Miranda v. State

Full title: JUAN MIRANDA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District, Houston

Date published: Mar 10, 2009

No. 14-08-00621-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 10, 2009)

Opinion

No. 14-08-00621-CR

Memorandum Opinion filed March 10, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 7th District Court, Smith County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 007-0856-07.

Panel consists of Justices FROST, BROWN, and BOYCE.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM J. BOYCE, Justice.

Appellant Juan Miranda challenges his conviction for aggravated assault using a deadly weapon. The jury sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of two prior convictions during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. We affirm.

Background

In the early morning hours of November 15, 2006, appellant and the complainant, Jose Villegas, were involved in an altercation with motor vehicles. At the time of the offense, appellant was married to Alicia Galdendez; while she was married to appellant, Alicia had a relationship with the complainant. Alicia had three children; appellant was the father of the oldest two children, and the complainant fathered the third child. Alicia became pregnant with the complainant's child while she was still married to appellant. Appellant's and the complainant's versions of the altercation differed substantially. The complainant testified that on November 14, 2006, he and Alicia went to his mother's house, and eventually fell asleep. At approximately 4:00 in the morning, they left her mother's house so he could take Alicia to her sister's house on his way to work. As they were driving toward Alicia's sister's house on Old Henderson Highway, they saw appellant parked in a white pick-up truck at a service station on Highway 31 and "the Loop." As they passed the truck, appellant pulled away from the service station and followed the complainant's car. Appellant sped up, passed the complainant's car, moved in front of the complainant, and abruptly stopped his truck. The complainant avoided a collision by stopping abruptly. When both vehicles were stopped, appellant shifted into reverse and backed into the complainant's car. The complainant stepped out of his car, questioned what appellant was doing, and ran away from the vehicles. Appellant pursued the complainant in his truck until the complainant ran toward the cover of some nearby trees. Appellant left the scene, but the complainant remained until the police arrived. Gerald McDowell, a security guard working in the area testified that he saw a white pick-up truck pass another vehicle, move in front of the vehicle, and stop abruptly. The truck backed up, and it appeared the truck struck an object. He approached the scene and observed skid marks where the truck had passed the car and where the truck had stopped. The driver of the truck sped away, returned to the scene, and circled the car at a high rate of speed. McDowell called the Tyler Police Department who responded to the scene. Appellant testified that on the morning of November 15, 2006, he awoke at approximately 2:30 or 3:00 in the morning and discovered that his wife was not at home. He asked a neighbor to watch his sleeping children while he left to look for her. As he drove toward Tyler on Highway 31, he saw the complainant's car traveling south on the Loop toward Old Henderson Highway. The complainant's car was behind appellant's truck, and the complainant sped up and "bumped" appellant's truck. Appellant stopped to turn into a driveway, backed out of the driveway, and collided with appellant's car. The complainant stepped out of his car and ran toward appellant's truck. Appellant drove into a ditch to avoid the complainant. As soon as he cleared the ditch, appellant drove home while calling the police. Appellant asked the police to follow him to his home because he was afraid the complainant and Alicia were going to harm his children. Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle. In a single issue on appeal, he argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of two prior misdemeanor convictions during the guilt-innocence phase. The convictions were admitted after appellant "opened the door" to prior convictions during the cross-examination of the complainant. During the cross-examination of the complainant, counsel for appellant, referring to Alicia's third child, asked:

Q. When, actually, did you find out when the baby was born?

A. I found out when she was in the hospital, because we were having legal stuff going in court. And so I called in here to find out dates and she told me — they told me that she wouldn't be able to make it to court; that she was in the hospital. That's when I found out that she was in the hospital.

* * * * *

Q. What do you mean a court proceeding?

A. We had a case with [appellant] right there, so I was calling to check when I was going to come to court. And since Alicia was a witness, they told me she was not going to be able to make it because she was in the hospital.

Later, counsel for appellant questioned the complainant on his choice of route on the night of the offense:

Q. Wouldn't it have been easier or less confrontational to simply take her home on Oxford Street?

A. Confrontation? I already had gone through issues with this man. And confrontation — he's just — I mean, he don't — he tries to hurt you. So that's the reason to try to avoid him. So confrontation with this man, no.

On re-direct examination, the State attempted to ask the complainant about appellant's two prior misdemeanor convictions in which appellant pleaded guilty to assault on the complainant and damage to the complainant's vehicle. The State argued that appellant opened the door to the admission of the prior convictions during the cross-examination of the complainant. Appellant objected that the evidence of prior misdemeanor convictions was being offered to show conformity with past conduct and that the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions outweighed their probative value. The trial court overruled appellant's objections and admitted evidence that on February 28, 2006, appellant pleaded guilty to assault and criminal mischief, which occurred on January 30, 2005. The offenses occurred in connection with an assault on the complainant with a vehicle. On appeal, appellant does not challenge the relevance of the evidence, but argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objection pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 403.

Standard of Review

We review the trial court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. See Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court's action; rather, it is a question of whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990).

Analysis

Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." TEX. R. EVID. 403. Relevant evidence alone does not ensure admissibility. "The issue is whether the search for the truth will be helped or hindered by the interjection of distracting, confusing, or emotionally charged evidence." Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (quoting J. McLaughlin, et.al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 403.02(1)(a) at 403-06. (2006 rev.)). A proper Rule 403 analysis includes, but is not limited to, the following factors: (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered evidence; (2) the proponent's need for that evidence; (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis; (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues; (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence; and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641-42.

Probative Force

In addressing the relevant factors, we note that probative value refers to the inherent probative force of an item of evidence, i.e., how strongly it serves to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation. See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). The evidence in this case boiled down to the conflicting testimony of appellant and the complainant. In cross-examining the complainant, appellant questioned the complainant's behavior and choice of route. The trial court reasonably could have concluded that the probative force of the evidence and the State's need for the evidence was to explain the complainant's fear of appellant at the time of the offense.

Confusion of the Issues

As to the tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, the trial court could have concluded that the evidence of appellant's prior convictions did not confuse or distract the jury in that the State briefly addressed the prior convictions and did not reveal details of the offenses. Evidence of appellant's prior convictions did not divert the attention of the jury from the indicted offense in such a way as to cause unfair prejudice.

Undue Delay and Presentation of Cumulative Evidence

The State presented evidence of appellant's prior conviction during the redirect examination of the complainant through the introduction of the judgments in the prior convictions. The State merely recited the offenses to which appellant pleaded guilty and the punishment assessed for each offense. During cross-examination of appellant, the State asked him if he remembered pleading guilty to the offenses. Appellant stated he did not remember and the State's attorney spent a few minutes refreshing appellant's recollection. The presentation of the evidence did not consume an inordinate amount of time, nor was it cumulative of other evidence. Measuring the trial court's ruling against the relevant criteria by which a Rule 403 decision is made, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior convictions. Appellant's issue is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.