $262.96 against the defendants, Frank Kaminski, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and John Peasecki, Andrew Piontkowski, Joseph Golembrewski and John Kashinsky, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union No. 898, and Charles Buber, chairman of the Grievance Committee, and Andrew Modla, and "Cappy" Gorchetski, members of the Grievance Committee, as members and officers of said Local Union No. 211, together with additional damages for delay, in the amount of six per cent from the date of discharge.

3. That the cost of this proceeding be paid by the said defendants.

BY THE COURT

JONES, J.

. . . . . .

FINAL DECREE

To the above Bill in Equity on the part of former employees of the Susquehanna Collieries Company, against two local unions, branches of District No. 1, United Mine Workers of America, and said District and their officers and members of the Grievance Committees and others, the court made an adjudication awarding a [permanent] injunction restraining and enjoining defendants from combining to prevent complainants from obtaining reinstatements in their respective employments with the Susquehanna Collieries Company, and from using any intimidation, threats of a strike or violence, against complainants while following their occupations or from coercing the Collieries Company to discharge them; also from congregating or loitering about the premises of the Collieries Company for the purpose of interfering with complainants, and awarding plaintiffs damages against certain of defendant members and officers of the Grievance Committee of both Locals, to which adjudication plaintiffs and defendants have filed exceptions.

The plaintiffs complain that the Local Unions Nos. 898 and 211, as well as District No. 1 of the United Mine Workers, should be included among those answerable in damages to the plaintiffs, as well as President John Boylan and Board Member John T. Kmetz, defendants of record, and Frank Shifka, an International Board Member, and requesting that their requests for conclusions of law covering these points should now be granted, as well as their requests for specific findings of fact to support their conclusions of law.

The defendants have filed numerous exceptions to the Chancellor's conclusions of fact and law and final decree; we have examined these exceptions carefully, considering this case to be especially important, involving the rights of employer and employees engaged in the outstanding industry in this community, and we repeat the suggestion we made in our adjudication that to continue this litigation will not promote the moral and physical welfare of the members of the Union, but provoke, antagonize and injure the usefulness of employer, employee and union.

Our adjudication is unusually lengthy, covering twenty-two pages of typewritten matter, containing 28 conclusions of fact and lengthy discussion of the facts and the law.

We can add nothing to what we have already said, believing that the adjudication covers all the exceptions and we, therefore, dismiss the exceptions of plaintiffs and the defendants and make the decree nisi now final.

BY THE COURT,

JONES, J.

Defendants appealed.

Error assigned, among others, related to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the chancellor.

Roger J. Dever, with him J.Q. Creveling, Joseph E. Fleitz and John A. Gallagher, for appellants.

E.C. Marianelli, with him James M. Stack, for appellees.

Argued May 5, 1937.

PER CURIAM, July 15, 1937.

This appeal was certified to this Court by the Supreme Court. The questions raised are, (1) whether the evidence in the record supports the findings of fact made by the Chancellor and approved by the court in banc; (2) whether the findings of fact sustain the conclusions of law and the final decree.

We have carefully read the testimony and are of opinion that the evidence in the record is sufficient to support all of the findings of fact of the learned chancellor except (1) the twelfth, (2) the twenty-fifth, in so far as it differs from or adds to the tenth, and (3) the last ten words of the twenty-sixth, "on account of plaintiffs' refusal to join the defendants' organization," for which should be substituted "on account of plaintiffs' membership in the new union, United Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania"; and (4) the words `and Goodwin Jones' should be eliminated from the 8th finding. It is also sufficient to support the facts as recited in the discussion of the chancellor, except (1) so much of the second paragraph on page 320a, as follows after "The difficulty arises from dissension among the members of the United Mine Workers of America. Complainants, with others, withdrew and organized a new union, called the United Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania." The facts, as they appear in the rest of this paragraph, may have been correctly stated, but they do not so appear in the record before us, to which we are limited. (2) The third paragraph on page 321a is also too broadly stated. The sentence beginning "The new union" etc. should read "The new union has since been abandoned and most of its members have returned to the fold," for it is not contended that the plaintiffs have again become members of the old union. (3) The last ten words in the first paragraph on page 325a — "on account of plaintiffs' refusal to join the old union" is not supported by the testimony, and the words, "on account of plaintiffs' membership in the new union, United Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania" should be substituted, to correspond with the modified 26th finding of fact. (4) The word `enforce' in the second line of the second paragraph on page 325a should be `force.'

The testimony and the facts found, as above, support all the conclusions of law except the fourth, which, in the state of this record, is inapplicable.

These changes make no material difference in the result. They do not affect the main findings of fact of the Chancellor, approved by the court in banc, or the conclusions of law resulting from them, on which the decree appealed from rests.

While the present litigation may have grown out of dissension among members of the United Mine Workers of America it is not a dispute within the order and hence is not ruled by the decisions relating to internal troubles within a society. These plaintiffs left the old union before the present difficulty began. Whether they had just cause for complaint within the order is not a question before us. They had the legal right to leave the order and they did so, and the acts complained of in this bill followed in the wake of their leaving.

Nor is it material that no technical `strike' was called by defendants. The plaintiffs were discharged from employment by the coal company employer, although the latter had no fault to find with their work, solely on demand of the defendants, who refused to work with them, accompanied by unlawful threats and acts of violence.

The seventh and eighth assignments of error are sustained to the extent indicated in this opinion. The remaining assignments are overruled. The decree is affirmed on the adjudication, findings and conclusions of the court below as modified herein.¹ Costs to be paid by appellants.

1 The modifications appear in brackets in the adjudication, etc. of the court below as printed in the reporter's statement.