Based on expert testimony that the anesthesiologist positions and cushions the patient's arm to avoid nerve compression injury during surgery, Mireles requested the trial court to describe the injury-causing occurrence that was within the exclusive control or management of the anesthesiologist as "inadequate protection of plaintiff's extremities during anesthesia." Because of alleged error in the statement of this element of the doctrine, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur as requested by Mireles. Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 827 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1992). We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Res ipsa loquitur is a method of proving negligence by inference and is not a substantive tort. Strong v. Shaw, 1980-NMCA-171 ¶ 10, 629 P.2d 784. "In New Mexico, [ ] res ipsa loquitur is simply 'a rule of evidence.'" Mireles v. Broderick, 1992-NMCA-011 ¶ 6, 827 P.2d 847, rev'd on other grounds, 1994-NMSC-041, 872 P.2d 863 (quoting Strong v. Shaw, 1980-NMCA-171 ¶ 10). Because res ipsa loquitur is not a substantive tort, the Court will dismiss the claims with prejudice.

Strong v. Shaw, 1980-NMCA-171 ¶ 10, 629 P.2d 784. "In New Mexico, [ ] res ipsa loquitur is simply 'a rule of evidence.'" Mireles v. Broderick, 1992-NMCA-011 ¶ 6, 827 P.2d 847, rev'd on other grounds, 1994-NMSC-041, 872 P.2d 863 (quoting Strong v. Shaw, 1980-NMCA-171 ¶ 10). Because res ipsa loquitur is not a substantive tort, the Court will dismiss the claims with prejudice.

Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M. 281, 283 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 543 (1981). In Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 461 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 117 N.M. 445 (1994), the New Mexico Court of Appeals explained: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has performed various functions.

A special instruction highlighting one link in any chain is not necessary. See UJI 13-305 (defining proximate cause); cf. Armstrong v. Industrial Elec. Equip. Serv., 97 N.M. 272, 275, 639 P.2d 81, 84 (Ct.App. 1981) (instructions given on proximate cause, in combination with the directives in the special interrogatories, were sufficient to adequately apprise the jury as to the definition of proximate cause); Cf. Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 461-62, 827 P.2d 847, 849-50 (Ct.App. 1992) (party relying on circumstantial evidence is not ordinarily entitled to instructions specifically describing chain of inference upon which party relies). {70} Further, the trial court gave UJI 13-306 NMRA 1998, defining an independent intervening cause.